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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is a geographic and environmental history of Soviet state building that 
examines how the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic was made. In the mid-1920s, the USSR 
created republics in Central Asia that endure today as nation states. Tajikistan, however, lay on 
land that is almost entirely mountainous, where there was no physical legacy of modern 
economy. To build socialism here, the regime needed to import capital, people, and animals 
along with plans and ideals. This, in turn, required the establishment of transportation and 
commodity chains. These material implications of political and cultural projects are routinely left 
out of histories of Soviet power. My work instead illuminates the material and economic 
operations that fueled and sometimes confounded socialism, and connects them to global 
patterns of economic growth. 
The dissertation draws on archival and library sources from Dushanbe, Moscow, and 
North America to make three major scholarly contributions. First, my focus on tangible context 
and the hows of region-making puts political, social, and economic factors into conversation 
where they converged on the physical connections of state building that were literally 
transnational. Doing so bridges usual separations of sectors and geographies that are 
characteristic in histories of the early USSR. It furthermore contests conventional portrayals of 
Central Asia as an indistinct yet enormous cotton colony by highlighting the built and 
environmental conditions that made Tajikistan’s Soviet experience unique. Drawing on human 
geography and landscape studies, I show that the construction of the first railroads and highways 
in Tajikistan was a distinctive form of Soviet state-building and nation-making. Second, I 
comment on the nature of Stalinism. This eponymous period is known for the centralization of 
power and planning in Moscow and the violent promotion of a modern, industrial society. My 
study of the operations of material economy in commodity chains spanning the USSR shows that 
real economic life was under-planned, and characterized by decentralized authority. In 
Tajikistan, utopian visions of technological prowess were implemented mainly by horses, 
camels, and human hands, often challenged by the rugged physical environment. Third, I 
compare Stalin-era enterprises in Tajikistan to other instances of postcolonial economic growth. I 
find that insights from global patterns of infrastructure and commodity chain management can 
help ascribe concrete causes, effects, and chronologies to mobilizational projects across the 
USSR. I also argue that this unfamiliar case of “international development” offers opportunities 
for new understandings from beyond the Euro-American imperial world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the Soviet Union established the Republic of Tajikistan in 1924, it embarked on a 
comprehensive state building project. The territory would be the new, titular home of the Central 
Asian peoples identified as belonging to the Tajik nation. Socialist authorities created its borders 
through a process known as the national territorial delimitation of Central Asia, which also 
founded three other lands that endure today as nation states. In doing so, the revolutionary 
regime enacted a radical state building process that was unprecedented in global history. It was 
aggressively and explicitly anti-colonial, and designed to empower the native peoples of this 
formerly Imperial Russian territory. It created states for borders and nations that had never 
existed before; it did so with the official intention of developing Marxist utopia. 
This dissertation explores the material implications of this process for Tajikistan. The 
republic’s terrain is almost entirely mountainous and had never before hosted a car, train, or any 
industrial facility. To build socialism on this territory, with no physical legacy of modern 
economy, the regime needed to import commodities, people, and animals along with plans and 
ideals. This in turn required the establishment of transportation and commodity chains. Such 
physical ramifications of political and cultural projects are routinely left out of histories of Soviet 
authority. My focus on the tangible considers how the power examined by studies of discourse 
was experienced by agents of economy; it explores how power was projected, limited, or 
refracted by structures, objects, and relationships that shaped the direction, speed, location, and 
quality of daily actions characterizing the existence of the state. I illuminate the operations that 
drove socialism in Tajikistan, and I relate them to Soviet and global patterns of state building.  
This dissertation’s analysis of materiality leads me to engage in several historical fields—
environment, economic life, mobility—that are underexplored in the scholarly literature. I 
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establish the importance of transportation infrastructure and logistics in Soviet history, engage 
the USSR as a land embodying transnational physical relationships, and highlight some of 
Tajikistan’s distinctions among Central Asian republics. 
The creation of Tajikistan and other Soviet national territories was the result of a 
complicated process that drew on a peculiar form of state-led national self-determination. The 
Bolshevik Party, and then the government it formed after the October Revolution of 1917, had 
promoted the principle of national self-governance by the peoples who inhabited the lands of the 
former Russian Empire. Empowering the formerly oppressed was a core principle of the state’s 
anti-capitalist and anti-colonial policies, as well as of its bid to spread revolution worldwide. 
Such apparent “affirmative action,” as Terry Martin most famously calls it, also played a key 
role in legitimizing the ideology of the new regime in the former tsarist realm.1 Marxist theory 
had posited that a communist uprising would first occur in countries where capitalism was most 
highly developed because corresponding development of the consciousness of exploited 
industrial laborers would lead its members to rise up against the upper classes. Among the 
requisite changes in consciousness was that of popular identification with a national group, a 
widespread European political phenomenon of the nineteenth century. The Bolsheviks, led by 
Vladimir Lenin, appropriated this philosophy for Russian circumstances by altering its 
prescriptive teleology. Marxism-Leninism provided them with the philosophical justification for 
their smaller uprising, led by a “revolutionary vanguard” against the regime of Tsar Nicholas II, 
prior to industrialization on Western European levels and related changes in popular 
consciousness. The Bolsheviks believed that Communist utopia could be achieved after such an 
                                                
1 See Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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uprising if the revolutionary regime actively worked, through education and social 
empowerment, to accelerate the changing consciousness of the residents in the land it served. 
Such a view also applied to the obligatory historical stage of popular identification with a nation.  
This is the ideological reason why the Soviet state engaged the diverse population of the 
former tsarist empire by promoting and defining nations and national identities through cultural 
and geographic programs. The regime standardized languages, and developed literatures, 
clothing traditions, and other symbols of national culture. The USSR also encouraged or 
obligated the members of each group to live in close proximity to one another, providing them 
with designated national spaces and forms of self-governance. The size of territory and self-
determining capacity differed in degree by group, depending on its size and other factors of 
negotiation. So, some groups were accorded their own Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), others 
“autonomous republics” (ASSRs) within republics, and most received some smaller form of 
recognition as minorities within larger regions, where governments were supposed to provide 
proportional national representation. Within such criteria, the Tajik nation qualified for its own 
territory. Tajikistan was created as an ASSR within the Uzbek SSR, and then transitioned to the 
full, stand-alone status of an SSR—the Tajik SSR—in late 1929.2 
Thus, nationalities policy played a leading role in shaping Soviet geographies, institutional 
structures, relationships, and regional demographics. From the perspective of Central Asia, 
however, these politics did not account for how the state was established—only for the fact that it 
was, and for some of the reasons why. In this region, nationalities policy is a poor fit for 
                                                
2 The proceedings and mechanisms of these deliberations are not yet explained well in the historiography. See Arne 
Haugen, The Establishment of the National Republics in Soviet Central Asia (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); and Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities of the Soviet Union: From 
Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1991). 
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explaining state formation, since there is little evidence for the existence of strong ethnic 
identities or movements prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, unlike in the rest of the USSR.3 
Nevertheless, scholars tend to assume that Central Asia’s experiences conform to the dominant 
narratives and processes identified in the broader literature on the Soviet Union, and especially 
that of socialist Russia. This body of work prioritizes the discourses and politics of nationalist 
projects as the drivers of state building. It emphasizes state-led modernization of identity, 
typically as a form of imperial imposition of newly coded cultures, or as a result of residents in 
the newly delimited homelands appropriating new selfhoods. These factors lead Francine Hirsch 
to assert that “no issue was more central to the formation of the Soviet Union than the nationality 
question."4  But the virtual absence of studies of institutions in the Central Asian SSRs leaves 
only a muddled picture of how the state behind nationalities policy operated daily to establish 
and then sustain itself.5  
This dissertation examines the how of state building beyond policy by addressing 
economy; specifically, it analyzes the monumental physical exercises that promoted the 
existence of the national republic and community of Tajikistan. Soviet planners wanted it and 
other republics of Central Asia to contribute to the Union through cotton production. The 
historiography of the USSR, however, comprises few histories of the Central Asian economy. 
Several studies discuss its establishment through analysis of wider cultural and political 
                                                
3 Adeeb Khalid qualifies such an understanding by arguing that the Jadid intellectuals of Russian Central Asia 
conceived of a broad confessional form of nationalism in their modernization project. See Adeeb Khalid, Making 
Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 13-18. 
4 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge And The Making of the Soviet Nation (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 5. 
5 The few include, for example, Shoshana Keller, “The Central Asian Bureau: An Essential Tool in Governing 
Soviet Turkestan,” Central Asian Survey 22, no. 2-3 (2003): 281-97. 
  
5 
projects.6 With some exceptions, though, a prevailing focus on central authorities’ dominance has 
resulted in a continuing characterization of economic experiences as homogenous with others 
throughout the Soviet Union.7 As a result, the distinctiveness of individual republics of Central 
Asia is obscured through replication of the Soviet government’s view that they together 
comprised a region with significant potential in cotton sector development.8  I will show that the 
particularities of the Tajik SSR’s participation in this broader agro-industrial sector distinguish it 
from neighboring territories. It is true that the major programs initiated in the mid-1920s for 
developing agriculture in fertile valleys of Tajikistan’s southern regions were just part of a larger 
set of similar projects across Soviet Central Asia.9 Tajikistan, however, faced material and 
institutional scarcity that was unique: it imported not only instructions, tasks, and financing, but 
also virtually all of the commodities needed for economic growth projects—from food, seeds, 
sand, and timber to trucks and excavators needed in economic growth and cotton cultivation—
                                                
6 See, for example, Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004); Hirsch, Empire of Nations; and Alexander Garland Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-
1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). 
7 Examples of scholarship that emphasizes regional particularities of economic life in Soviet Central Asia include: 
Sergei Abashin, Sovetskii kishlak: Mezhdu kolonializmom i modernizatsiei (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe 
Obozrenie, 2015); Maya Karin Peterson, “Technologies of Rule: Empire, Water, and the Modernization of Central 
Asia, 1867-1941” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2011); and Christian Teichmann, “Canals, Cotton, and the Limits 
of De-colonization in Soviet Uzbekistan, 1924-1941,” Central Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (December 2007): 499-519. 
More general works that are focused on contemporary economies of Central Asia sometimes provide useful 
background that emphasizes the distinctiveness of the region or its individual republics in the USSR. See for 
example Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East: A Communist Model for Development (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967); and Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
8 See, for example, Ian Murray Matley, “Agricultural Development (1865-1963),” in Central Asia: 130 Years of 
Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview, ed. Edward Allworth, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 266-
308.  In fact, scholars discussing “Central Asia” traditionally have done so by reference to “Uzbekistan,” the actual 
object of their analysis. See, for example, Terese S. Zimmer, “Regional Input into Centralized Economic Planning: 
The Case of Soviet Central Asia,” Policy Sciences 18, no. 2 (September 1985): 111-26. 
9 See Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History (Canberra: Australia 
National University E-Press, 2013), 67. 
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primarily from Russia.10 The actions involved in obtaining this capital, and using it to alter the 
physical legacy of Tajikistan’s terrain to found a Soviet economy persisted throughout the 1930s. 
From this material perspective, the narrative of the Tajik SSR’s history is out of sync with 
major familiar timelines of the early USSR. In matters related to economy, scholars still promote 
the view that the first five-year plan (1928-32) inaugurated a so-called command system that 
endured until at least the mid-1950s. In this scheme, economic decision making was 
concentrated in the executive institutions of the USSR, and ultimately in Moscow, where upper-
level officials disseminated plans setting production targets for every organization, prescribing 
operations and the ways that goals would be met.11 This shift is conceived as part of a larger 
reorganization of Soviet institutions in the 1930s, which founded practices and dispositions that 
came to be collectively associated with the great leader’s name as “Stalinism.”  In general, this 
meant the centralization of power and planning in Moscow, the violent promotion of a modern 
society, and forced, massive social upheaval caused by economic growth projects.12 I will argue 
that Tajikistan’s experience of this period of Soviet history does not align with these broad stroke 
characterizations. As I will show, a massive overhaul of this kind in political and economic 
sectors was simply impossible because the state was preoccupied with creating them. In 
                                                
10 On this, see, for example, “Summary Report on Construction in the Tajik ASSR, by Construction Agency, in 
October 1929,” Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv respubliki 
Tadzhikistan; hereafter TsGART), f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), ll. 53-60 (full document); M. Asimov, Tadzhikskaia 
sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika (Dushanbe: Glavnaia nauchnaia redaktsiia Tadzhikskoi sovetskoi 
entsiklopedii, 1984), 109; and S. Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo i razvitie transporta v Tadzhikistane, 1917-
1941 gg. (Dushanbe: Izdatel’stvo “Donish,” 1979), 6. 
11 See, for example, James R. Millar, The ABCs of Soviet Socialism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 21-
35; and Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 214-
17, 267-71. 
12 See, for example, Robert C. Tucker, “Introduction: Stalinism and Comparative Communism,” in Stalinism: Essays 
in Historical Interpretation, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1979), xi-xx; and 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. 
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Tajikistan, moreover, building rather than altering legacy was characterized by unplanned 
activities, and decentralized authority. 
This does not mean that Tajikistan’s experience was necessarily exceptional in the USSR. 
Rather, my uncommon emphasis on the material aspects of economic life leads to questions 
about and considerations of state and relationships across regions that are less explored. The 
historiography of the Soviet Union tends to rely on a Weberian definition of the state. This entity 
is a ruling or political organization monopolizing legitimate physical coercion within a particular 
space. As John A. Hall points out, however, “one must stress that Weber’s definition is as much 
about pretension as reality” since monopoly on coercion is usually (but not always) an 
aspiration.13 The lack of diversity in scholarly analysis of Soviet statehood may be related to 
broader scholarly trends of the recent past that hold close to Weber’s concept.14 The dominant 
theoretical approaches of thought of the last half-century—Marxism, modernization theory, 
neoliberalism—do not make concrete efforts to define the state, and claim that it is declining.15 
There is general agreement that states occupy particular spaces, where they control territories, 
institutions, bureaucracies, monopolies on or access to various or all forms of coercion and 
surveillance, legal authority and legitimacy—all of which may be drawn upon to express or exert 
power.16 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet state was changing at a bewildering pace. Economic 
                                                
13 John A. Hall, “Varieties of State Experience,” in The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State, ed. 
Stephan Leibfried et al., (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2015) pdf of online version accessed 29 
January 2016 through the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) Library Catalog, 1-2. 
14 See, for example, Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and 
European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990). 
15 Jonah D. Levy et al., “Changing Perspectives on the State,” The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the 
State, ed. Stephan Leibfried et al., (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2015) pdf of online version accessed 
29 January 2016 through the UIUC Library website, 1-2. 
16 See, for example, Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 5. 
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policies alone changed significantly at least four times in the first fifteen years after the 
Bolshevik Revolution. And, as in Tajikistan, many regions across the USSR were undergoing 
wholesale change of their material conditions for the purpose of strengthening the state through 
economic growth. The creation of the Magnitogorsk iron and steel complex of of the Ural 
Mountains and the Turkstano-Siberian Railroad network through Kazakhstan, for example, 
involved mobilization of large populations and capital on an unprecedented scale.17 The daily 
activities that made this possible, like those in any period of social upheaval in global history, 
were characterized by ambiguity, contradiction, and contingency.18 
Tajikistan was, however, well-suited to reframing questions about the Soviet state because 
of its physical environment. The absence of a material legacy of modern government or 
economy, as I have stated, makes prevailing frameworks for discussing statehood ill-suited to the 
decades addressed in this dissertation. The continuation of Tajikistan’s dependency into the 
recent past, similar to other post-colonial global contexts, leads some self-described studies of 
state to circumvent any clear working definition at all.19 Such works tend to emphasize apparent 
symptoms of state weakness that rely on models of stability. The undeniable material changes 
that manifested Soviet statehood in Tajikistan correspond better to less traditional frameworks 
that see the state as something continuously changing.20 States transform themselves constantly 
                                                
17 See, Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995); and Matthew J. Payne, Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Stalinism (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2001). 
18 See, for example, Jeremy Adelman, Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the 
Atlantic World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
19 See, for example, John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig, “Introduction: The Source of Statehood in Tajikistan,” 
in special issue, ed. John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig, Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 5-19; and 
Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young, eds., Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in 
Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
20 See, for example, George Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 8-9. 
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to accommodate perpetual change in the circumstances and locations within their purview. In 
early Tajikistan, change could be observed because the entire republic’s territory and relationship 
to the world was altered by an entirely new built environment.  
I argue that the Soviet state forming in 1920s and 1930s Tajikistan was defined by the 
material conditions that it concurrently accommodated and intentionally transformed to create a 
particular space. My concern with the geographic history of how southern Central Asian lands 
became Soviet places attends to questions of how and when those spaces changed.21 Allan Pred 
observes that while a designated space may be conceptually produced (“socially produced,” in 
his words), the character of the place is dependent and contingent upon the material geography of 
power relations. His generalist claim is well-suited to Tajikistan: 
The production of space and place is both the medium and the outcome of human agency 
and social relations, and it occurs in conjunction with the making of histories. (The 
production of space and place by definition involves the construction of an unevenly 
developed built environment, the shaping of landscape and land use-patterns, the 
appropriation and transformation of nature, the organization and use of specialized 
locations for the conduct of economic, cultural and social practices, the generation of 
patterns of movement and interdependence between such localized activities, and the 
formation of symbolically laden, meaning-filled, ideology-projecting sites and areas).22 
I argue that that the introduction of land transportation and commodity chains gave material form 
to the administrative creation of the Tajik ASSR in 1924 through ongoing negotiation with the 
native terrain. Built environment was a central aspiration and medium of place-making 
                                                
21 On space and place as concerns of geographic history, see Alan R. H. Baker, Geography and History (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 62. On the importance of mobility studies to understanding social 
dynamics and place-making in Central Asia, see Madeleine Reeves, ed., Movement, Power and Place in Central 
Asia and Beyond: Contested Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2012), especially 1-12; and Till Mostowlansky, “The 
Road Not Taken: Enabling and Limiting Mobility in the Eastern Pamirs,” Internationales Asienforum 45, no. 1-2 
(2014): 153-170. 
22 Allan Richard Pred, Making Histories and Constructing Human Geographies: The Local Transformation of 
Practice, Power Relations, and Consciousness (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 10. 
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envisioned as the foundation for constellations of other activities. To this extent, my analysis of 
the physical allows me, as Bruno Latour has observed, to engage uncertainty in early Soviet 
history that is less bound by political and cultural discourse.23 The completedness of desired 
physical objects, contexts, and relationships corresponded to the degree of socialism’s 
contingency in the republic. This emphasis on the material is also what distinguishes my 
approach from Actor-Network Theory, where networks and relationality are foregrounded in the 
creation of spaces.24 This dissertation is more concerned with how the desires of Soviet state 
officials in Tajikistan could be altered by material conditions. 
The paucity in the republic of a built environment and other antecedents of the sort with 
which the USSR wished to define and sustain itself meant that authorities literally needed to 
import the state, in the form of commodities, people, and animals.25 This dissertation’s 
examination of this process contributes to a spatial turn underway among studies of Russia and 
the USSR. These include works that seek to correlate state ambitions with the vast size of its 
territory.26 Robert Argenbright, for example, demonstrates that Soviet governance and state 
building was from the earliest years of the regime characterized by tension between the growing 
control of Moscow-based authorities and their proxies in localities. In the case of Bolshevik 
activists who traveled throughout far-flung regions of the former Russian empire, their work 
                                                
23 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 10-11, 60-71, 76.  
24 John Wylie, Landscape (New York: Routledge, 2007), 201. 
25 On shortages and the unequal distribution across regions and sectors, see Chapter 2: “Soviet Locational Objectives 
and Problems,” in Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1957).  
26 Mark Bassin et al., “Russian Space,” introduction in Space, Place, and Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the 
New Spatial History, ed. Mark Bassin et al. (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 3-19. 
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amounted to “efforts to transform places on the periphery of the regime’s power, a process of 
spatial colonization, i.e., the effort to make real places resemble imagined space.”27 
I engage the tenuousness of the state in Tajikistan by focusing on southern regions, which 
I show were often or partly representative of larger problems of change in the larger republic and 
across the USSR. I define southern Tajikistan loosely, though conventionally, as those parts of 
Tajikistan that are at, or south of, the latitude of Dushanbe in today’s Districts of Republican 
Subordination, and Khatlon province. The analysis here is not restricted to that region only, 
sometimes venturing beyond those vague borders—sometimes as far as western Russia. I take 
the view that southern Tajikistan is not restricted to the abstract place-making of its space—i.e., 
in terms of intent and perception. Rather, I see the region as a product of its connections to other 
places. From the perspective of Soviet state building, southern Tajikistan of the late 1930s was a 
product of material links formed by economy and mobility shared with other regions of the 
USSR developed over two decades.28 
I engage the contingency and potential for transformation of these material factors by 
analyzing projects that produced them, and their everyday circumstances. The Soviet state in and 
of Tajikistan was the product of specific, purposeful constellations of activities. Project 
encompasses the variety of influential, sometimes loosely related factors associated with 
infrastructure construction and logistics or mobility management by invoking operational limits. 
Paul Greenough and Anna Tsing take this approach in order to overcome the difficulty of 
connecting effects of economic growth on social groups and environment.  For them, projects are 
"tight clusters of ideas and practices that appear as particular historical undertakings...practical 
                                                
27 Robert Argenbright, “Soviet Agitational Vehicles: Bolsheviks in Strange Places,” in eds. Bassin et al., 144-45. 
28 On region-making, see Baker, Geography and History, 184, 191. 
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arrangements.”29 The concept dynamically connects policies, institutions, and individuals with 
its social and natural environmental challenges and manifestations. 
The standpoint of projects provides flexibility for considering impact of related factors 
less commonly seen as involved with state activities. Operations related to built environments 
can be important opportunities for considering intersections of abstraction and materiality 
because they are where state endeavors play out in relation to processes that are not informed by 
intentionality.30 Thomas G. Andrews refers to workscapes to describe settings where human 
labor negotiated environmental processes in the coal mines of southern Colorado. His term 
effectively captures the spatial complexity of enterprise and toil as “a constellation of unruly and 
ever-unfolding relationships—not simply land, but also air and water, bodies and organisms, as 
well as the language people use to understand the world...wherever people work, in short, the 
boundaries between nature and culture melt away.”31 In the mining workscapes of Fremont 
County, mules and mice both were intertwined in the life of labor as instruments and 
companions. Geology structured labor by creating limits on how miners could move and how 
productively they could work. Variation in the character of the earth created competition among 
laborers for worksites or compensation, for materials such as equipment and timber for pillars, 
and avoidance of danger and discomfort. These conditions forced companies accommodate 
workers, and to pay them higher tonnage rates than many regions.32 In Tajikistan, the 
mountainous terrain influenced the kind of transportation that was possible (often contrary to that 
                                                
29 Paul Greenough and Anna Tsing, eds., Nature in the Global South: Environmental Projects in South and 
Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 15. 
30 See Paul S. Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of American 
History 100, no. 1 (2013): 116-19. 
31 Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008), 123-25. 
32 Andrews, Killing for Coal, 136-40. 
  
13 
officially desired), it affected the tempo and form of freightage, and thereby affected the pace 
and scale of economic growth. Here, horses and camels formed the basis of the freightage 
economy, and required that the state develop modern resources for maintaining and growing the 
available animal resources. As Sarah Whatmore points out, referencing Latour, attention to 
hybrid natural and built environments alerts “us to a world of commotion in which the sites, 
tracks, and contours of social life are constantly in the making through networks of actants-in-
relation that are at once local and global, natural and cultural, and always more than human.”33 
The concept of project is one approach where the fields of geographic and environmental 
history overlap, facilitating my analysis of the physical relationships that comprised economic 
life in early Soviet Tajikistan as an environmental management state. Paul Sutter promotes 
“environmental management as a formative arena of state building, equivalent to social welfare 
and national security.” Projects within this category “‘see beyond the state’” to acknowledge the 
complicated interactions of many kinds of groups and institutions, as well as individuals across 
professions, and their ability to influence or be influenced in their relationship with the physical 
environment.34 In the rapidly transforming, contingent material and state context of Tajikistan, 
economic growth projects were first and foremost environmental management projects. The 
included diverse interests meant to cooperate in common cause. In the workscapes of southern 
Central Asia, however, organizational and individual hierarchies were unclear and sometimes 
unknown, so that the state was in fact composed of diverse groups of varying, competing, and 
temporary influence cooperating on projects. Such a view of the state has grown in scholarship 
                                                
33 Sarah Whatmore, “Hybrid Geographies: Rethinking the ‘Human’ in Human Geography,” in The Animals Reader: 
The Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings, ed. Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald (Oxford, England: Berg, 
2007), 344. 
34 Sutter, “The World with Us,” 100, 105. 
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as NGOs, transnational businesses, and other organizations have gained influence with 
globalization after the collapse of the USSR.35 Tania Murray Li calls for a concept (or 
reconceptualization) of the state in international development contexts that eschews traditional 
binaries over competitions for power. She sees “an array of authorities,” including NGOs, which 
reshape the actions of subjects who have varying degrees of freedom. The state in southern 
Tajikistan’s economic growth endeavors  conformed to Li’s definition: consisting of a range of 
institutions that influenced governance within particular territories through execution of 
projects.36 
Whereas this perspective differs in general from common visions of the Soviet state writ-
large, I also propose a peculiar view of the nature of its empire specifically. As an environmental 
managerial state, the USSR exerted its power in southern Central Asia within the limits of 
possibility imparted by the legacy of the native physical environment. The operations of this 
empire were characterized by authority diffused among different organizations, cooperating in 
varying degrees to complete economic growth projects through arrangements that were often ad 
hoc. As with any environmental history of problems and places that have mostly been addressed 
by other methodologies, my exploration of the dynamics and scale of the transformations the 
Soviet state conducted also contributes to a broader understanding of Soviet operations across its 
                                                
35 Jonah D. Levy et al., “Changing Perspectives on the State,” 6. Another body of work suggests that, from the 
standpoint of the global economy, the day-to-day nature of lending and borrowing has not changed significantly—
though its scale has. See Levy et al., 7-9. 
36 Tania Murray Li, “Beyond ‘the State’ and Failed Schemes,” American Anthropologist, vol. 107, no. 3 (September 
2005): 383-394. More traditional analyses of states see such contexts of dispersed authority as a sign of state 
weakness, usually due to foreign intervention. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, “Transnational Linkages and the 
Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II 
Period,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans et al. (Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
192-226. 
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geographic scope.37 Stephen Brain has illuminated the need to encourage more historically 
grounded and complex understandings of the natural environment in Soviet history in terms of 
intention and practice across economic sectors, and not primarily based on industrial legacy.38 
Several scholars have argued convincingly for the view that the domination and exploitation of 
nature was part of the early Soviet, and especially Stalin-era, drive to radically transform society 
by way of industrialization. William Husband argues that “nowhere did the state undercut long-
term objectives more heedlessly than in its approach to resources, where centralized state 
planning further disfigured inherently flawed designs to transform nature.”39 My goal is to 
explore how Soviet activities in pursuit of specific project goals corresponded to or were 
reflected by the physical, including the natural, environment in service of economic growth—and 
not Soviet attitudes towards nature. 
I explore the environmental history of Soviet empire from the vantage of an unfamiliar 
aspect of economic life. The state materialized in the Tajik SSR because of importation and 
exchange made possible by growing networks of transportation and logistics. My emphasis on 
infrastructure and commodity chains highlights regional expressions of empire. Doing so adds 
new dimensions to the body of studies of Russian empire in Imperial Russia and the USSR. 
Recent contributions evaluate the relations and mechanisms of empire by studying rationales of 
state expansion through specific governing institutions and functions, building upon older studies 
of bureaucracy. They show that enactment of policy existed beyond autocrats or dictators in the 
                                                
37 See Adam Rome’s critique of histories of the USA that do not include an environmental history approach in 
“What Really Matters in History? Environmental Perspectives on Modern America,” Environmental History 7, no. 2 
(2002): 303-18. 
38 Stephen Brain, “Stalin’s Environmentalism,” Russian Review 69, no. 1 (January 2010): 94-95. 
39 William B. Husband, “‘Correcting Nature’s Mistakes’: Transforming the Environment and Soviet Children’s 
Literature, 1928-1941,” Environmental History 11, no. 2 (April 2006): 309. 
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administrations involved in specific activities of state, and had independent impacts on the 
formation and outcome of policy.40 This dissertation’s focus on material change, however, is less 
interested in how the USSR was supposed to function from the starting point of policy, and more 
on how it actually worked in practice. It analyzes this problem from the position that empires 
successfully promote transfers and mobility of goods and people through processes typically 
referred to as trade and settlement.41 
I illuminate material operations that facilitated those more ambiguous categories, 
following work that seeks to understand global and empire histories in terms of material 
conditions, networks, and mobility.42 Gary Wilder’s study of Negritude in imperial France, for 
example, argues that observing the physical connections and flows of empire dismisses 
simplistic dualities of traditional scholarship. He claims that "there were universalist and 
particularistic dimensions of republican and colonial poles of the imperial nation-state, each of 
which contained emancipatory and oppressive dimensions", so that historical work focusing on 
racism or colonialism, for example, as violations of an idealized republicanism ultimately fail to 
explore the actual operation of empire.43  Wilder’s vision of a concurrently global and local, 
progressive yet oppressive French state-empire resonates with my projected characterization of 
the USSR. My study of building in early Soviet Tajikistan intrinsically challenges traditional 
assumptions about the “metropole-periphery” spatial distribution of power in empires, and it is 
                                                
40See, for example, Robert Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006); and “Forum: Colonialism and Technocracy at the End of the Tsarist Era”, special 
section, Slavic Review 69, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 120-88. 
41 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 197. 
42 See, for example, Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in 
World History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, trans. 
Richard Mayne (New York: The Penguin Press, 1994). 
43 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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thus designed to contribute to scholarly literature of postcolonialism, in addition to that on 
imperial Russia and the USSR. As Adeeb Khalid argues, studies of Soviet Central Asia can 
“inject new caveats and perhaps a new skepticism toward generalizations built on the basis of the 
experience of mainly bourgeois, western European overseas empires.”44 In my dissertation, the 
capitals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, respectively Tashkent and Dushanbe, often played the role 
of metropole, representing Moscow as administrative centers, even though they are usually seen 
as its peripheries. My focus on physical context and connections situates state power in daily 
experiences and causes rather than hierarchies of peripheries.45 In southern Tajikistan, authority 
in the quotidian operations of construction and transportation was often located in disparate 
villages and work camps, or in movement along roads. 
This dissertation accepts the profound ambiguities produced in post-tsarist Central Asia by 
revolutionary change. The complicated relationship between state and empire that pervades the 
historiography of the USSR and modern Central Asia is especially concerned with questions 
about colonialism and nation. I follow Francine Hirsch’s view that, while comparisons based in 
typology help complicate and fill in the picture of empire, they are rarely able to make clear 
connections between ideology and action, or political and physical experience of the events they 
address. “When it comes to discussing the unique form of the Soviet state and the nature of 
Soviet rule, ultimately all [comparative approaches based on colonialism and nationalism 
                                                
44 Adeeb Khalid, “Locating the (Post-) Colonial in Soviet History”, in Central Asian Survey, 26 (4) December 2007: 
471. Studies of the USSR developed methodologies and concepts similar to those of “colonial” studies for 
overcoming comparable problems of analysis, including strategies for reading between the lines of official state 
documents. Stephen Kotkin’s concept of “speaking Bolshevik”, for example, is a form of what the postcolonial 
critic, Homi Bhabha refers to as “mimicry.” Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; and Homi Bhabha, The Location of 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
45 See, Latour, Reassembling the Social, 182-91; and Madeleine Reeves, “Trace, Trajectory, Pressure Point: Re-
imagining ‘Area Studies’ in an Age of Migration” (keynote speech to the 16th annual meeting of the Central 
Eurasian Studies Society, Washington D.C., 16 October 2015). 
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typology] have more descriptive than explanatory power.”46 I see the emergent USSR as a 
postcolonial empire, both temporally and analytically, rather than fixating on disproving 
Bolsheviks’ claims to emancipating oppressed peoples in order to highlight colonial 
characteristics of the Soviet Union. In my view, it is more productive to acknowledge the 
coexistence of upheaval and novelty on one hand, and of continuing imperial, exploitative, and 
oppressive relations on the other, with both originating in Russia.47 As in the decolonized states 
formerly comprising the British and French empires, many legacies of subjugation by Russia in 
Central Asia remained after the Bolshevik Revolution, and they were integrated with new 
institutions and identities. More recently, scholars differentiating themselves from the 
colonialism comparative school have preferred to conceive of Soviet Central Asia as postcolonial 
to highlight its post-tsarist temporality and the state modernization drive. Doing so frees the 
concept of imperial and subject agency from the limits of analysis in terms of colonizer, but need 
not relinquish the context of continuing neo-colonial exploitation that is widely acknowledged. 
Such studies are less static, emphasizing the rapidity and depth of Soviet change, and the 
potential of diverse actors. Scholars who explicitly evaluate Central Asians as similar to actors in 
other postcolonial contexts also, however, sometimes resort to superficial typologies.48 Others 
avoid this by emphasizing comparison with histories of state-led modernization in different 
global contexts, such as those of Turkey and Iran in the 1920s and 1930s.49 
                                                
46 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 4.  See also, Peter Robb, Empire, Identity, and India: Liberalism, Modernity, and the 
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 192-96. 
47 In Adeeb Khalid’s most recent characterization, early Soviet Central Asia “hung between empire and revolution.” 
See his, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2015), 10. 
48 Please see: “Locating the (Post-) Colonial in Soviet History,” ed. Adeeb Khalid, special issue, Central Asian 
Survey, 26, no. 4 (December 2007). 
49 Please see: Adeeb Khalid, “Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in 
Comparative Perspective,” in “The Multiethnic Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective,” special forum, Slavic 
Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 231-51; and Adrienne Lynn Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The 
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This dissertation provides a postcolonial analysis that is committed to a clear operative—
as opposed to symptomatic—concept of empire. It engages the material and economic life of an 
imperial state whose activities cannot be pigeonholed and dismissed along with other modern 
Euro-American empires as the result of capitalism’s growth. I approach the question of 
modernization here the same way.50 This dissertation is part of a larger set of studies concerned 
with modernization as a process, which typically sees global appropriations of rich world 
symptoms of modernity as the pluralization of its form. For most scholars, the modernization of 
economic growth is almost synonymous with modernization theory, which they (like myself) 
today see as having Eurocentric and imperialist implications.51 Unlike virtually all of that 
literature, one difference of the Soviet context is that capitalism could only be construed most 
tangentially as the cause of a desire to modernize.52 Thus, I address modernization as an 
aspiration of the Soviet state—rather than some imposition. The projects I engage are of a scale 
and quality that that are generally associated with modern history, projects, and economic 
growth. Moreover, the people implementing them at various levels of Soviet authority did so in a 
manner that was generally conscious of the idea that they were appropriating practices, 
technologies, and goals modeled on those of other countries with larger economies, but altered 
for a Soviet context. For this reason, I identify with Michael David-Fox’s desire to avoid models, 
                                                
Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective,” in “The Multiethnic Soviet Union in 
Comparative Perspective,” special forum, Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 252-72. 
50 Skocpol, for example, sees the character of states as the result of transnational economic and political relations is 
skeptical about the degree to which the form of a domestic economic system or models of modernization affect the 
success of the state. See, States and Social Revolutions, 19-22, 291. 
51 James Ferguson, for example, holds to such a view despite his recognition that it was a new formulation of ideas 
about progress that were at least as old as nineteenth century imperialism. See, Expectations of Modernity: Myths 
and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 247-54. 
Studies of other periods posit very similar critical approaches to Euro-American participation in economic and 
technological change abroad. See, for example, Jessica B. Teisch, “California Welcomes the World,” introduction in 
Engineering Nature: Water, Development, and the Global Spread of American Environmental Expertise (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 1-16. 
52 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 126-27. 
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and to reframe aspects of modernity as a “lens” for examining Soviet history, rather than as a 
qualitative value-judgement.53 I am not denying modernity’s implications or contradictions, but 
attempting to move beyond an unresolvable debate. The study of Russia and the USSR, David-
Fox argues, “would benefit from grappling more directly with the concept of multiple 
modernities.” This perspective accepts that there is no single road to modernity, and it takes 
emphasis off of the so-called western world as a model.54 
This dissertation demonstrates that multiple modernities also existed within the USSR. 
The example of Tajikistan examined here furthermore shows there were also multiple versions of 
the Soviet state, each with its own distinct history. Chapter 1 grapples with the challenge of 
reconciling the economic starting point of the Tajik SSR in the 1920s with the massive changes 
taking place throughout the USSR. It examines the construction of Tajikistan’s first railroad and 
the meaning that its completion in 1929 had for physically connecting the republic to Soviet—
and historiographic—narratives, as well as to Union transportation networks. The completion of 
the railroad, at least two years late, arrived just months before Tajikistan’s independence. It 
facilitated greater efficiency in imports, and thus enabled significant changes in the scale and 
intensity of economic activity. The primary justification for constructing the railroad had been its 
anticipated role in economic growth of the republic’s southern regions. Tajikistan marked its 
newfound political status by giving its capital Dushanbe the name of Stalinabad to honor the new 
leader of the USSR, Joseph Stalin. 
The republic needed roads in order to enable commodity distribution. Chapter 2 engages 
the way that the experience of roadlessness—as officials referred to it—impacted the 
                                                
53 Michael David-Fox, Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 7. 
54 David-Fox, Crossing Borders, 2-8. 
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prioritization of mobility infrastructure among economic projects. The roadless legacy of 
Tajikistan’s physical environment was a key obstacle to the pace and scale of desired activities. 
My case study of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road project demonstrates that the Soviet state 
accommodated material limits on possibility by giving up on making it a railroad, the preferred 
form of mobility. Officials instead opted for a highway, deciding that roads were a more 
expedient form of infrastructure in Tajikistan’s mountainous territory. 
Chapter 3 examines how commodity chains worked as new opportunities for mobility 
were being formed. It shows that efforts to import cargo in order to facilitate the construction of 
a new built environment faced challenges in institutional cooperation because logistical 
relationships were as incomplete as the construction projects they supported. At a time when the 
government in Moscow endeavored to centralize control of economic operations, shipping 
services that sustained economic growth in Tajikistan were characterized by ad hoc, and often 
illegal, activities. The world of Soviet mobility in Tajikistan was comprised of relationships and 
activities that are unfamiliar to the history of the USSR. In fact, most of the transportation at 
local levels was achieved by pack and draft animals that were better suited to the republic’s 
roads. In Chapter 4, I argue that the state’s management of horses and camels, most notably 
through institutionalization of breeding with in the republic, was a form of Soviet modernization 
in Tajikistan of the 1930s. From the perspective of transportation, the history of Soviet state in 
Tajikistan reflected a different version of modernity from the automotive vehicle-obsessed ideals 
known from the more familiar historiography; it also had a different narrative, mobility 
landscape, and forms of economic authority. 
Chapter 5 picks up on these findings in a case study of a railroad constructed for an agro-
industrial cotton complex in Tajikistan’s Vakhsh River valley. It analyzes the developing 
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connection of this infrastructure to changes occurring in the region due to resettlement and 
economic growth. I find that, because of the peculiar conditions of Tajikistan’s landscape of 
mobility, and its unorthodox shipping relationships, this railroad attracted unplanned usage. 
Because of its relative reliability as a platform for movement in a place where there were few, 
commodity chains gravitated to the line, giving it importance to the changing built environment 
of the valley of a scale that shaped the developing geography of Soviet statehood under Stalin in 
Tajikistan’s southern regions. 
State building is physical as well as political. In addition to organizing government 
bureaucracies, laws, enterprises, and policies, it is also done through assembling the 
infrastructures and material exchanges that serve them. Soviet planners of Tajikistan in the 1920s 
and 1930s envisioned new factories, roads and canals, schools, hospitals, libraries—even whole 
towns and cities. They believed that this infrastructure would facilitate a modern industrial 
economy that could support a government of welfare, and a classless society where women and 
men lived as equals who freely expressed and protected national and ethnic identities. The 
socialists also, however, found that the basic materials needed to constitute this desired physical 
environment were lacking in the republic. Their ambitions were thus dependent on capital 
originating beyond Tajikistan’s borders.
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CHAPTER 1 
SOVIET LAND BY RAILROAD: 
CONNECTING SPACE AND TIME IN 1920s TAJIKISTAN 
 
“At present, the economy of Tajikistan is to a significant degree closed and natural 
[zamknuto-natural’noe]. This results from the fact that Tajikistan has no good routes of 
transportation linking it to the outside world. Moreover, we have within Tajikistan itself a 
series of separate regions that are very poorly connected to one-another for this reason: the 
virtual absence of roads. The task of overcoming the disconnection of Tajikistan from the 
outside world and of consolidating of all of its parts into a united economic whole, this task 
is fundamental to the economic and political development of the young republic.”1 
———Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana 
 
Officials of the Tajik ASSR’s State Planning Committee (Gosplan) who authored this statement 
believed they faced rare challenges. They were introducing a book of essays on their agency’s 
mandate to establish the Soviet economy in Tajikistan. In it, they claimed that basic problems in 
institution building were hampered by even more fundamental challenges in the management of 
physical geography. Gosplan’s position resonated with views of personnel from many 
organizations and regions. As I will demonstrate, state representatives from Moscow to 
Dushanbe, as well as managers and laborers at worksites throughout southern Central Asia and 
Tajikistan agreed that economic projects in the new republic were inhibited by location and 
limited possibilities for mobility. Many such statements, like that of the Gosplan book, were 
produced more than a year after the Tajik ASSR’s creation. The fundamental problems they 
described were at odds with the statehood suggested by Tajikistan’s official status as a defined, 
semi-autonomous territory. 
                                                
1 Komissiia Sredne-aziatskogo ekonomicheskogo biuro po delam Tadzhikistana, preface in Narodnoe khoziaistvo 
Tadzhikistana (Izd. Gosplana Tajik ASSR, 1926), ii. 
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In this chapter, I explore this disjuncture between political and economic geography by 
analyzing the construction of the first railroad in the republic. The line was built between 1927 
and 1929, from the city of Termez, on Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan, northeastward to 
Dushanbe. I argue that the activities associated with establishing the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad 
revealed practical realities undermining the superficial autonomy accorded by the national 
territorial delimitation (NTD) of 1924. As I will show, and as personnel involved in economic 
projects knew, Tajikistan without a railroad was physically disconnected from sources of capital 
like feedstock, which were located in other Soviet regions. The construction of the line was a 
complicated process involving continuous uncertainty and negotiation among individuals who 
spanned Central Asia and the Soviet Union. This persistent contingency, I contend, made the 
completion of the railway a founding achievement of the Republic of Tajikistan on par with its 
political creation. 
The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad represented a solution to a set of practical problems that 
many officials knew by the spatial byword, isolation. The term encompassed the lack of an 
adequate connection to state administrative and material support, which frustrated efforts to 
implement Soviet plans in Tajikistan. I analyze two factors at stake in overcoming Tajikistan’s 
isolation: first, the republic’s realization as a producer within the socialist economy; and second, 
this space’s involvement in the futurity of the USSR. In the 1920s, officials increasingly felt that 
a railroad was critical to overcoming isolation because of real and teleological ramifications. 
Officials were concerned that challenges of the formative stages of economic growth 
were exacerbated by the lack of a reliable transportation. Tajikistan began its very existence at 
the pleasure and direction of institutions in other regions of the USSR. From them, it received all 
forms of sustenance: policy and plans, financial support, building materials, equipment, laborers 
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and draft animals, experts and expertise.2 In such a context, Gosplan Tajikistan’s book could 
only present Soviet economic growth ambitions in the republic in a way  that was daunting 
because of the scale and number of tasks. Infrastructure and transportation, however, were 
central to their vision of change within the republic. 
The population of Tajikistan is poor, but [changes in] objective conditions would allow 
the population to significantly improve its well-being. The realization of a railroad, the 
improvement of waterways and [in general] ways of communication, the cultural and 
economic work of cotton growing, the development of government procurements and 
government trade, the enlargement of the work of credit agencies, the development of the 
independence of the population and different economic sectors through cooperation and 
the collectivization of production processes.3 
This prioritization of railroads among state tasks was typical in the documents I analyze, even 
though the republic’s economic identity had little to do with mobility. Officials across sectors 
shared the view that the unique conditions imparted by the territory could only be altered by 
economic growth if this land were linked to the rest of the USSR by a suitable built environment 
and modern forms of transportation. 
Soviet officials’ regular claims about the desperate needs of the residents of Tajikistan, 
however, was more a comment on the fragility of state capacity and ambitions within the 
territory. The native population that resided in the republic’s southern regions during the 1920s 
was sustaining itself through livelihoods that survived the upheavals of the revolutionary era. 
Prior to Soviet governance, most of the land that would become Tajikistan was a provincial 
region within the Amirate of Bukhara that was usually called East Bukhara—a term that 
                                                
2 Nazrulloev goes so far as to note that, at the time of his writing, the relationship of Tajikistan to the USSR was the 
same. See S. Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo i razvitie transporta v Tadzhikistane, 1917-1941 gg. (Dushanbe: 
Izdatel’stvo “Donish,” 1979), 5; Ia. T. Bronshtein, “Opyt likvidatsii bezdorosch’ia i sovremenaia strategiia razvitiia 
transporta Tadzhikistana,” Izvestiia AN respubliki Tadzhikistan 3, no. 7 (1987): 44; and R. M. Masov, ed., 
Noveishaia istoriia (1917-1941), vol. 5 of Istoriia tadzhikskogo naroda (Dushanbe: Institut istorii, arkheologii i 
etnografii im. A Donisha AN  respubliki Tadzhikistan, 2004), 376, 420. 
3 Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana, ii. 
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continued to be applied to Tajikistan’s southern regions even after the NTD. East Bukhara’s 
economy had been closely tied to that of the Amirate of Bukhara. It also involved low levels of 
trade with South Asian interests, especially related to goods transiting Bukhara between Russia 
and destinations in Afghanistan and India. Following Russian conquests in Central Asia during 
the 1870s, Bukhara’s protectorate economy became attached to its colonizer’s. All of the 
Amirate was to some degree dependent on Russia for all forms of primary and especially 
processed resources, from bread to metals.4 East Bukhara’s economy, especially in the post-
tsarist period, was characterized by the stability of subsistence agriculture and livestock 
breeding.5 
Soviet experts and planning bodies imagined that Tajikistan with better transportation 
links could most rapidly come to participate meaningfully in the economic life of the USSR if 
the republic were developed as a base of raw materials already known or thought to flourish 
there. Cotton production became the main ambition, especially in southern regions. I. E. 
Khodorov argued that the Amu Darya River region, especially, had a "great economic future." In 
his view, the combination of soil, climate (the vegetative period and heat), and irrigation 
conditions was better there than elsewhere in Central Asia.6 Livestock rearing would also be 
important because it was already well established, and had twice the share of local economy as 
elsewhere in Central Asia. Many also assumed that Tajikistan likely had great mineral wealth in 
                                                
4 Internal report on “The Turkestan Republic and Adjacent Countries,” addressed to the Turkestan Commission, 
copy attributed to B. I. Dolgopolov (Deputy Head of the Historical-Diplomatic Section of the Office of External 
Affairs in Turkestan under the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR), 6 July 1921, Russian State 
Archive of Social and Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii; hereafter 
RGASPI), f. 122 (Administration and Personal Affairs of Employees of the Central Executive Committee and 
Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic on Affairs of Turkestan), op. 4 (1918-
1924), d. 56, ll. 56a-57a (full document is ll. 55a-57b). 
5 Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia, 418. 
6 I. E. Khodorov, “Perspektivy khoziaistvennogo razvitiia Tadzhikistana,” in Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana, 
343. 
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the form of gold, coal, asbestos, salt, and others. But little was known about which was out there, 
in what quantity, where they were, or how to obtain them.7 Soviet discussions on economic 
growth in the 1920s and 1930s derived plans from incomplete understandings of extant forms of 
economic activity and other opportunities that geography permitted.8 Planners decided to focus 
on the southern regions because of a decision to concentrate energy on the production of cotton. 
The uptake in economic activity that occurred after the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad ended 
Tajikistan’s isolation from the USSR is demonstrably related to the new possibilities for 
importation that the route afforded. Soviet officials had correctly anticipated the impact that rail 
would have on the economy of Tajikistan, and on the viability of the republic as a project. 
This physical solution had also been directed at the second implied problem of isolation. 
Overcoming Tajikistan’s remoteness by rail would improve the territory’s relationship to Soviet 
time. In the 1920s, the republic’s isolation represented its tenuous connection to the USSR’s 
teleology of nations. It was an understanding that indicated the need to reconsider conventional 
narratives of Soviet history to account for material life. Social change, as Allan Pred observes, 
always involves some struggle “over the use and meaning of space and time.”9 When Tajikistan 
was created in 1924, it was a liminal Soviet space where revolutionary aspirations encountered 
physical challenges to the future. The introduction in the Gosplan book, for example, contains a 
detailed glorification of Tajikistan as the deserved homeland of the “Iranian peoples of Soviet 
                                                
7 According to Khodorov, livestock production consisted of about 21.8 percent of the agricultural economy of the 
rest of Central Asia, for Tajikistan it was about 56.1 percent. Khodorov, “Perspektivy,” 343.  See also, Teresa 
Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1970), 32-37; and  Iu. Rakitin, “Respubliki i Oblasti Srednei Azii.,” Sredne-aziatskie sovetskie 
respubliki: Promyshlennost’, torgovlia, financy i transport: Prilozhenie no. 4 k zhurnalu Predpriiatie (June 1925): 
12-17, 29-32. 
8 Khodorov, “Perspektivy,” 343; and Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, 32-37. 
9 Italics in original. Pred, Making Histories, 12. 
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Central Asia,” who  “do not only have a rich past; they undoubtedly have a great future."10 The 
authors of these lines, like those of many of the other sources I draw on in this chapter, were 
seeking to match their discussion of the nuts-and-bolts of planned economic growth in Tajikistan 
to an ideological context that had led to the formation of this republic in the first place. Like 
other commentators, they saw this national republic more as an idea than a reality because of its 
material conditions. This perspective led a contemporary to write that "there are two Tajikistans: 
one is of the past, and the other is of the future."11 In the larger context of this formulation, the 
past and future were separated by the deplorable present that manifested in the republic’s 
physical isolation from the rest of the USSR. As long as its remoteness persisted, Tajikistan 
would also be separated from the historical trajectory of the Soviet state building project. 
Andrew Abbott explains that for many relationships to time the ‘present’ is a space “between 
endless past and future.” Much like the time passed in isolation that Soviet officials associated 
with southern Tajikistan, the current moment was to Marxist-Leninist teleology suspended in 
almost “nothingness, the present an island of reality in a sea of ideation.”12 Many economic 
planners saw the task of overcoming Tajikistan’s physical disconnection from the USSR as a 
way of facilitating the future and bringing the autonomous republic into the orbit of Soviet 
aspirational time. The construction of reliable transportation links would bring the Tajik ASSR 
into the narrative project of the USSR as an intentionally changing physical presence. 
                                                
10 Komissiia Sredne-aziatskogo ekonomicheskogo biuro po delam Tadzhikistana, preface in Narodnoe khoziaistvo, i. 
11 Iu. I. Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana,” in Tadzhikistan: Sbornik statei; S kartoi, ed. N. L. 
Korzhenevskii (Tashkent: Obshchestvo dlia izucheniia Tadzhikistana i iranskikh narodnostei za ego predelami, 
1925), 179. 
12 Andrew Delano Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 
239. 
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The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad was completed in September 1929, just before Tajikistan 
was upgraded to the status of a full Soviet republic in December. The finished route facilitated 
possibilities for movement that helped materially conceive the political geography imagined half 
a decade earlier. The timing of the completion of this railroad, and the permanent physical state 
presence that it enabled, call into question periodizations of Soviet history writ-large. The major 
historical works of nationality in the early Soviet period disagree on the timeline of state 
formation—a result of further disagreement on how this ‘formation’ worked in practice—but 
they agree that it happened during the 1920s. Francine Hirsch’s analysis of the role of economic 
considerations in the formation of the USSR leads to her view that, in the 1920s, “the USSR was 
a work in progress.” She positions herself against most “classic works,” pointing out that they 
“describe a [Bolshevik] party with decisive leadership and clear aims,” so that they emphasize 
certain central state proclamations of policy as indicators of action.13 Richard Pipes argues that 
the USSR had more or less taken shape once the constitution of the USSR was inaugurated in 
1924, defining the hierarchy of relationships among Union-level agencies, between them and 
those of republics, and among those of republics.14 Terry Martin is less decisive about dates; he 
describes a process by which the national relationships that came to define the USSR were not 
only cultural, but established through proclamations of central agencies, as opposed to 
negotiation.15 Hirsch, rather differently, highlights the debates that informed or followed policy-
making. She shows in detail that the formation of the USSR’s regions was a process that took 
into consideration and was influenced by factors at Union-wide as well as local levels, and that it 
                                                
13 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge And The Making of the Soviet Nation (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 65. 
14 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), 276. 
15 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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was realized not only by handful of elite cadres but by a wide range of personnel found across its 
massive landmass and bureaucracy. Focused on how policy level discussions and the 
“production of knowledge”—especially ethnographic knowledge—influenced border-making, 
she argues that state formation was a “conceptual conquest” of Soviet land that was completed 
around 1929.16 
I believe that real conquest in the form of instituting government agencies settled 
officials, built environment, and economic activity provides a more precise way to periodize the 
establishment of the state in regions (though, the term “conquest” misrepresents the permanence 
and progression that I see as state building). Periodizations that emphasize politics of nationality 
misrepresent how Tajikistan and other regions experienced Soviet state building. Such 
scholarship promotes narratives that speak only for central and top authorities. They ignore E. H. 
Carr’s cautionary note about the vast diversity of Soviet regional experiences. He highlights 
Central Asian conditions as having been very different from other parts of the USSR; 
Tajikistan’s, he shows, were unique among them all. The Autonomous Republic lacked basic 
infrastructures needed to establish governance in 1925, with no railway or adequate housing for 
offices or board. "These conditions make it unusually clear that it is dangerous and inappropriate 
to generalize about the character and working of Soviet institutions, even those bearing the same 
name and possessing the same formal functions, throughout the vast and diverse expanse of the 
USSR.”17 
From the perspective of the material, 1929 had a very different significance for Central 
Asia. The completion of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad signaled the end of Tajikistan’s physical 
                                                
16 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 12. 
17 Italics Inserted. Edward Hallett Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, vol. 3, part 1 (New York: Macmillan, 
1958), 271-72. 
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isolation from the rest of the USSR thanks to reliable access to comprehensive support. My view 
of state power relations across space in material terms draws on Pred, who argues that 
“regardless of whether they involve exploitation, domination, or subjection, cannot be separated 
from the realm of actual or potential behaviors, from situated actions and practices.”18 I argue 
that changes in the construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad can be read as the history of 
Soviet state building in Central Asia—as did the officials who authored the documents serving as 
my sources. It was an environmental management project in-progress. 
 
Legacy and Isolation 
No whim led Soviet officials to conclude that the land appointed to Tajikistan in 1924 was 
isolated from major processes of economic change. The idea was informed by revolutionary and 
socialist personnel involved in concerted efforts to alter the economy of this space from the start 
of the post-tsarist era to 1929, while political institutions and borders of Central Asia changed 
several times. Observers’ and authorities’ opinion that overcoming the remoteness of Tajikistan’s 
territory was a prerequisite to the desired scale of economic growth was a view formed on the 
basis of various kinds of evidence. In this section of the chapter, I analyze how state 
representatives situated in the region corroborated scientific characterizations of the republic as a 
dislocated space needing external connection. I show that both groups view of economy led them 
to perceive problems in the physical phenomena that are signposts for a new narrative of Soviet 
state building beyond politics. 
                                                
18 Pred, Making Histories, 12. 
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Soviet officials understood the republic’s current and previous scale of economic activity 
in deterministic geographical terms that confirmed calls for transport development. After the 
NTD, a foremost concern of planners was the manner in which the native physical environment 
itself isolated Tajikistan. This problem was most often understood in terms of effect on 
commodity chains:  the Soviet government’s inability to maintain reliable, intensive contacts 
between Tajikistan and other regions of the USSR inhibited the movement of goods and people. 
The primary effect was a prohibitive limit on imports necessary to growing the economy in 
general. Secondarily, Tajikistan would be unable to share any of its future economic products 
with other republics. Officials saw new transportation infrastructure as the way to overcome the 
isolation inherent in the physical legacy of the territory of Tajikistan. 
Geographic determinism focused especially on the topography of this land, and the claim 
that this factor had limited the possible forms of economic life to low intensity activity. For the 
Soviet geographer, Iu. Poslavskii, the "rustic character of Tajikistan expresses itself...in the 
forms of organization of production.”19 To him, the "physical and geographical conditions" of 
Tajikistan were the reason that it lacked incidental industrial centers dependent on mineral 
resources.  His most instructive observations came from comparison to other Soviet places. The 
economy of the land becoming Tajikistan, he claimed, was very different from the middle and 
lower level industrial and trade activities of the societies on such major river regions as the lower 
Amu Darya and Zerafshan, as well as from the nomadic herders of the Kazakh steppe, and the 
intensive agricultural regions of the Russian steppe. It also lacked the kinds of plains found in 
Uzbekistan, with their incidentally populated crop areas. 
Along with this, the Tajik population's distance from cultural regions, and its 
confinement in hard-to-reach mountain ravines and valleys prevents extensive nomadic 
                                                
19 Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana," 186.  
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economic activity and the use of vast pasturable spaces. Here, they are more limited to 
rain-fed lands and irrigated lands. Cramped between the slopes of mountain ranges close 
to impassible mountain streams or shallow mountainous piedmonts on the border of 
deserts (Uroteppa, parts of the Qurgonteppa and Kulob vilaiats), deprived of the 
possibility for permanent and free economic relations with other economic centers of 
Central Asia, the population of Tajikistan developed a distinctive style of economy...the 
population directs its energies only on those resources which are easily found on the 
surface of the earth...[but] nevertheless hard to obtain.20 
Later, some historians would argue that Tajikistan’s territory’s relative proximity to Silk Road 
caravan routes included it in global trade networks. Such claims, however, were first of all rather 
overstated, and furthermore usually emphasized the northern regions of the country, particularly 
the plains around Khujand (known as Leninobod in the Soviet era), which were officially not 
part of the republic until 1929.21 
Deterministic understandings of Tajikistan’s isolation were also informed by its weather. 
Precipitation and such weather events as flooding and avalanches easily interfered with the dirt 
roads and paths used to transport goods into and throughout the republic. These challenges were 
especially common and troublesome from late fall to mid-spring when most kinds of large-scale 
goods exchange stopped. From about November to March, an internal memo stated, “mass 
transport of goods is almost impossible."22 Improved transportation infrastructure, it was 
thought, would help overcome productivity problems related to the delays in commodity 
exchange caused by seasonal variation. Some commentators also claimed reliable trade routes 
                                                
20 Poslavskii, 187. See also, Professor V. A. Vasil’ev, “Section 1: A Brief Description of the Physical Geography of 
the Region,” in “Regarding the Impending Transportation Construction, Improvement and Use of Water Forces in 
Central Asia,” 1st ed., 1926, Russian State Archive of the Economy (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki; 
hereafter RGAE), f. 4372 (State Planning Committee of the USSR (Gosplan), op. 15 (Section for Regionalization, 
1921-1931), d. 902, ll. 125a-120a (full document). Inverted pagination in archival citations reflects the original 
pagination in the files themselves. 
21 See, for example, Iusufi Shodipur, “Avtoreferat. Istoriia putei soobshcheniia i transporta Tadzhikistana vo vtoroi 
polovine XIX - nachale XX v.,” (Dushanbe: Tadzhikskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1992), 12. 
22 “Plan for Trade,” n. d. (1925), Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi 
arkhiv respubliki Tadzhikistan; hereafter TsGART), f. 19 (State Planning Committee of the Tajik ASSR), op. 1, d. 
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could help establish Tajikistan as a zone of intensifying trade between other SSRs and 
neighboring foreign countries.23 
Such studies of geography and environment were often made after or by individuals who 
had only visited Tajikistan. They nevertheless resonated with the reported experiences of state 
representatives who communicated with institutions throughout the USSR. Such individuals, 
whether they visited or were situated in Tajikistan, often phrased their observations in more 
familiar political terms. Some, for example, pointed out to the paradoxical effects of isolation on 
East Bukhara during the Russian civil war. Russian Communist Party officials speculated that it 
was “one of the most devastated and impoverished Soviet regions.”24 Its remoteness from sectors 
of Soviet authority made its recovery particularly difficult. Authorities believed that East 
Bukhara’s continuing isolation perpetuated the stunting of a broad range of economic and social 
institutions, along with the population in general. The post-tsarist conflict featured a mass exodus 
from regions around and south of Dushanbe which, along with revolutionary disruptions had 
broken the personal networks of such elites as bais that had propped up local, cross-sectoral trade 
with lands to the west and north prior to the revolution.25 Mobility problems separating East 
Bukhara from Central Asia and Russia limited the flow of commodities and people, and thus 
slowed recovery under the Soviet regime. 
                                                
23 See  Khodorov, “Perspektivy, 344. 
24 “Informational Letter of the Organizational Bureau of the Communist Party of the Tajik ASSR on the Months of 
January-February 1925,” signed by P. P. Sokolov (former Executive Secretary of the Tajikistan Orgbiuro) and 
Kamen’kovich (Assistant to the Secretary of the Office of Information of the Central Committee [of the Communist 
Party of Tajikistan]) on 20 March 1925, and sent as an “absolutely secret copy” from the Office of the Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to its Office of Information on 25 April 1925, RGASPI, f. 
17 (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, 1898, 1903-1991), op. 33 (Correspondence of the 
Office of the Secretariat and the Secret Section for local party organizations, 1920-1929), d. 444, l. 52 (full 
document is ll. 47-64). 
25 Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana,” 228. 
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The state’s fragility in East Bukhara was further reflected in its representatives on the 
ground. The region was included in the Bukharan National Socialist Republic (BNSR) formed in 
1920 after the Red Army defeated Amir Alimkhan and captured the Amirate of Bukhara. Due to 
the USSR’s lack of presence, resources, and enforceable authority in East Bukhara, its 
representation there consisted of a temporary governing agency known as the Extraordinary 
Dictatorial Commission of the Bukhara Central Executive Committee.26 At the beginning of 
1924, this agency was re-organized and renamed the East Bukhara Central Committee (hereafter, 
EB TsIK), answering to the Central Committee of the BNSR. The EB TsIK was an unstable, 
improvised operation, which contemporaries characterized as having unorthodox structure and 
lacking distinct organs of government. For this reason, it could not offer an institutional basis for 
governance of the Tajik ASSR in 1925.27 
The recorded experiences of EB TsIK agents before delimitation are replete with 
complaints and despair at their real and imagined isolation from their government—the BNSR—
and country—the USSR. In their perceptions, East Bukhara was not a priority of authorities 
based in Bukhara city or in more important centers of Soviet power like Tashkent and Moscow. 
An August 1923 EB TsIK report to the Central Asia Bureau explained that efforts to establish 
socialist forms of economy (kooperatrabota) as well as Soviet governing institutions had almost 
entirely failed despite two years of effort.28 The cause of slow progress was the lack of material 
                                                
26 Paul Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic (New York: I. B. Taurus, 
2007), 32. 
27 A. Ianishevskii, “Sovetskoe stroitel’stvo v Tadzhikistane,” in Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana (Izd. Gosplana 
TASSR, 1926), 201. 
28 Report titled “Bukhara,” addressed to Comrade Rudzutak, copy attributed to the Deputy Head of the Office of 
Information and Instruction, 11 August 1923, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84 (Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central 
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and financial support, and the “significant lack and shortcomings of workers.”29 Messages such 
as these often made recommendations for improving the situation. A later report requested a 
concerted effort to improve regional transportation in order to overcome the “detachment and 
isolation of East Bukhara,” and to bring the region into closer cooperation with “the west” 
(Bukhara proper).30 
While such reports couched authorial frustration in terms of challenges to goal 
attainment, they sometimes revealed the effects of isolation on morale. Officials posted in these 
southeastern lands felt they were on the periphery of the periphery. East Bukhara was at best a 
secondary concern of upper-level personnel elsewhere in Central Asia. One EB TsIK official felt 
abandoned to work on monumental tasks and and live in trying conditions. In a letter to the 
Bukhara TsIK, he expressed dismay about the apparent futility of his previous letters. “I think 
that, if you sent me to East Bukhara, then I must have been [seen as] needed in the work here. 
And that is why I am quite surprised at the lack of letters and telegrams from you. It [this state of 
affairs] amounts to fully ignoring East Bukhara and myself, and this should not be.”31 From the 
perspective of EB TsIK operatives, the land that became Tajikistan was at the end of the line in 
real space, as well as when it came to Soviet priority and support. According to one 
contemporary, these conditions of the early and mid-1920s "made it impossible to effect the 
same tempo of Soviet state building [sovetskoe stroitel'stvo] that was taking place in other 
regions of Central Asia and the USSR."32 When Tajikistan inherited the land of East Bukhara, 
                                                
29 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 507, l. 61b. 
30 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 507, ll. 66a-b. 
31 Report addressed to N. Khojaev (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bukhara), translated copy, author 
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problems related to isolation—such as extreme material shortages, delays in the opening of 
credit, and poor connection by post and telegraph—continued. The Soviet state remained unable 
to secure its position and change the local economy because of a lack of capital of the kind 
needed for construction and for the sustenance of settlers. 
This material context was more important and consequential than can be surmised from 
the historiography of Central Asia, and especially the literature of the NTD. Scholarly emphasis 
on military and especially political achievements neglect the degree to which physical conditions 
were interwoven with security and institutional challenges. In the prevailing scholarly narrative 
of Tajikistan, the delayed establishment of political institutions is attributed to popular resistance, 
especially from rebel fighters known as Basmachi. In one representative iteration of this view, 
statehood came to Tajikistan "thanks to the successes of military-repressive [voenno-
represivnykh] campaigns."33 Such narratives, however, rarely connect the challenge posed by the 
rebels to the constellation of tangible problems at work in this land during the 1920s. Material 
obstacles included the lack of transportation infrastructure, an economy that did not sustain 
Soviet ambitions, a shortage of available and trained labor, and a profoundly traumatized native 
population.34 
The Basmachi thrived in these circumstances because socialist officials of East Bukhara 
and Tajikistan lacked physical means for altering them, and had limited opportunities for 
persuading native inhabitants to enjoin them. In fact, the nexus of Soviet material wealth, 
relations with the native population, and isolation, was closely associated with the persistent 
threat from the Basmachi. EB TsIK representatives within East Bukhara were not only under-
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supplied and under-staffed; they also had poor relations with the few natives among whom they 
could find allies in the conflict. In 1923, for example, an official complained that, beyond such 
regions of strength, such as Dushanbe vilaiat (province), temporary governing organizations 
known as Revkoms (Revolutionary Committees) were not very effective. These were responsible 
for maintaining sufficient supplies and housing for state officials or military detachments that 
might pass through, but their efforts were significantly hampered by the considerable 
depopulation of many regions, and the almost absolute decline of local agriculture.35 This 
individual argued that the only way to improve matters would be to import many more personnel 
and supplies. A large number of staff, in particular, were needed since those who were present 
are stretched to the limit working “from morning to night,” most of them in two or three 
capacities, and many of them alone much of the time in rebel territory. Furthermore, the labor 
shortage was exacerbated by environmental threats to cadres’ health. “All this is would be 
manageable were it not for the illness of [Comrade] Rafikov and my frequent trips to this region 
or the other. To boot, almost all officials suffer from malaria.”36 
The material and administrative weakness of the Soviet regime in East Bukhara and 
Tajikistan also exacerbated challenges to gaining the trust and allegiance of native peoples. A 
core part of the offensive against the Basmachi was economic and material: an appeal to native 
communities’ “hearts and minds” through financial as well as food aid. Such shows of wealth 
acted as incentives for natives’ passive support or, preferably, actively joining the Socialist 
regime.37 This kind of trust was hard-won, and by no means widespread until the 1930s. The Red 
                                                
35 RGASPI, f. 17, op 84, d. 507, l. 68b. 
36 Notably, “rafiq” is the Tajiki word for “comrade.”  RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 507, ll. 68b-69a. The author 
concluded by commenting on his worries about how to delegate tasks to this workforces during his own pending 
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Army offensive in Central Asia, known as the Turkfront, was mostly composed of Russians. It 
came to be resented by the local population of Tajikistan since it was associated with half a 
decade of violence and depredation that had washed over the land in fighting with the Basmachi 
as well as, earlier, with armies of regional princedoms. The Russians were seen as callous 
occupiers who—like the rebels—obliged natives to provide them with all forms of resources, 
including limited food and lodging. 
Most scholarship follows a narrative by which, after NTD, local Communist Party 
organizations are foregrounded and presented as the solvers of state building problems like 
rebels, and as the drivers of historical change.38 State agencies are presented as overcoming 
"exceptionally difficult and complicated conditions" of Basmachi resistance and devastated 
economy that delayed crucial founding events of the Republic of Tajikistan. Following political 
signposts, this argument promotes the view that only in August of 1926 did authorities come to 
feel confident enough vis-à-vis the rebels to announce fall elections to Soviets, which would 
replace Revkoms.39 Following the elections, this story goes, the First Founding Congress of 
Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red Army Deputies took place from 1-12 December 1926. On 
the first day, the congress declared their native approval of the creation of the Tajik ASSR, and 
(somewhat ironically) "'the adamant decision for the voluntary entry into the Uzbek SSR, and 
through her the USSR with all the rights of an autonomous republic.’"40 
My research shows that the path to stabilization and the establishment of soviets in 
Tajikistan involved considerably more than fighting off Basmachi rebels. The delayed elections 
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and pronouncements of Tajikistan’s statehood themselves should also be attributed to the 
territory’s isolation and material property. Though exact dates, concepts, and chains of events 
can be elusive in the historical record of early Tajikistan, primary and secondary sources do 
generally agree that the conditions of its territory delayed the expected official initiation of state 
building from the beginning of 1925 to the very end of 1926. In November and December of 
1924, after the TsIK USSR’s late October approval of the delimitation of Central Asia, officials 
in Tashkent went to work setting up the government of the Tajik ASSR. The first agencies of 
government were “organized” in the first half of December, in Uzbekistan.41 These activities 
were guided in part by representatives from the Office of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee of the Russian Communist Party. As they explained in a later report, “the Tajik 
Party’s Organizational Bureau’s [Orgbiuro] work began only in the month of February because 
of the fact that workers and the whole apparat of the TASSR Orgbiuro and government spent the 
entire month of January traveling from Tashkent to Dushanbe.”42 
The problem was that getting into Tajikistan from just beyond its borders was difficult 
even for individuals after NTD. While most sources about the earliest period of Tajikistan 
contain information about problems of transportation, few make detailed connections between 
mobility and state building. The closest mechanized transport to the southern regions was the 
railroad station in northern city of Guzar, beyond the Fan Mountains, and the shipping dock in 
Termez.  
It is about 200 versts from Guzar to the closest centers of Tajikistan (Sary-Assiia), [first] 
by a very difficult wheel capable road, and later on by pack animal transport. An 
automobile capable road from the river dock in Termez to Kabadian is somewhat shorter, 
                                                
41 Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia, 373-77. 
42 Italics inserted. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 444, l. 47. 
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but it has not been developed, and the crossing at the Surkhan and Kofarnihon rivers 
make the journey even less comfortable for the moving of goods than [the other route].43 
With respect to external as well as internal travel of Tajikistan, pack animal transport continued 
to have “decisive significance.”44 The combination of transport methods used in Tajikistan—dirt 
roads, paths, “which are for the most part not even suited to horse passage due to climactic 
conditions," and rivers in need of engineering—and the related degree of its needs for economic 
growth, made transportation and commodities there extremely expensive, and distinguished it 
from the other Central Asian republics.45 Government personnel mostly traveled by animal or 
foot on the dirt road from Guzar, while some others came by airplane from the city of Kagan, 
east of Bukhara city in Uzbekistan.46 
Sources disagree on the timing of the arrival of government personnel because of 
different understandings of who and what comprised the government or key cadres. Some claim 
that it arrived in January, and others at other times. To A. Ianishevskii, a contemporary, the core 
group of cadres arrived in Tajikistan between February and March. Converging in Dushanbe, he 
explained, they also required time to "become acquainted with local conditions.”47 Among that 
first group of arriving representatives of the new state was B.V. Tolpygo, the Executive 
Secretary of the Uzbekistan SSR Orgbiuro in the Tajik ASSR, the organization responsible for 
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“Dushanbe: Stolitsa Tadzhikistana,” in Tadzhikskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika, ed. M. Asimov 
(Dushanbe: Glavnaia nauchnaia redaktsiia Tadzhikskoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1984), 8. 
44 Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana,” 229. 
45 “Transport and Connection,” TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 539: ll. 28, 41 (full document is ll. 28-41); TsGART, f. 19, 
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"economic and cultural development, [and] the process of sovietization of the republic."48 In the 
summer of 1925, after his journey to his new home, and experiencing the territory’s isolation 
from its Soviet neighbors, he explained to Joseph Stalin that “building the Party organization in 
Tajikistan is an undertaking of especially difficult conditions, far more difficult than in any other 
place in the Soviet Union.”49 
Tajikistan’s physical isolation and extreme material needs manifested in the continuing 
belief among republic officials that their efforts were neglected by other regions and central 
authorities. As late as 1927, even judicial officials openly complained about the minimal human, 
material, and financial resources at their disposal. They blamed Moscow administrators, and 
claimed this was a primary reason why they had problems establishing legal apparatus.50 At the 
same time, isolation also conveyed a sense for why Tajikistan seemed to be a lesser priority for 
upper-level Soviet authorities. “The scale of work in our republic is lower than the scale of work 
in some guberniia [in other regions of the USSR] and the only difference is that our republic is a 
vast territory and lacks ways of communication.”51 Drawing attention to the fragility of the state, 
one party stated that “we agree with you that such a Procurator's office structure as exists in 
Tajikistan exists nowhere else. We are, however, unable to do much, for, as you are no doubt 
aware, the Republic of Tajikistan does not have a cent of its own income, and lives at the 
expense of other republics.”52 Their letter highlighted the new republic’s dependency, using 
                                                
48 Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia, 396-97. 
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comparison to explain why its sender believed that projects of other regions of the USSR 
logically took priority.  
[At a time] when the Central Government sets to the task of industrialization or 
electrification of the country [of the Soviet Union], when the Government everywhere 
presses an economic regime, and when our republic is entirely sustained by the 
expenditures of other republics, and your viloyat is worth less than the uezd of any 
guberniia on account of the size of its population and the scale of its work, it is clear that 
the Central Government cannot agree to increase material support and increase your 
personnel.53 
This assessment of the economic and material reality of the Soviet state in Tajikistan during its 
earliest years is a less culturally biased evaluation than was often promoted by the cadres 
initiating programs for wholesale social, political, and economic change in the Tajik ASSR. 
Unfortunately, historians have been more interested in this more typical form of commentary 
about Tajikistan. They have too often been willing to reproduce, or too intent on criticizing, 
characterizations of the republic’s early conditions using opaque judgments expressed in 
comments about "exceptional economic and cultural backwardness.”54 
 
The Railroad Solution 
Contemporaries and historians alike have had no illusions about the comparative disadvantage of 
Tajikistan with respect to the wider USSR. The Termez-Dushanbe railroad was conceived as a 
project to overcome those trying conditions and to enable economic ambitions. In this section, I 
analyze how this project fit into broader planning and construction projects for railroads in 
Central Asia, and the extent to which it was prioritized within a larger program for connecting 
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western and eastern parts of the USSR. The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad was only a tiny part of 
that larger endeavor, which Minister of Ways of Communication, I. N. Borisov put in 
perspective at the First Special Interagency Meeting. “‘It should not be forgotten that the six 
thousand versts of daily construction envisioned by the meeting is but a drop in the ocean, the 
minimum necessary to satisfy the basic needs of cultural life in our country.”55 
The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad first entered policy and planning as an economic priority 
during the 1923-24 operating year in discussions between NKPS and STO. It was still at a design 
phase when it came up again at the Second Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan 
in November 1925, where the assembled officials set a tentative completion deadline of the fall 
of 1927.56 In various aspects of institution building, commentators viewed the railroad as critical 
to economy and state, and thereby the overall well-being of the republic. For the authors of a 
1926 report on economic growth prospects, the overall feebleness of the state in Tajikistan stood 
apart from the territory’s political status, as reflected in the following assessment. 
At the moment of formation as a state [svoego Gosudarstvennogo obrazovaniia], 
Tajikistan, due to its geographic position—politics of the Amirate, several years of 
Basmachism—inherited weak finances and a fundamentally ruined economy, the 
recovery of which can progress normally only when the TASSR receives, on the one 
hand, the ability to connect itself with the general network of roads in Central Asia and 
the Union and, on the other, [sic] to establish economic ties among its own regions, 
thereby eliminating its current isolation from the broader Union economy.57 
Such arguments about the purposefulness of the railroad, set squarely as they were in the context 
of economy of the republic and wider Central Asia, provided a good measure of the current 
condition and status of Tajikistan and regional territories as Soviet spaces, the physical legacies 
                                                
55 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 15, d. 902, ll. 76b-a, 73a. 
56 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 43; Masov, Noveishaia istoriia, 418. 
57 Capitalization of “gosudarstvennogo” in original. TsGART, f .19, op. 1, d. 539, l. 28. 
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of the pre-Soviet period, and of what opportunities were on the horizon. They also indicated that 
the circumstances of potential railroad projects for Tajikistan, however, were not so different 
from those of its economy, being dependent on outside generosity.58 
Tajikistan’s mobility challenges, however, were part of a general Central Asian transport 
crisis.59 Many railways of the tsarist era were still unrepaired or non-functioning, and those that 
could be employed were far over-taxed in service of state building efforts across sectors in 
Central Asia. A 1926 report on the topic, titled “Transport and Connection,” explained that 
freight turnover in Central Asia had come to exceed that of the pre-war period, though "the 
technical facilities that make up a [rail]road—such as the track, bridges, buildings, water supply, 
wagons, and locomotive parks, etc.—are significantly worse than in the pre-war period, and have 
been left behind the technical achievements of the past ten years."60 This was similar to patterns 
throughout the USSR. In the 1920s, the state commitment to industrialization altered the usage of 
the railroads inherited from tsarist Russia. R. E. H. Mellor explains that, "in contrast to the pre-
revolutionary pattern of short, light and infrequent trains serving a predominantly agricultural 
economy, heavier, faster trains with a greater service frequency were needed."61 The first 
railroad in Central Asia, the Transcaspian Railroad built in 1879, served military purposes until it 
was turned over to the Ministry of Communication in 1899, when it was renamed the Central 
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Asia Railroad. Its economic usefulness had been observed early on, and then the growing rail 
network became as integral to the development and success of cotton agriculture. Socialist 
commentators would later argue that the networks developed had not served the state well 
because many of the branch lines were planned, built, and managed privately.62 The poor 
condition of railroads in the early Soviet period, combined with low river shipping capacity—
and a dearth of rivers in Central Asia—meant that transport throughout the region was 
inefficiently conducted using "dirt, caravan roads."63 
Railways, in particular, were seen as the key form of transportation. Soviet planners had 
inherited from Russian imperial ones the view that economic growth and state building in 
general was best facilitated by railroad construction, and this form of mobility remained 
dominant in the USSR for decades after WWII. Emphasizing rail development in transportation 
also made sense because of significant expansion of networks prior to the Russian Revolution 
left a legacy of tracks on the land. Moreover, railroad construction was a unique economic 
endeavor in the 1920s and 1930s because it did not require the hiring of foreign experts.64 These 
conditions led the Central Asian Economic Council (SredazEkoso) to make rail a construction 
priority of its 1926 five-year plan.65 
The [five-year] plan addresses questions about the development of transport of all kinds. 
For Central Asia, far from internal regions of the Union, where the existence within the 
republics of a series of regions that are isolated from one-another by sands, deserts, and 
mountains, the improvement of routes of transportation is a fundamental prerequisite for 
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eliminating [dependence on] natural forms of economy and involving all regions in the 
broader economic life of the Union."66 
Rail was the most expedient form of intensive mobility between Central Asia and the dominant 
Soviet region of western Russia.67 
Although commentators had differing views about which railroads to prioritize for 
construction (new or renewed) in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s need for a line was undeniable.68 
“Transport and Connection” included statistics that revealed Tajikistan’s relative disadvantage in 
a Soviet Union that prized railroad use. One table profiling Central Asia showed that, of a total 
of 3587 kilometers of lines in the region, 1703 kilometers lay in Turkmenistan, 1789 kilometers 
in Uzbekistan, and 95 kilometers in Kirgizstan.69 Tajik ASSR was implied as part of Uzbekistan 
and not mentioned at all, though it had the same territorial status as Kyrgyzstan at the time. The 
Kyrgyz ASSR capital of Frunze (previously Pishpek; now Bishkek) had been connected to 
regional rail networks in 1924.70  The railroad conditions of Tajikistan come more clearly into 
comparative focus in the regional statistics shown in Table 1. Not surprisingly, SredazEkoso‘s 
five-year plan of 1926 identified the construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad as the most 
important priority in Central Asian railroad construction, and scheduled it to start that year.71 
“Transport and Connections” version of the railroad plan approximated the final route of 
Tajikistan’s railroad, though the route itself had been a matter of controversy up to when plans 
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Table 1. Kilometers of railroad per territory and capita in Central Asian and other Soviet 
regions (1926)72 
Name of republic or 
autonomous Oblast 
Kilometers of railroad per 
1,000 sqare kilometers 
Kilometers of railroad per 
10,000 of the population 
Uzbekistan 10.5 4.1 
Turkmenistan 4.1 17.6 
Kyrgyzstan 0.5 1.1 
Tajikistan 0 0 
Total for Central Asia 3.9 5.2 
Ukraine 30.5 n/a 
Byelorussia 13.2 n/a 
Central Black Earth 
Regions 
25.5 n/a 
Northern Regions 4.4 n/a 
Moscow 44.1 n/a 
Total for USSR 3.5 n/a 
 
were approved in 1926. Some officials even debated the plan to have the line go to Dushanbe out 
of a belief that a different, more southerly destination would better serve economic ambitions.73 
The dominant plan which prevailed offered limited information on anticipated distances and 
costs of the line, and large sections. In all, it would be 256 kilometers-long and cost about 26 
million rubles to build in three years, according to the following schedule: in 1926-27, the first 
leg of 150 kilometers from Termez to Regar was to be built at a cost of 12 million rubles; in 
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1927-28, leg of 70 kilometers from Regar to Dushanbe at a cost of 10 million rubles; and then in 
1928-29, a leg of 36 kilometers from Dushanbe to Kofarnihon (Kafirnigan) would be built at a 
cost of 4 million rubles.”74 These schedules and estimations were subject to ongoing 
negotitations of various kinds—as I discuss in the next section—that had material and temporal 
significance for the republic. 
 
The Narrative of State Building: Construction Negotiations 
The disadvantageous material conditions of Tajikistan by comparison with other regions of 
Central Asia and the USSR were easy to demonstrate in the fields of economy and 
transportation; it became part of often repeated arguments made in support of ongoing 
construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad.75 The nature of these conversations was 
important because it outlined stakes associated with providing this route to the republic, and with 
the desired relationships it should create for the USSR. So long as the railroad was incomplete, 
however, these definitions remained suppositional. This contingency also extended to the 
existence of Soviet Tajikistan. Such a spatial context, as Torsten Hagerstrand explains, is 
“undetermined until a project defines it.” Discussions about the progressing construction of the 
Termez-Dushanbe Railroad reveal agents involved in the material foundation of the economy in 
Tajikistan. In this section, I analyze their infrastructure building events from the perspective of 
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the project, and I identify diverse phenomena dynamically involved in the making of Soviet 
“thereness” (to use Hagerstrand’s term) in the new republic.76 
The continuing bureaucratic uncertainties and debates that I examine corresponded to 
ebbs and flows in the railroad’s construction, revealing influential factors, actors, and problems 
for consideration as part of the narrative of Tajikistan’s history. I do so out of agreement with 
Abbott’s claim that “a serious narrative program must address the problem of periodization, the 
problem of deciding whether the beginnings of social sequences inhere in the social process itself 
or are simply an arbitrary aspect of the way we talk about that process.”77 The palpable nature of 
the day-to-day activities involved in construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad provides 
progression timelines for a clearer history of nationalities and NTD in Central Asia. Institutional 
conversations about the railroad were always about the degree of its material existence, and often 
about its relationship to capital for construction or the physical possibilities that it did and would 
offer to mobility. Those tangible markers of completedness, regardless of specificity, are 
signposts for periodizing the establishment of the state in Tajikistan in terms of railroad 
construction. 
Soviet officials’ conversations repeated rationales about the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad’s 
anticipated value to the republic and the USSR because it strengthened their appeals to other 
agencies. Various organizations based in Tajikistan, Central Asia, and Moscow were involved in 
managing the railway project, and needed to appeal to each other as well as to more central and 
upper-level agencies, for the confirmation, assurance, or continuation of various kinds of 
support. In the mid- and late-1920s, inter-organizational cooperation was a messy affair, where 
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lines of hierarchy were vague and shifting, and where agencies and names frequently appeared, 
disappeared, and changed, perhaps especially in Central Asia. The logics of state building, 
however, had some consistency, and demanded specific types of considerations. “Transport and 
Connection,” for example, commented on the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad project by pointing out 
that 
The meaning of this line for Central Asia is undisputed, since not one kilometer of 
railroad track has been built in the TASSR [Tajikistan] to date. One of the most remote 
parts of Central Asia, it will be joined to the Union by way of railroad connection and 
will acquire the ability to develop cotton production, animal husbandry, arable farming 
and the extraction of its mineral wealth.... As a pioneering line, [the] Termez-Dushanbe-
Kofarnihon [line] will not be profitable [rentabel'naia] for the first period.”78 
The report did go on to posit, however, that local prices would decrease after the railroad 
connected regions previously deprived of ways of communication, and included them in 
commodity turnover of the USSR. The economic growth that it expected would occur in most 
regions of Tajikistan "without a railroad would be impossible.”79 
Hesitancy characterized this and other statements about the railroad and economy 
because, following NTD, there was no guarantee at all that a railroad to Tajikistan would be 
built. The officials affected most by this uncertainty were those working in and on behalf of the 
republic. From the perspective of these individuals, negotiations on realizing the Termez-
Dushanbe Railroad were structured by a spatial and logistical pecking order of organizations that 
attended to infrastructure budgeting in Central Asia. At a regional level, these institutions 
included central republican organizations and SredazEkoso, while Union-level agencies that 
were most involved—through local as well as Moscow representatives—were NKPS and STO. 
                                                
78 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 6, d. 402, l. 264. 
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All of them participated by some degree in planning, funding, and managing work on the 
Termez-Dushanbe Railroad. Inevitably, a hierarchy existed whereby Moscow organizations, 
empowered with greater jurisdiction, funds, supplies, and technical expertise, had greater 
influence than Central Asian ones. Tajikistan interests, meanwhile, had the least clout, isolated as 
they were, politically from information and spatially from control of funds and materials. All of 
these things were transferred to the republic from other regions of the USSR. 
This hierarchy also reflected realities of physical networks affecting the schedule of 
construction on the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad. The line could only be built after the completion 
of other routes farther away. Tracks to Termez—rebuilt from Bukhara, or newly extended from 
Samsonovo, the city on the border between central Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—were still 
under construction after the NTD.80 Tajikistan officials, conscious of logistical and Union-wide 
limitations on resources, saw Tajikistan’s economic well-being as linked to reconstruction of 
railroads taking place throughout other parts of Central Asia. Those other lines to Termez, after 
all, would bring goods to within two hundred versts of Dushanbe, from where they could 
currently be moved by road or by river.81 
Though understandable, this situation exacerbated uncertainty about the Termez-
Dushanbe Railroad. Even after this project became a long-standing point of discussion on 
economy and the object of preliminary plans, its form and future were indeterminate. Tajikistan 
officials seeking assurance were expected to prevent possible delays or cancellations by 
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81 Message addressed to STO USSR, copied to NKPS, copy attributed to Ter-Egiazar’ian (Chairman of 
SredazEkoso) and Solntsev (Executive Secretary), 20 July 1928, RGAE, f. 1884 (Ministry of Ways of 
Communication of the USSR), op. 31 (t. 1 (Special Division of the Secretariat of the People’s Commissariat for 
Ways of Communication of the USSR, 1921-1933), d. 1199 (April 1928-August 1929), l. 23 (full document is ll. 23-
16); and Rakitin, “Respubliki i Oblasti Srednei Azii,” 3 
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continuously lobbying personnel and institutions across Central Asia and the USSR to ensure 
that tracks were laid to Dushanbe. In fact, these authorities received guidelines from other 
institutions on how to navigate contingencies in the planning, funding, and construction process. 
In the summer of 1925, for example, NKPS advised Tajikistan officials that the Termez-
Dushanbe Railroad was only a “preliminary project” based on “reconnaissance surveys,” and 
that it faced several practical problems already. Technical planning, firstly, needed more 
financing. The union-level agency explained that, though there was indeed funding available for 
it, the challenge was to obtain it through the proper channels.82 Obtaining labor of all kinds, 
secondly, was a different kind of complicated challenge. While a provisional agreement with the 
Turkfront—as the Red Army offensive in Central Asia was called—allocated soldiers to 
roadwork, neither this military organization nor roads administrations had obtained approval for 
the levels of credit needed to pay wages and other support. NKPS offered several possible 
solutions, including the recommendation that Tajikistan support its department, the Central Asia 
Region Department of Local Transportation (SAZOMES), in formally requesting that “the 
Center” give the planned line to Dushanbe status of “government road” (gosudarstvennaia 
doroga) since it that would come with guaranteed funding.83 NKPS officials also informed their 
Tajikistan-based interlocutors that work on the railroad would likely be further stalled due to 
delays on other lines connecting to Termez. The union-level agency suggested that appealing to 
                                                
82 Report titled “Information in Response to the Tajikistan Autonomous Republic’s Representation in Central Asia’s 
Inquiry about the Short-term Plan for Work in Transport,” no. 1312, copy attributed to Nikolaev (Acting Director of 
the People’s Commissariat of Ways of Communication in Central Asia), certified by Perskii (Secretary of the Tajik 
ASSR’s Representation in Central Asia), 15 August 1925, in Tashkent, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 512, l. 4 (full 
document is ll. 3-8); and Message addressed to the SNK Tajik SSR, no. 2352, copy attributed to Director of the 
Central Asia Regional Office of Local Transportation of the People’s Commissariat of Ways of Communication 
(NKPS) of the USSR, 25 June 1925, in Tashkent, and received in August 1925 (possible mistakes in the dating), 
TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 512, l. 17b (full document is ll. 17ab). 
83 TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 512, l. 17a. 
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the governments of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan might motivate faster construction of railroads 
farther away.84 Allegedly, management disputes between these two republics, especially related 
to the sharing of costs for construction, was the primary cause of current delays. NKPS estimated 
that, even if the pace improved, the construction of the 217 kilometer line from Samsonovo to 
Termez, begun in April, could only be done by November 1925.85 
Tajikistan’s officials’ efforts to influence funding and progress of the construction of the 
Termez-Dushanbe Railroad was hampered by material obstacles to information. They frequently 
lacked the knowledge need to manage day-to-day operations because of the very isolation that 
the railway project was meant to help overcome—exacerbating the sense of a spatial hierarchy in 
economic decision-making. Intense lobbying and negotiation had continued after SredazEkoso, 
in 1926, unambiguously prioritized completing the endeavor. It turned out that the planning and 
initiation of the construction project was still in no sense a guarantee that it would be done. Even 
after the first 30 kilometers of the railroad were finally constructed in January 1927, uncertainty 
persisted in related state correspondence.86 The global constellation of problems—competing 
institutional and regional interests, material and financial shortages, as well as environmental 
factors that heightened the sense of remoteness—that threatened economic endeavors in 
Tajikistan were made more acute by a scarcity of information. In May 1927, following the spring 
period of bad weather, republican officials were keen to ensure that work on the next section of 
the line from Dzhar-Kurgan to Denau would continue without delay.87 They expressed their 
                                                
84 TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 512, l. 3. 
85 TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 512, l. 3. 
86 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31 (t. 1), d. 1199, l. 22. 
87 Message addressed to the Permanent Representation of the Tajik ASSR to the Central Asian Economic Council, 
attributed to Mukhitdinov (Chairman of the SNK of the Tajik SSR), Strel’nikov (Acting Chairman of Gosplan [Tajik 
ASSR]) and Zavel’skii (Secretary of Gosplan [Tajik ASSR]), no. 2490, 24 May 1927 (with a note indicating it was 
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frustration with isolation by complaining about their inability to greatly influence progress on the 
line. In a message to the Permanent Representation of Tajikistan to SredazEkoso, these SNK and 
Gosplan authorities explained that a key problem was that they did not receive updates with any 
regularity. “Given the absence of communication about the Central Asian Railroad’s stock, about 
the release of funds, and about the commencement of work, we ask to be informed about these 
matters, and at the same time that measures be taken to start work as soon as possible so that the 
line to Denau will be completed by the end of the construction season.”88 Tajikistan officials’ 
supplications were accompanied by an attempt to show that they too were willing to sacrifice for 
the project, and requesting that it be known that they were committed to contributing some of 
their government’s own meager funds to the infrastructure project once it reached inside their 
republic’s borders.89 Their concerns and sense of isolation could not have been allayed by their 
representative’s delayed response of two months later. It stated only that his office had passed on 
the requests for information and diligent construction progress, and that he was himself waiting 
for a response.90 
Such logistical and spatial challenges to the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad project appeared 
to confirm the NKPS claim that the causes of Tajikistan officials’ many problems lay in Central 
Asia. I will show, however, that this union-level transportation organization created many of the 
difficulties that regional projects faced. The reason for this was that the resource at the center of 
                                                
received 28 June 1927 (no. 2027), TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, ll. 22a-b (full document). Dzhar-Kurgan and Denau 
are presently referred to as Jarqorghon and Denov, respectively. 
88 Italics inserted. TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 22b. 
89 Notably, the 100,000 rubles that they specified were still far short of the 250,000 to be provided by the Uz SSR. 
TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 22a. 
90 Message from the Permanent Representation of the Tajik ASSR to the Central Asian Economic Council in 
Tashkent to Gosplan of the Tajik ASSR in Dushanbe, no. 2877, signed by Gofman (Deputy of the Representative of 
the Tajik ASSR in Central Asia) and Burshtin (Clerk), 10 July 1927, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 21 (full 
document). As Gofman notes, he had only received their message on 28 June 1927. 
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most discussions of infrastructure was money, and NKPS was the ultimate manager and 
distributor of funds in the 1920s. As I already showed, correspondence pertaining to the Termez-
Dushanbe Railroad was replete with anxieties over the availability and granting of funds for the 
purchase of materials and labor. NKPS’ decision not to guarantee financial support in some cases 
directly contributed to delays in realizing the railroad, economy, and statehood of Tajikistan. 
NKPS withheld funds and interfered in many stages of the construction process despite 
the fact that trans-republican and interdepartmental relations that governed and determined 
support for work on the line were based in central planning, budgeting, and law. One funding 
controversy in the fall of 1927 showed that problems sometimes stemmed from the fact that the 
Soviet budgeting process was not capable of contending with the unanticipated expenditures 
posed by the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad project. An engineer’s report from August explained 
that construction would be stopped if an additional 200,000 rubles were not be sent to his work 
crew by 1 September. The Senior Inspector, Dubrovin, had conducted a revisionary survey 
inspired by concerns shared amongst his co-workers. His findings demonstrated that the state 
was especially underprepared for environmental management in this part of the USSR. He 
explained that many of the higher costs were due to the fact that the terrain became increasingly 
challenging to work on as the structure neared Tajikistan. Dubrovin warned that, should they not 
receive the requested funds, the project would face severe consequences. 
We will be forced to disband the construction organization and staff, which will 
immediately damage our project and furthermore have an effect on subsequent 
construction. It would be much easier to go on without interruption, since the 
construction season [in southern Uzbekistan ] closes for only two winter months, 
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[causing less inconvenience] than having to once again organize the construction 
organization, [and thereby] raising the cost of the project with such overhead costs.91 
An accompanying note also pointed out that other laborers were currently en route to his work 
site in the Surkhan River region, and could lose their planned employment before they even 
arrived.92 The issues that he raised led to a debate between NKPS and Central Asian 
organizations over which institution should be responsible for this new expenditure. 
There was no set procedure for finding or allotting extra funding in such an 
improvisational manner. The state still under construction lacked many rules, and the lack of 
clear procedures often interfered with the common cause. Tajikistan officials lobbied those of the 
Uzbek SSR for these funds. Following confused lines of authority and communication, their 
representatives to SredazEkoso and to the Central Committee of the Uzbek SSR asked whether 
funds would be forthcoming before Dubrovin’s deadline of 1 September. Out of desperation, 
they asked about the truthfulness of a rumor that Faizulla Khojaev, the head of the Uzbekistan, 
had made a verbal promise of 50,000-80,000 rubles to Comrade Ratkai, the Deputy Head of 
NKPS in Moscow.93 The deadline passed, and as the work stoppage continued into the end of the 
fall Uzbekistan officials also made genuine efforts to find the funds, though in ways that their 
counterparts in Tajikistan might not have agreed to. In November, the Uz SSR representative in 
                                                
91 “Report on the Construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad (Dzhar-Kurgan-Surkhan-Kuterma leg),” attributed 
to Dubrovin (Engineer, and Senior Inspector of the Representation of NKPS in Central Asia), and certified by 
Burshtin (Clerk), n.d., TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 11 (full document is ll. 7-12). 
92 Cover letter for the “Report on the Construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad (Dzhar-Kurgan-Surkhan-
Kuterma leg),” from the Representative of the NKPS in Central Asia to the Permanent Representative of the Tajik 
ASSR, no. 1412 (copy no. 3341), certified by Burshtin (Clerk), 20 August 1927, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 6 
(full document). 
93 Message in response to the Representation of the People’s Commissariat of Trade in Central Asia’s 21 August 
communication (no. 1428) regarding the construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad,” addressed to the 
Permanent Representation of the Tajik ASSR to the Central Committee of the Uz SSR in Samarkand, copy no. 3358, 
attributed to Gofman (Deputy Representative of the Tajik ASSR to SredazEkoso) and Tolstiakov (Secretary), n.d. 
(1927), TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, l. 13 (full document). 
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Moscow proposed that money be funneled to the railroad from agricultural development 
programs in the autonomous republic. He reasoned that cotton agriculture in southern regions of 
Tajikistan “would not be expedient or profitable due to transportation conditions and because the 
line has not yet been built” far enough.94 No measure of offered sacrifices like this, nor lobbying, 
maneuvering, and rumors could find the money needed before the winter. A key reason for this 
was that NKPS was ultimately in control of disbursements of funds in railroad construction, and 
it did not consider Uzbekistan and Tajikistan worthy of the help they were requesting. 
Between the fall of 1927 and early 1928, NKPS way open about the fact that it was 
withholding funds and slowing construction for at least half a year on the basis of some budget-
related bitterness.95 The rapidity of political, institutional, and material change throughout the 
region had resulted in disputes over the governance of economy, even as laws on the scale of the 
USSR were still being formed. NKPS claimed that the Uzbek government owed 271,000 rubles 
worth of work, overdue from prior work completed on the Samsonovo-Termez line. The sum, it 
explained, was a debt transferred from the BNSR to the Uzbek SSR after the NTD of 1924, and 
then carried forward into the budget of the 1926-1927 budget year. NKPS alleged that Bukhara 
had only spent two-thirds of the 934,000 rubles received for construction of the Samsonovo-
Termez line in 1924, and that the remaining money was still in play as an Uzbek transportation 
resource. “So it has been brought forward to the current year, and is the reason that NKPS is 
                                                
94 Message in response to “message no. 1565 on the question about the allotment of materials for continuation of 
construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railway line” from the Permanent Representation of the Uzbek SSR to the 
Government of the USSR to the SNK of the Uzbek SSR (in Samarkand) and the SNK of the Tajik ASSR (in 
Dushanbe, “by air”), no. 5289, attributed to Rozental’ (Permanent Representative of the Uzbek SSR [to the 
Government of the USSR] and Tanal’skii (Executive Secretary), 24 November 1927, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, 
l. 52b (full document is ll. 52a-b). 
95 Message addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Tajik ASSR to the Central Asian Economic Council 
(copied to Gosplan Uz SSR in Samarkand, and the Management of the Central Asian Railway in Ashkhabad), no. 
3250, attributed to Ratkai (Deputy Representative of NKPS in Central Asia, based in Tashkent), and certified by 
Burshtin (Clerk), 21 August 1927, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 541, ll. 14-15 (full document). 
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providing 729,000 and not the requested 1 million.”96 In fact, SredazEkoso accused NKPS of 
withholding more than one third of 2.5 million rubles originally expected for the 1927-28 
operating year for construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad. “After four years of sincere 
requests,” it explained, only 50 kilometers would be completed—and at the most austere 
standard of construction.97 More importantly, the dispute over the alleged debt showed that the 
nature of Soviet budgeting was without clear or enforceable norms in Central Asia. The region’s 
Economic Council appealed to other All-Union organizations in Moscow—STO and Gosplan—
to fix the lack of “realistic budgeting” exhibited by NKPS. It claimed that resources assigned to 
Central Asia “do not satisfy even the most basic needs for the strengthening of transport in 
Central Asia and radically diminish all projects.”98 
Central Asian institutional appeals won support of union-level institutions by maintaining 
focus on material and spatial significance of the funds debated, while accusing NKPS of illegally 
penalizing them. The Permanent Representation of the Uzbek SSR to the Government of the 
USSR drew attention to the material significance of the sum by explaining that Tajikistan was a 
place where every single kilometer of track was critical to the cotton economy, and that 
“experience shows” that 271, 000 rubles could add from twelve to fifteen kilometers of track.99 
                                                
96 “NKPS Statement in Response to the Request of the Permanent Representative of the Uzbek SSR on the 
Allotment for the Construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad,” addressed to the SNK of the USSR, copy no. 3a-
72, attributed to the NKPS Central Department for Railroad Construction in Moscow, signed by Borisov (People’s 
Commissar of Ways of Communication) and Lazarevskii (Director of the Central Department for Railroad 
Construction), 30 April 1928, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 80, d. 345, ll. 232b-231a (full document). 
97 See Message addressed to the Council of Labor and Defense (copied to Gosplan USSR), no. 3a-41, attributed to 
the NKPS in Moscow, signed by Sh. Borisov (People’s Commissar of Ways of Communication) and Lazarevskii 
(Director of the Central Department of Railroad Construction), 3 March 1928, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31 (t. 1), d. 1204, 
l. 2a (full document is ll. 2a-3b). Notably, they referred to the history of requests for investment. The actual amount 
allotted fo the 1927-28 year was 1 million. 
98 Message addressed to the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR in Moscow (copied to Gosplan and NKPS 
of the USSR), no. 2060, attributed to Ter-Egiazar’ian (Chairman of the SredazEkoso), and certified by Solntsev 
(Executive Secretary), 19 February 1928, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1204, ll. 5a-b (full document is ll. 5a-6b). 
99 Message “Regarding the Question of Obligating NKPS of the USSR to Release the Full 1 Million Rubles 
Assigned by its Budget of 1927-1928 to the Construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad,” addressed to the SNK 
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In his view, the sum and the budget became a legal obligation when the SNK of the USSR 
approved it, followed by its confirmation by the Central Committee of the USSR.100 Higher 
organs evidently agreed. They favored the Central Asian case’s appeal to a particular 
understanding of hierarchy in the USSR. As late as May 1928, the National Commissariat of 
Finance of the USSR argued that the NKPS action in “migration of credits from item to item [of 
budgets]” was illegal and violated a number of regulations. Above all, the credits in question 
belonged to a project and budget that had been closed two years earlier, and thereby were no 
longer relevant to current budgets. “Therefore, it is hard to understand what is the goal and 
according to what procedure the NKPS believes it is justified in requesting reimbursement of the 
named sum.”101 Their inability to silence the transport agency, however, reflected continuing 
lack of clarity over lines of authority in the USSR. NKPS answered these accusations by asking 
STO to ignore them.102 NKPS saw itself as empowered to work autonomously in transportation 
work mandated by “Higher Organs.” Citing sections of the Budgetary Law of the USSR, it 
argued that “in order to do this, NKPS is vested with the right to independently maneuver 
                                                
of the USSR (copied to NKPS USSR, the People’s Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, and the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Inspectorate of the USSR), signed by Islamov (Permanent Representative of the Uzbek SSR to the USSR) 
and Tanal’skii (Secretary of the Permanent Representation of the Uzbek SSR to the USSR), 21 April 1928, RGAE, 
f. 1884, op. 31 (t. 1), d. 1199, l. 3a (full document is ll. 3b-2a). 
100 They viewed NKPS’s justification for withholding 271,000 rubles to be “unlawful” for several reasons. First, 
nothing in the budgetary materials for the current year of railroad construction, nor did those of the TsIK USSR 
suggest of any consequential relationship to the Samsonovo-Termez line, which was already in use. Second, these 
materials did not mention the 271,000 rubles allegedly owed. Third, it noted that this information was also missing 
from from 1925 budgetary materials of both NKPS and STO for the 1926-1927 fiscal year. See RGAE, f. 1884, op. 
31, t. 1, d. 1199, ll. 3b-2b. 
101 “Regarding the Transfer of Credits from the NKPS Budget to the Construction of New Railroads,” addressed to 
the Council of Labor and Defense (copied to NKPS), no. BV-381, attributed to Kuznetsov (Deputy Director of the 
People’s Commissariat of Finance of the USSR) and Pal’chikovskii (also of NKF USSR), n.d. (7 May 1928 
according to RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, ll. 13b-12a), RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 15b (full 
document is ll. 15b-a). 
102 “NKPS Statement in Response to the Request of the NKF USSR of 7 May 1928, no. BV-381 on Denying the 
People’s Commissariat of Ways of Communication the Right to Transfer Credits from Item to Item,” addressed to 
the STO of the USSR, signed by D. Sulimov (People’s Commissar of Ways of Communication) and B-[illegible] 
(Director of the Central Department of Finance and Budgeting of NKPS), 16 May 1928, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31 (t. 
1), d. 1199, ll. 13b-12a (full document). 
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credits” to those projects it saw as most fit, and to “close the work and non-productivity of those 
who in the current year cannot complete construction in the approved term.”103 
The matter had devolved, in part, into a debate over legality and procedure, the outcome 
of which is not known to me. Central Asian lobbyists had succeeded in exposing the Soviet 
administration’s potential for arbitrariness at the center of authority over a sum that, although 
being of immense significance to Tajikistan, was ultimately very minor on the scale of the 
USSR. Whatever its actual motives, NKPS used this imbalance of significance to intimidate 
Central Asian organizations several times over the course of 1928. In February, it justified its 
unwillingness to pay out the 271,000 by claiming a different understanding of the Termez-
Dushanbe Railroad project. It claimed that NKPS had envisioned “the most minimal sort of 
construction, which would not guarantee uninterrupted movement, and subsequently requiring 
excessive, and fairly significant expenditures for reconstruction” over the next three years—on a 
timeline of completion far later than original plans.104 The push and pull of negotiations between 
NKPS and Central Asian organizations frequently revolved around real-time assessments of 
projects in progress, or around the desire for better surveys and other preparatory exercises. In 
October 1928, NKPS gloomily predicted a delay in work completion because of the greater 
environmental challenges to work on the Tajikistan side of the railroad. “Given the work that 
will be required by the topography of the Denau-Dushanbe leg, including major earthwork 
operations and with a significant amount of bridge construction the line may not be completed, 
even to the most basic technical specifications, any earlier than the end of 1930.”105 The Central 
                                                
103 RGAE, f 1884, Op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 12b. 
104 RGAE, f 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1204, l. 2a. 
105 Message titled “On the Completion of the Termez-Dushanbe Railway Line,” addressed to STO (copied to the 
Permanent Representation of the Uzbek SSR to the Government of the USSR), signed by Iu. Rubyi (People’s 
Commissar of Ways of Communication) and A-[illegible] (Director of the Central Department of Railroad 
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Asian organizations continued to counter such tactics by calling for faster tempos on the basis of 
familiar spatial arguments. In July of 1928, SredazEkoso even highlighted Tajikistan as a 
republic embodying problems usually affecting smaller scale spaces. 
The joining of new economic regions with economic life of the Union, and their 
transition to socialist forms of development, invariably depends on the problem of 
transport.  This situation particularly concerns such regions as Tajikistan, where the lack 
of a basic form of transport—railroad and the corresponding waterways and carting 
roads—is the single cause of its economic and cultural backwardness, preventing the 
development of its rich productive capacities.106 
Central Asian agencies called upon economic rationales for building the Termez-Dushanbe 
Railroad that were defined earlier in the 1920s and which they could  now cite in government 
reports and various publications.107 As the project progressed, however, these arguments  
highlighted real-time causal connections between the pace of railroad construction and that of 
economic growth in Tajikistan. At the end of the 1920s, such statements complained that what 
little cotton was being produced was very difficult to export by current available means of 
transportation.108 
Nowhere was the relationship between material conditions and economic vitality 
converging on the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad under construction felt more strongly than on the 
line itself. The various laborers and managers of this project experienced delays of supply, 
                                                
Construction), n.d. (April 1928-August 1929), RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 42a (full document is ll. 42b-
a). 
106 RGAE, f. 1884, Op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 23. 
107 See, for example, RGAE, f. 1884, Op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 21. 
108 Message “regarding the release of 8 million rubles during the 1928-29 operating year for the completion of 
construction on the Temez-Dushanbe Railroad line,” further to the plan of the People’s Commissariat of Trade of 
the USSR, having no. 177 on 16 July, and the conclusions of the Permanent Representative of the Uzbek SSR , 
having no. 543-2 on 27 July, addressed to the Council of Labor and Defense (copied to NKPS USSR, NKFin USSR, 
NKTorg USSR, VSNkh USSR), signed by Islamov (Permanent Representative of the Uzbek SSR to the 
Government of the USSR) and Tanal’skii (Secretary of the Permanent Representation of the Uzbek SSR), 31 July 
1928, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, t. 1, d. 1199, l. 37b (full document is ll. 38b-37b). 
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whether for work or sustenance, in a way that affected their ability to accomplish their daily 
tasks. To a certain extent, the debates of mid- and upper- authorities concerned with construction 
of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad did not resonate with how they were understood by the people 
who worked on the ground. To Vargarshak Karamov, the Deputy Chief of the project, he and his 
colleagues on site were ill-treated by the variable and difficult environmental contexts that they 
had no choice but to endure, in addition to the unpredictability of supply. He had worked on the 
Central Asian railroads since 1925, starting in Samsonovo before his appointment to the Termez-
Dushanbe line. In his recollections of the railroad to Tajikistan soon after completion, he 
attributed delays and slow progress to a lack of material support from upper-levels of 
organization; he was not concerned with what institutions were culpable.109 
For Karamov, the Soviet economy arrived in Tajikistan with the train, on tracks that were 
a reliable, controllable, indisputable link to the rest of Soviet territory, and its material and other 
forms of support. This significance of the railroad to Tajikistan was palpable on the line as each 
leg was constructed. When, in late 1927, construction reached the Surkhan station near Denau, 
about sixty kilometers from Termez on the Uzbek side of the border, it populated the place with 
the materials for labor and with those which would go on to Tajikistan. Kamarov later recalled 
how supplies were brought closer and closer to Tajikistan with the progress of the line. "'Buses, 
carts, caravans of camels, and all that used to be based in Termez was relocated to the Surkhan 
warehouse point'" on the dirt road that had been built from Termez to Dushanbe ahead of the 
                                                
109 Report addressed to Comrades Guseinov (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan), Zelenskii 
(Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party), Blagonravov (Deputy Peoples 
Commissar of Ways of Communication), and Mustu (Representative of NKPS [in Central Asia]), signed by 
Vagarshak Dzhavadovich Karamov (Director of the Termez-Stalinabad [Railroad] Project, Member of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Parties of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the Representative of NKPS in Tajikistan), 
30 May 1930, in Stalinabad, RGASPI, f. 62 (Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Communist Party, 1922-1934), op. 2 (Documents, 1922-1934), d. 2185, l. 46a (full document is ll. 45a-46a). 
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railway. "'And so, just like mushrooms, tents, bases, warehouses, sheds made of reeds, teahouses, 
and cafeterias, grew up all around the station.'"110 His reminiscences corresponded to the 
imagined significance of the railroad implied by the discussions that had explicitly supported it 
for most of a decade.  Kamarov himself drove the first train into Dushanbe two years later, at 
15:00 o’clock on 1 September 1929, one hour after the railroad was completed.111 
 
Conclusion 
Just three months later, Tajikistan’s status was upgraded from Autonomous Republic to an 
independent republic (SSR) of the USSR. The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad had been conceived 
as a project to overcome the isolation of Tajikistan and to enable Soviet ambitions in its 
economic growth by material connection facilitating mobility. The new republic had almost no 
legacy of the sort of life envisioned by Soviet planners, having no history of what they 
considered large- or even medium-scale trade or industry, nor any sophisticated political and 
administrative antecedents. The new republic also had few of the structures usually associated 
with supporting such sectors, including buildings and construction materials, machines, 
equipment, and roads. Instead, officials saw Tajikistan as characterized primarily by subsistence 
economies and small-scale, localized politics.  They considered this a result of how insular its 
roadless territory was, with respect to the outside world as well as in the ways its regions 
internally related to one-another. This, in turn, was due to the fact that the land was a primarily 
mountainous terrain that was uniquely difficult to traverse and get to. The construction of the 
Termez-Dushanbe Railroad provided a physical connection that periodized the new republic’s 
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real inclusion in the grand narrative of Soviet state building. The Tajik SSR was now a physical 
part of the USSR, unequivocally involved in the historical trajectory of its planned economic 
growth. 
The correlations between the railroad and the space, history, and economy of the republic, 
made more often by contemporaries than by historians, indicates that considerable contingency 
characterized the physical connection of Tajikistan to Termez and the USSR. It is not enough to 
claim, as do Masov et al., that “the economic birth of the Tajik republic began somewhat later 
than in other regions of the country [USSR].”112 The very establishment of the Soviet state came 
later, arriving on the train, which represented a reliable, controllable, indisputable link to the rest 
of Soviet territory, and all forms of support for state building that that represented. The 
completion of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad constituted the palpable founding event of the 
republic of Tajikistan. Because the significance of the railway was agreed upon both prior to and 
following its construction, the debates and struggles ongoing as it was built together amount to 
conversations about the existence and value of the republic itself.  It may have been a 
coincidence, but the railroad’s arrival in September 1929—along with all that it meant 
materially—also anticipated the renaming of the capital city in the fall to “Stalinabad.” The 
railroad name, however, continued to use the old title for the city for at least another year. 
By connecting Tajikistan and facilitating its economy, the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad 
project delimited the republic’s relationship to the Soviet state and to Soviet geography, as well 
as the manner and tempo with which this occurred. This was only a first step in Soviet efforts to 
overcome the legacy of Tajikistan’s physical environment in order to support economic growth. 
Road building, as I discuss in Chapter 2, remained a priority of the state alongside establishing 
                                                
112 Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia, 418. 
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reliable commodity chains to exploit the new possibilities of mobility, which I analyze in 
Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STALINABAD-QURGHONTEPPA ROAD PROJECT: LANDSCAPING THE 
SOVIET STATE IN TAJIKISTAN’S SOUTHERN REGIONS 
 
"Tajikistan is a country of solid mountains…. The mountainous character of the country 
determines the form of its ways of communication."1 
        ———Saidov Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo 
 
The top-priority transportation project of the Tajik SSR was cancelled midway through the first 
five-year plan (1928-1932). This railroad was meant to connect the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad 
junction in the capital with Qurghonteppa, the administrative center of agricultural operations in 
the republic’s southern foothills regions. The defunct project had been universally hailed as 
critical to the establishment and growth of an industrial-scale cotton sector out of a belief that 
such infrastructure would facilitate greater commodity exchange with other Soviet regions. The 
lack of a reliable connection to far-away transportation networks stilted immense efforts 
underway to create irrigation, planting, and processing facilities in southern Tajikistan. On 27 
April 1930, however, the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) in Moscow initiated a series of 
resolutions cancelling the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Railroad endeavor. In its place, the People’s 
Commissariat for Ways of Communication (NKPS) commissioned the construction of a highway 
capable of carrying horse-drawn carts and automotive vehicles, which was completed in 1933. 
This chapter addresses the changing form of this route to analyze how the Soviet state 
created physical space for itself in southern Tajikistan. On the surface, this road project’s story 
was already remarkable for several reasons. First, it was a rather short route of just over 100 
kilometers, yet it took seven years to establish a connection of sufficient quality between the 
                                                
1 S. Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo i razvitie transporta v Tadzhikistane, 1917-1941 gg. (Dushanbe: 
Izdatel’stvo “Donish,” 1979), 8. 
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capital and Qurghonteppa.2 Furthermore, Soviet planners seldom chose highways as primary 
transportation arteries. They had inherited from Russian imperial policy the view that economic 
growth and state building in general was best facilitated by railroads—the form of mobility that 
remained dominant across the USSR until the 1970s.3 Opting for a highway was atypical, and 
indicated that unusually significant challenges of Tajikistan outweighed the benefits of doing the 
more complicated and time-consuming work involved in a railroad. Finally, the changing form 
of this project was also significant because organizations agreed that railroad construction here 
was too expensive.4 Planners had decided that a highway could be constructed more cheaply and 
easily. The efficient completion of the transport artery would more rapidly facilitate the wider 
economy under development.5 
                                                
2 Message addressed to the Representation of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party 
and the RKI in Central Asia, attributed to the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party and 
the People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate of the USSR, signed by Sevriugin (Deputy 
Director of TsITIS) and Shippo (Senior Inspector), 19 May 1930, Russian State Archive of Social and Political 
History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii; hereafter RGASPI) f. 121 (Representative 
of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party and the People’s Commissariat of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate in Central Asia, 1924-1925), op. 2 (Documents, 1925-1934), d. 235 (February 
1930), l. 109 (full document); and Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 71. 
3  Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 42; and Leslie 
Symons and Colin White, introduction in Russian Transport: An Historical and Geographical Survey, ed. Symons 
and White (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1975), xx.  
4 See, for example, Message addressed to Anvarov (Permanent Representation of the Tajik SSR to the USSR in 
Moscow), attributed to Chernyi (Gosplan Tajik SSR), 22 April 1930, Central State Archive of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv respubliki Tadzhikistan; hereafter TsGART), f. 18 (Council of 
People’s Commissars of the Tajik SSR, 1929-1939), op. 1, d. 102, l. 201 (full document). 
5 “Report on the the fulfillment of Resolution no. 29 (18 July 1929) of the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Communist Party ‘On the construction of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Railroad’” (secret), addressed to the Central 
Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, attributed to the Central Control 
Commission of the All-Union KP and the RKI of the USSR, n.d. (February 1930), RGASPI, f. 121, op. 2, d. 235, ll. 
105, 103 (full document is ll. 107-103); and Internal report “on the issue of constructing the Iangi Bazar to 
Qurghonteppa Railroad,” attributed to the RKI in Central Asia, n.d. (February 1930), RGASPI, f. 121, op. 2, d. 235, 
ll. 92-90 (full document); and Message addressed to Mikhail Andreevich, copy of a copy attributed to Khojibaev and 
Solntsev, 26 November 1928, TsGART, f. 17 (Council of People’s Commissars of the Tajik ASSR, 1926-1929), op. 
3, d. 78, l. 4a (full document is ll. 4a-b). Inverted pagination in archival citations reflects the original pagination in 
the files themselves. 
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In the case of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road project, the language of administrative 
expediency obscured the real challenges responsible for the decision to abandon it in favor of a 
highway. As I showed in Chapter 1, mundane conversations about finances associated with 
transportation often reflected other dimensions of state building. Here, delays, wasted resources, 
and the perennial failure to complete the road(s) was the result of the Soviet state’s inability to 
effectively manage the native physical environment. The fundamental problem was that this 
territory had simply never borne transportation infrastructure sufficient to accommodate the 
material culture of an industrial society—to say nothing of an aspiring Communist utopia.6 I will 
argue that the cycles of starting and stopping in planning and progress on the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa road project illuminate how Soviet officials negotiated the republic’s terrain. The 
native physical environment was an under-anticipated challenge to plans for creating a material 
context suited to activities and goals of economic growth in Tajikistan. The republic’s legacy, of 
a rugged territory combined with lesser ways of transportation, magnified the difficulty of tasks 
related to mobility in general, and to this route in particular. 
The central challenge to officials involved in the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road project 
was their need for knowledge about southern regions of the republic. Politicians, planners, 
engineers, and others lacked the information required to confidently plot routes and construction 
in the form of roads that could be built over and otherwise exploited.7 Officials’ ignorance of the 
territory had ramifications beyond planning the route too. The mountainous terrain and climate 
                                                
6 See Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 5; Ia. T. Bronshtein, “Opyt likvidatsii bezdorosch’ia i sovremenaia 
strategiia razvitiia transporta Tadzhikistana,” Izvestiia AN Respubliki Tadzhikistan 3, no. 7 (1987): 43–49; and R. M. 
Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia (1917-1941), vol. 5 of Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda (Dushanbe: Institut Istorii, 
Arkheologii i Etnografii im. A Donisha AN  Respubliki Tadzhikistan, 2004), 376, 420.  
7 Report titled “General assessment of the construction of railroads based on evaluation by the Representation of 
RKI in Central Asia that was conducted in February 1930,” attributed to Stoianovich (Commission Chairman) and 
Bel’khov, Sabanin, Anfilov, and Remnev (members of the commission), and certified by the signature of 
Makarevskii, n.d. (February 1930), TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 93, l. 167 (full document). 
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challenged work crews involved in surveying as well as construction. Under-anticipated weather 
and land formations caused a variety of delays in productivity, including by interfering in 
roadwork through seasonal variation in soil consistency, flooding and wash-outs, and other 
factors occurring by virtue of dynamics beyond human intention. Saidov Nazrulloev summarizes 
some of their effects with special emphasis on the loessial soils of Tajikistan. In the rainy periods 
of fall and winter, he explains, this dirt turned into "impassable mud," and in the summer formed 
a fine dust that in some places was a meter thick. "Add to this mountain rivers, and the need to 
clear roads of persistent avalanches and landslides, and one can understand the high cost of 
constructing and maintaining the roads."8 
This situation did not, however, prevent Soviet officials from making large-scale plans. 
By the mid-1920s, they envisioned the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road as the priority artery of a 
constellation of routes comprising what soon came to be known as the Southern Circle (Iuzhnoe 
Kol’tso) of roads. Altogether about five hundred kilometers long, they would extend southwest 
past Qurghonteppa to border areas, then east and north, through Kulob and Iangi-Bazar, and back 
to the capital, reaching points in fertile river valleys of the Kofarnihon, Vakhsh, and Amu 
Darya.9 As noted in Chapter 1, the facilitation of mobility was a state priority in East Bukhara 
and Tajikistan of the 1920s. Even though ground routes were generally managed for only basic 
functionality between important centers and for military passage, the transportation sector 
                                                
8 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 67. 
9 “Transport and Connection,” Russian State Archive of the Economy (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki; 
hereafter RGAE), f. 4372 (State Planning Committee of the USSR (Gosplan), op. 6 (Transport Section, 1921-1930), 
d. 402 (September 1926-January 1927), ll. 226-225 (full document is ll. 274-177); and Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe 
stroitel’stvo. 68. For historical comparison with these early beginnings of the iuzhnoe kol’tso, see, for example, Ia. 
T. Bronshtein, “Sovremennoe sostoianie gruzovogo transporta Tadzhikskoi SSR i nekotorye perspektivy ego 
razvitiia,” in Voprosy ekonomiki transport: Sbornik trudov, Trudy Tashkentskogo instituta inzhenerov 
zheleznodorozhnogo transporta no. 28, edited by M. N. Belen’kogo (Tashkent, 1963), 97. For a useful summary 
discussion of the main roads construction works in the 1920s and 1930s, see A. I. Ismoilov and A. V. Sutsepin, 
Naqliyot va rohhoi kishvari kuhi (Dushanbe: Nashriyoti “Irfon,” 1974), 10-16. 
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received one of the largest portions of state funds devoted to the region.10 During the first half of 
the decade, the EB TsIK devoted much of its small staff’s energy to maintaining useable routes 
for mobility.11 Their efforts included obligating Revolutionary Committees (Revkoms), native 
residents, and military staff to help repair or improve routes and bridges, as well as to shelter and 
supply traveling representatives of the state. The EB TsIK viewed the improvement of routes as 
having contributed greatly to successes of the Red Army against Basmachi guerrillas, as well as 
to the importation of all forms of supplies for building and sustenance.12 The NTD injected new 
energy into planning and economic growth efforts on the territory of Tajikistan, although the 
state still faced significant challenges. The two railway stations closest to Dushanbe in the mid-
1920s were located beyond waterways and mountains, at Guzar (in northern Tajikistan) and 
Termez (in southern Uzbekistan), over 100 and 200 kilometers away, respectively.13 This 
situation made the completion of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad an urgent necessity, and the 
recipient of the majority of state support for transportation related to Tajikistan. 
                                                
10 “Preliminary considerations regarding road and bridge construction in the T[ajik] SSR [sic] in 1925,” certified by 
signature [illegible], 29 January 1925 in Dushanbe (handwritten), TsGART, f. 4, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 16a-b; and Botakoz 
Kassymbekova “Humans as Territory: Forced Resettlement and the Making of Soviet Tajikistan, 1920-38,” Central 
Asian Survey, vol. 30 (3-4), September-December 2011: 352. 
11 Paul Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic (New York: I. B. Taurus, 
2007), 32. 
12 Record of proceedings no. 6 “of the 27 November 1923 meeting of the Dikkomissia [EB TsIK],” signed by Mulin 
(Chairman), Usman (Member), Khojaev (Member), and Postnek (Secretary), with many others in attendance, 
TsGART, f. 1 (Extraordinary Dictatorial Commission on Affairs of East Bukhara, under the Bukhara Central 
Executive Committee of the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic, 1920-1924), op. 1, d. 12, ll. 8a-b (full document is 
ll. 7a-9a); Record of proceedings no. 7 “of the 2 December 1923 meeting of the Dikkomissia [EB TsIK] in East 
Bukhara,” signed by Mukhamidiev (Chairman), Mulin (Member), and Postnek (Secretary), and also attributed to 
Rakhmatulla (Member), Kameldzhanov (Member), with many others in attendance, TsGART, f. 1, op. 1, d. 12, ll. 
13a-14b (full document); and Nazrulloev, 1979, 27. 
13 “Transport and Connection,” TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 539, ll. 28, 41 (full document is ll. 28-41); “Plan for Trade,” 
TsGART, f. 19 (State Planning Committee of the Tajik ASSR, 1925-1929), op. 1, d. 504, ll. 61-74 (full document); 
and Iu. Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana,” Tadzhikistan: Sbornik statei; S kartoi (Tashkent: 
Obshchestvo dlia izucheniia Tadzhikistana i iranskikh narodnostei za ego predelami, 1925), 229. 
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Hopeful officials in the autonomous republic called for rapid change to the quality of 
internal transportation as well. For upper-level authorities among the first settlers of the Tajik 
ASSR, the experience of mobility had a profound impact on their economic priorities. 
B.V.Tolpygo, the Executive Secretary of the Uzbekistan SSR Orgbiuro in the Tajik ASSR was 
dissatisfied at the quality of the estimated total of about one thousand versts of tracts often 
known as “roads.” He recommended that five hundred versts be upgraded from mostly pack 
animal trails to roads traversable at least by carts.14 The arrival of the first ever car in Dushanbe 
in 1926 was a sign of immense improvement. The machine was a part of a convoy of fifteen 
passenger cars sent to serve the newly opened automobile road from Termez to the capital, which 
was further distinguished by its gravel surface layer—rare on Tajikistan’s roads.15 V. D. 
Karamov, even though he was at the time laboring on the railroad project between Samsonovo 
and Termez, knew of the accomplishment and views of its significance. He later recalled that 
“the event caused such a sensation that it was on a level far beyond that caused today by the 
launch of a trolleybus or of a large power plant. Even worldly people considered the passage of a 
car from Termez to Dushanbe to be a wonder.”16 
Karamov was well placed to comment on the impact of roads and changes to mobility on 
daily life in Tajikistan. After the line reached the capital in the fall of 1929, he was reassigned as 
director of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad Region. Even at his high post, pedestrian matters of 
encumbered mobility made his life difficult at every level. Complicated access to food and 
                                                
14 “Regarding workers,” RGASPI, f. 62 (Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Communist Party, 1922-1934), op. 2 (Documents, 1922-1934), d. 185 (January 1925-January 1926), ll. 75-76, 82 
(full document is ll. 72-82). 
15 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 34. 
16 V. D. Karamov, "O proshlom," in Govoriat stroiteli sotsializma v Tadzhikistane (Vospominaniia uchastnikov 
stroitel’stva sotsializma v Tadzhikistane), ed. A. M. Bogoutdinov (Dushanbe: Izd “Irfon,” 1967), 70. 
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shelter in his private life mirrored difficulties acquiring equipment and other supplies for the 
work he managed. The situation led him to frequently request relief from this post, and for 
permission to leave the region—perhaps to return to his home village in the Armenian SSR.17 
Tasked with improving and developing local transportation, he immediately became involved in 
the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Railroad project too. Eventually, he came to hold other significant 
posts in transportation development throughout Tajikistan, making him an important figure who 
had observed and participated in the development of mobility, from the ground up. 
Karamov and other officials encountered experiences at work and private life in 
Tajikistan during the 1920s and 1930s that shaped the manner in which Soviet institutions 
approached the relationship between economy and mobility. To them, the republic was 
characterized by a condition they referred to as “roadlessness” (bezdorozhnost’). The designation 
helped them describe the challenges to economic growth in terms of the landscape of Tajikistan. 
After the NTD, many authorities cast roadlessness as a “fundamental obstacle” to economic 
growth, equivalent to institutional disorganization, ubiquitous illiteracy, and guerilla rebel 
assaults.18 In Tajikistan of the 1920s and 1930s, however, roadlessness denoted more than 
shorthand for landscape and technical categorization. It was a way to describe the experience of 
being on and traveling across the territory, for researchers and military expeditionary parties, 
                                                
17 Message regarding business with “citizen Burkanov,” addressed to RKI (in Stalinabad), copy no. 4112, attributed 
to the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad Administration under the NKPS Management of the Central Asian Railroad, 
signed by Karamov (Deputy Head of Operations) and Shketik (Head of the Financial Division), 17 November 1929, 
TsGART, f. 350, op. 1, d. 23, l. 12 (full document); Message addressed to the RKI of the Tajik SSR, signed by 
Munzin Burkhanov (private citizen), 14 November 1929, TsGART, f. 350 (People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Inspectorate of the Tajik SSR, 1929-1932), op. 1, d. 23, l. 13b (full document is ll. 13a-b); RGASPI, f. 
121, op. 2, d. 235, l. 109; and A. Vishnevskii, "Stroitel' dorog," in Za narodnoe delo: Sbornik statei, ed. P. Evteev 
(Dushanbe: Izd. “Irfon,” 1970), 278. 
18 See, for example, RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680 (February-October 1926), l. 105; and RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, 
l. 138. For a summary scholarly characterization of Tajikstan’s roadlessnees up to the mid-1920s, see A. Ismoilov, 
Naqliyoti Tojikiston, (Dushanbe: Nashriyoti Davlatii Tojikiston, 1962), 42-45. 
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engineers and laborers, as well as for native residents. The implied comparison to a place where 
mobility was easier or better was based firmly in felt and measured physical phenomena. 
My emphasis on officials’ experiences in, and on their assessments of, the territory of 
Tajikistan leads me to a somewhat different view of the Russian Soviet concept of ‘roadlessness’ 
from that iterated in other North American and European scholarship. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, for 
example, sees bezdorozhnost’ as both a metaphorical and material term. Metaphorically, it was 
associated with the “sense of being lost of in a swamp, of aimlessness…the polar opposite of the 
‘path to socialism.’” Here, the term defined standards of modernity to be achieved by society in 
connection with mobility, and its meaning changed over time as Soviet technological and capital 
capacity, as well as ambitions, became greater. Materially, it referred to the “paucity of roads and 
the poor condition of roads,” near Moscow and Leningrad, and in the far reaches of the USSR.19 
To Siegelbaum, ‘roadlessness’ was almost synonymous with rasputitsa, which refers to seasonal 
impassibility of roads.20 Other works have demonstrated that ‘roadlessness’ is a term that was 
and continues to be appropriated colloquially and regionally in the former Soviet Union to have a 
variety of meanings at different moments and contexts.21 
The term bezdorozhnost’ also should be considered more literally. I have found that state 
and party officials, as well as published authors often used bezdorozhnost’ in a very concrete 
sense with reference to borderlands, whether outer regions within Russia, or republics of the 
                                                
19 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 134-136. 
20 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Roadlessness and the ‘Path to Communism’: Building Roads and Highways in Stalinist 
Russia,” Journal of Transport History 29, no. 2 (September 2008): 282. 
21 See, for example, Tatiana Argounova-Low, “Roads and Roadlessness: Driving Trucks in Siberia,” Journal of 
Ethnology and Folkloristics 1, no. 6 (2012): 76-77; and Yulian Konstantinov, “Roadlessness and the Person: Modes 
of Travel in the Reindeer Herding Part of the Kola Peninsula,” Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumplar 
Societies 26, no. 1 (2009): 27-49. 
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USSR, and especially Tajikistan.22 To be sure, “landscapes are simultaneously of the mind and in 
the world.”23 In popular culture of the early Soviet Union, the term roadlessness was used to 
gage both civilizational progress and physical conditions. A 1937 article pronounced the role of 
roads construction in the advancement and flowering of a multi-cultural Soviet society and 
economy where there once had been “backwardness.” 
In places where roadlessness had existed for ages, separating the borderlands from 
culture—where people trudged primitively on trails, scrambled on rocks, waded across 
rivers and got stuck in morass, using sledges instead of carts—there are now in many 
such regions of the country well-built roads and durable bridges traversed by Soviet 
automobiles.24 
Read alone, this passage could be analyzed as yet another Orientalist vindication of Soviet 
(imperial) progress and, less obviously, Russian (imagined) ethnic superiority. And, it is. The 
article also, however, referred to things that were material, which changed in quantitatively 
measureable ways, and to actions and events that were not substantially of the mind or ideology. 
It plainly described the increased, country-wide connectivity as a result of roads construction in 
regions of Russia such as the North (where 3,600 kilometers of new roads were built, while 
22,000 kilometers were repaired by the time of publication in 1937), and the Karelia ASSR (with 
1,000 kilometers of new roads since the Revolution). It also notes various ‘parts’ of more 
familiar borderlands like Georgia (where kilometers of roads grew from 2,280 in 1914 to 10,500 
in 1935), Dagestan (where 3,200 kilometers of road were built in just five years), and 
Kazakhstan (where the kilometers of automobile roads rose from 52,805 in 1911 to 101,608 in 
                                                
22 Siegelbaum’s different definition is partially attributable to a source-base that is more cultural than mine, and 
perhaps also to the fact that his work focuses on Russia (though it sometimes reaches beyond to make broader 
generalizations about the entire USSR). Kassymbekova also sees bezdorozhnost’ as a physical reality delaying 
Soviet state-building of Tajikistan. See “Humans as Territory,” 352-54. 
23  Nick Baron, “New Spatial Histories of Twentieth Century Russia and the Soviet Union: Surveying the 
Landscape,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge 55, no. 3 (2007): 377. 
24 N. Vasil’evich, “Ot bezdorozh’ia—k kul’turnym dorogam,” Doroga i avtomobil’, no. 11 (1937): 43. 
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1936).25 The article does not mention Tajikistan, nor any of its regions. A later Tajik source, 
however, estimated that by the start of the Second World War, the republic’s territory hosted 250 
kilometers of railroad, 1,800 kilometers of dirt road, and more than 100 kilometers of paved 
highway.26 Statistics on Soviet roads were often, however, confusing and contradictory, as 
Siegelbaum points out. Categorizations of various kinds of roads, and estimates of what 
constituted their length and completion, varied from source to source.27 
The landscape I am addressing is less the one of perception, and more one of physical 
potential, action, and experience. I conceive of the problem of Soviet landscape in Tajikistan in a 
way common with the “non-representational theory” school of landscape phenomenology. From 
this perspective, nature and environment are not only the container and object of human activity, 
but also negotiate it as active participants. As a result, “the act of representing (speaking, 
painting, writing) is understood by non-representational theory to be in and of the world of 
embodied practice and performance…the world is understood to be continually in the making—
processual and performative—rather than stabilized or structured via messages in texts and 
images…”28 For Tim Ingold, a prominent contributor to this school, this is a way of dissolving 
dichotomies between culture and biology. His “dwelling perspective” promotes the 
acknowledgment of human structures (real or imagined) as existing in and shaped by the present. 
It holds that built and natural environments “are never complete but continually under 
construction, and have life-histories of involvement with both their human and non-human 
                                                
25 N. Vasil’evich, “Ot bezdorozh’ia”: 43-46. 
26 Ia. Bronshtein, “Vliianie transporta na razvitie ekonomiki Tadzhikistana,” K probleme vyravnivaniia urovnei 
ekonomicheskogo razvitiia soiuznykh respublik (na primere Tadzhikskoi SSR), ed. Iu. I. Iskhakov et al. (Dushanbe, 
1968), 66. 
27 Siegelbaum, “Roadlessness”: 285. 
28 John Wylie, Landscape (New York: Routledge, 2007), 159, 164. 
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inhabitants.”29 Soviet officials’ demands and declarations about the desire to fill Tajikistan with 
roads were always accompanied by descriptions of how its landscape was not yet to the liking of 
the state under construction. 
The concern with roadlessness exposed the hybrid qualities of this Soviet landscape in 
southern Tajikistan. Here, efforts to promote a particular built environment were especially 
vulnerable to factors beyond human intention at a time of state weakness. In the 1920s, 
commentators used the term “roadlessness” to describe how transportation in the territory 
compared to that of other regions, as well as to express their assumption that a viable Soviet 
landscape was a roadful one. Karamov recalled the character of mobility in early Tajikistan from 
the vantage of a very different era in Tajikistan four decades later. 
Mountains, lined with trails, hot, waterless valleys, villages of dilapidated nomad tents, 
the occasional semblance of a fortress with wattle and daub walls—the castles of local 
beks of the era of the amirate. This was the landscape of East Bukhara of the recent past. 
One could walk the length and breadth of pre-revolution Tajikistan without encountering 
a single, marginally decent road. The [local] population exclusively used pack-animal 
transport. Not infrequently, goods were hauled long distances by humans, since [many] 
mountain trails and ravines could not be traveled by even a donkey…. It was a 
completely roadless land.30 
Karamov’s account, however subject to romanticizing the past, expressed experiences of 
travelling the land that accurately addressed the methods and feasibility of movement in the 
tsarist and early post-tsarist era of East Bukhara. Economic mobility happened by rafting on 
rivers that had never been engineered, as well as on dirt roads and paths through valleys and 
passes, traversable mainly by pack animals, rarely by carts pulled by draft animals, and some 
                                                
29 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 154. 
30 Karamov, "O proshlom," 65. 
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only by humans.31 The danger that socialists associated with moving through this territory 
corroborated native residents’ characterizations of mobility. For example, the steep slopes of the 
south-westerly route from pre-revolution Qurghonteppa to Qobodiyon earned it the Tajiki 
nickname of "dan-dan-shikan" (“the broken teeth”).32 
 
Exploring Roadlessness in Southern Tajikistan 
The schema for roads development in southern Tajikistan was based on planners’ knowledge of 
regions targeted for agriculture. Further work on infrastructure, as well as related economic 
ambitions, required more surveys to specify routes, forms of road, capital needs of construction, 
and schedules. In the unique conditions of this territory, roads surveying was conducted 
alongside all forms of study to overcome what officials saw as a disabling lack of data about the 
landscape.33 As a result, surveys for roads planning often had the character of larger exploratory 
missions. This section analyzes the impact of surveys on larger ambitions for the economic 
landscape of Soviet Tajikistan. I trace their reciprocal influence on the form of the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa route as it was surveyed in early stages, which set the tone for infrastructure 
development practices during the first five-year plan. The mutual dependence of roads and 
resource exploitation projects limited the extent to which either could be explored. In the interest 
of rapid development, explorations of Tajikistan’s economic potential had fixated on reviving 
existing agricultural regions and populated centers of southern Tajikistan.34 Since roads were 
                                                
31 TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 539, ll. 28, 41; TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 504, ll. 61-74; and Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii 
ocherk Tadzhikistana,” 229. 
32 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 14-15. 
33 See, for example, Komissiia Sredne-Aziatskogo Ekonomicheskogo Biuro po Delam Tadzhikistana, preface in 
Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana (Izd. Gosplana Tajik ASSR, 1926), iii. 
34 I. E. Khodorov, “Perspektivy khoziaistvennogo razvitiia Tadzhikistana,” in Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana, 
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meant to serve targeted agricultural regions, they tended to travel familiar territory, where 
discovery of new agricultural or mining resources was less likely. 
The legacy of Tajikistan’s territory represented a unique challenge because Soviet 
institutions aspired to replicate forms of environmental management there that it used elsewhere 
in the USSR. The deployment of roads infrastructures and modes of mobility, along with the 
replication of Union-level agencies at the level of republics (for example, Gosplan USSR 
cooperated with Gosplan Tajik SSR) was part of a large state building effort to standardize 
quality, function, and knowledge of all forms of institutions. The same process had already taken 
place in other countries, including in early nineteenth century Britain, the inventor of the 
“infrastructure state.” According to Jo Guldi, 
building with advanced planning was characterized by the production of a homogenous 
swath of space around the highway that was made uniform across the entire nation 
without regard to local differences in geography or political structure….The very 
landscape to either side of the road became part of a technological system standardized 
for use.35 
In the case of Soviet railways, highways, and dirt roads, standardization occurred through an 
evolving system of classifications related to the perceived purpose and significance of a road, 
which in turn impacted its funding and services as it was planned, constructed, and later 
maintained.36 
                                                
35 Jo Guldi, Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
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36 See, for example, Cover letter for “Proposal of guidelines for classification of highways and dirt roads,” addressed 
to Gosplan of the Tajik SSR, copy no. 2144, attributed to Central Department for Highways and Dirt Roads and 
Automotive Transport known as “Tadzhglavdortrans” (TGDT) under the SNK Tajik SSR, signed by Dadabaev 
(Director of TGDT) and Evreinov (Director of the Economic Planning Department), 10 June 1930, TsGART, f. 18, 
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signed by Dadabaev (Director of TGDT) and Evreinov (Director of the Economic Planning Department), TsGART, 
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In Tajikistan, however, the unfamiliar, inaccessible landscape made interpretation 
difficult—to say nothing of classification. In May of 1925, the Central Asia Bureau 
commissioned a report titled “Report on a Tour of Tajikistan,” which it sent on to several offices 
in Moscow. It confirmed that transportation in Tajikistan was both difficult and expensive. But it 
argued that a proper assessment of this and other sectors required greater study. “It is hard to 
determine the economic potential of the country since there are no statistical materials, 
credentials, [or] financial data. Nor are there any exchange offices, nor railroads, nor any places” 
from whence to receive information about pre-revolutionary economy and land.37  
Most exploratory research of Tajikistan consisted of short investigations, conducted in 
preliminary fashion, sometimes because of a lack of resources, and less often out of 
dismissiveness at the unfamiliar and unwelcoming environmental conditions of the territory.38 
One key Gosplan publication of 1926 is based, to a large extent, on only about three months of 
work accumulated between two expeditions to Tajikistan. Notably, they somehow conducted 
their work between the spring months of February and April, when travel within the country was 
very difficult.39 
Those who researched the roads of southern Tajikistan were tasked with finding the most 
convenient and cheap routes, which also would best serve maximal exploitation of natural 
resources. Their reporting frequently revealed awe and concern with the challenge presented by 
the land, which was categorically different from that encountered elsewhere in Central Asia. In 
                                                
37 “Report on the mission to Tajikistan,” addressed to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 
January 1925 (attached to summary report at RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 444, ll. 12-13), RGASPI, f. 17 (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, 1898, 1903-1991), op. 33 (Correspondence of the Office of the 
Secretariat and the Secret Section with local party organizations, 1920-1929), d. 444 (January-July 1925), ll. 22-23 
(full document is ll. 14-28). 
38 Poslavskii, “Ekonomicheskii ocherk Tadzhikistana,” 179. 
39 Preface, Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikistana, iii. 
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September of 1926, an engineer named Lemonus reported to the Central Asian Department of 
Local Transportation about his study of what would become the Southern Circle. He clearly 
wanted to be fairly technical, giving grades, heights, and distances, but his report is also filled 
with descriptions of a difficult landscape. The character and condition of roads is ever changing 
and often treacherous beyond expectation, rising and falling on passes, along mountains, and 
across steep chasms and rushing waters. In one passage, he explained that on an earlier leg 
between the villages of Kofarnihon and Vakhsh (which are also the names of rivers), the road 
could be traveled by carts, though in some places it was so narrow and steep that the driver 
needed to use his own hands to prevent the vehicle from falling down the hill.40 
The problems he faced were not unlike those facing the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad 
project concurrently under construction. Work persistently encountered unanticipated delays 
caused by landforms. Building crews frequently found that surveys took longer than expected. 
Just as often, they needed to be scrapped and redone. Shortly after the Termez-Dushanbe 
Railroad came under construction in 1927, an engineer named Dubrovin stopped work following 
a second study he conducted. He alleged that the original survey and the budgeting had not 
properly taken into account significant “technical complications” caused by the physical 
landscape, including the need to traverse several gorges of up to seventeen meters deep.41 In the 
documents I have seen, Dubrovin comes off as humbly fixing the work of other engineers, 
                                                
40 Report “on the expedition on the roads of government significance of the T[ajik] ASSR [September/October 
1925],” attributed to Lemonius (Representative of SAZOMES, and Engineer), TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 519, l. 89 
(full document is ll. 89-95). 
41 Report addressed to the “Deputy of the U.Ts. in Central Asia,” attributed to Dubrovin (U.Ts.G. Engineer), 
certified in Tashkent by Tolstiakov (Secretary of the “Government of the Tajik ASSR”), 29 October 1927, TsGART, 
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attributing their mistakes to a lack of knowledge of Central Asia, and to the fact that the route 
faced many topographical challenges as it neared the Tajikistan border.42 
Having traveled inside that boundary, Lemonus recommended practices that ultimately 
confirmed the character of roads construction in the Autonomous Republic in Tajikistan. He 
called on his employers to seek limited roadwork because of what he saw as an insignificant 
level of funding currently available. Instead of trying to enlarge pack animal paths into draft and 
carting roads, he recommended repairing particularly dangerous stretches. “On those trails that 
cause wreckage: construct safe bridges, widen paths on slopes, strengthen the baskets used to 
cross gorges on lines, and place signs at the intersection of routes.” Above all, though, he called 
for much more surveying and study of the land so that possible road plans would be viable when 
funds and projects were forthcoming.43 These recommendations more or less corresponded to the 
approach employed by the Soviet regime in Tajikistan. Few new major roads were constructed, 
while those commonly used were maintained for basic functionality. Although the greatest rise 
of automobile capable roads linking regions to the capital occurred during the first five-year 
plan, they were built quickly, with participants knowing their many defects, sub-par technical 
standards, and that they would need reconstruction.44 
The case of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad confirms that work on even priority transport 
was conducted shoddily to enable greater economic objectives. Its early construction, as with the 
roads, was provisional and understood to be needing later improvement. This approach 
                                                
42 “Report on the issue of the construction of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad (Dzhar-Kurghan to Surkhan-Kuterma 
leg),” signed by Dubrovin (Senior Engineer, Representative of NKPS in Central Asia), TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 530 
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of the Tajik ASSR, attributed to the Representation of NKPS in Central Asia (in Tashkent), 20 August 1927, 
TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 530 (t. 1), ll. 12a-b. 
43 TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 519, l. 94. 
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accommodated the weak state and its imperfect knowledge of the land it claimed to govern. A 
report by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (RKI) from as late as the summer of 1929 
explained that “secondary surveys” and new work to improve lines that had been built within the 
last year should not been seen as wasted work, but as necessary to the effectiveness of the 
railroad. Another statement from the same organization explained that, though bridges were 
preferred for river crossings, a lack of knowledge about water flows in southern Central Asia 
meant that culverts were temporarily preferred because of their technical simplicity. In some 
areas, even roadbeds were designed to be short term. As a result, the speed limit on the railroad 
remained at a low 20 kilometers per hour to avoid destruction by the passage of trains.45 
The ongoing exercise of surveying routes also reflected the decentralized character of 
planning and work implementation. Tracts that were pre-, post-, or under construction, were 
subject to competing research of people commissioned by the various Union and Central Asian 
agencies involved in planning and management of work. Organizations ranging from NKPS and 
RKI, to the Central Asia Bureau and the Tajikistan SNK, often disputed, resurveyed, and 
renegotiated routes and work plans. Officially cooperative, though often in conflict, these 
agencies worked together in complicated ways that included sharing budgets, laborers and other 
forms of capital, as well as logistics. 
                                                
45 “Clarification by the SAZ[OMES] administration regarding [its] comments on the report about ongoing 
construction on the Termez-Dushanbe line, attributed to the Representation of RKI in Central Asia,” signed by 
Puzinov, n.d., RGAE, f. 1884 (Ministry of Ways of Communication of the USSR), op. 80 (Central Administration 
of Railway Construction, or Glavzheldorstroi (1919-1946), d. 345 (September 1927-October 1929), ll. 37, 35 (full 
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The extent to which engineers’ apparent mistakes and disagreements appear to have been 
tolerated is partially explicable by the unique position they held in the hierarchy of planning in 
roads projects globally. Guldi finds that roads engineers of nineteenth century Britain were 
protected by law and mission to do their best with the difficult task of translating projects 
planned according to general standards into scientific and mathematical terms that could be 
implemented locally. These experts were cast as neutral observers who facilitated projects of 
great scale, importance, and permanence, as if they were above politics. “The result was a kind 
of civil engineering characterized by its deployment of large funds to alter landscapes without 
regard for local social or environmental context.”46 
Although Soviet planners and engineers appear to have begun their work on the 
Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Road with this type of attitude, they quickly came to terms with a 
physical environment context that challenged preliminary plans for how construction should 
unfold. Rather differently from Guldi’s vision of the British infrastructure state, the Soviet 
mobility landscape of the 1920s and 1930s was a working compromise. Officials managing 
territorial legacy and material shortage opted for what seemed most possible. Their desire for 
rapid economic growth in targeted regions of southern Tajikistan deployed a complicated series 
of overlapping surveys whose purpose was to seek the shortest, most cost-effective paths for a 
prospective railroad, and to ensure that it could be built rapidly. The desire for a better road to 
Qurghonteppa became a more definite goal in 1927, when Soviet officials came to see the 
southern city as the administrative and logistical center of the cotton agro-development project. 
They wanted to join it to the capital by a higher class of dirt road, traversable by horse-drawn 
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carts and automobiles.47 The Tajikistan Central Directorate of Highways and Dirt Roads 
(Glavnoe upravlenie shosseinykh i gruntovykh dorog, or Tadzhikglavdortrans), hereafter TGDT, 
succeeded in making the route traversable by limited automotive traffic in November.48 
Continued surveying and roadwork through that year had seen a significant increase in the 
number of improved roads in Tajikistan. One estimate suggests that in that year wheel-capable 
roads totaled 1592 kilometers—of them 504 kilometers traversable by automobile—and 1088 
kilometers for pack animals.49 
In 1928, however, Tajikistan officials convinced Moscow agencies to upgrade the route 
from a dirt road to a railroad, and to include the project in the first five-year plan.50 Stronger 
economic initiatives led officials to reconsider transportation needs between the capital and 
southern agricultural regions, and to lobby for the construction of a railroad between Stalinabad 
and Qurghonteppa. A November 1928 letter from the Tajikistan SNK to the Central Asia Bureau 
promoted this upgrade on grounds that this route should be prioritized after the anticipated 
completion of the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad.51 The message argued that a railroad would link 
cotton-rich areas like Iangi Bazar while supporting a growing Qurghonteppa, which was “to be 
the main cotton villaiat” of the southern agricultural regions. Transport needs for commodity 
exchange would rise alongside projections for cultivated cotton hectares to climb from 30,000 in 
1928-29 to 45,000 by the end of the first five-year plan. The letter’s authors wanted definitive 
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48 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 68, 71. 
49 Nazrulloev uses “wheel capable” or kolesnye as a collective category for roads that could carry carts and 
automotive vehicles. See Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 35-37. 
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surveying for the railroad to take place during the 1929-30 year, which they saw as critical to 
ensuring that the line, including service roads, be ready by the end of the five-year plan.52  
 
Environmental management and road type 
The railroad project was eventually scrapped, but officials only came to that decision after a 
process of experimental surveys and construction on the landscape they wanted to traverse more 
effectively. In this section, I examine how the combined challenges of environmental 
management and the rush to economic growth led authorities to abandon the planned railroad in 
favor of a highway project. The decision to do so, moreover, was accompanied and justified by a 
widespread agreement about the mobility capacities of Tajikistan’s territory. This land, many 
would conclude, was simply unsuited to railways. 
Before that, however, the shift to a railroad plan demanded a whole new program of 
surveys and construction schemes that was set to begin in the summer of 1929. An atmosphere of 
extreme urgency led officials responsible for designing the new tract to forego normally cautious 
procedures. The pressure they felt to move quickly was derived from the tense atmosphere under 
the first five-year plan. Moreover, the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad was slated for completion 
shortly, meaning that attention and resources focused on that priority transportation project 
would soon be transferred to the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Railroad. The Central Committee of 
the All-Union Communist Party ordered the new line be completed by the end of the 1930 
operating year, leading the representation of the Central Railroad Construction Department of 
NKPS to rush.53 This transportation organization announced the commencement of surveys 
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exploring not one, but two possible variants for the route (one to and along the Kofarnihon River 
and the other straight south to Qurghonteppa). The urgent atmosphere also led it to prepare to 
employ available labor to do assumed work “in order to speed up the job.” NKPS instructed 
Karamov’s Termez-Dushanbe Railroad construction organization to prepare to use working 
drafts of construction plans to at least begin construction in the capital city.54 These jumps to 
action reflected tendencies that would hinder the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road until it was 
done. Among them, moving to work before the project was defined led to wasted resources. 
More importantly, indecision hampered institutional will to operate quickly because officials 
were frequently uncertain about what routes to choose due to complicated technological 
challenges in the physical environment. 
The indecision and confusion created by the short timelines and environmental conditions 
were exacerbated by the expectation that surveys and construction take place concurrently. This 
norm was encouraged by a Gosplan USSR official named Poliudov, who immediately halted the 
program of work that NKPS had initiated. Electing to greater decisiveness instead of considering 
alternate routes, he determined the destination of the first leg of the line as the village of 
Kofarnihon, east of Stalinabad, just beyond Iangi-Bazar. He ordered that these first 19 kilometers 
of the railroad be built by the start of the rainy season in December.55 To overcome the fact that 
there was no finalized plan for even the first leg of the railroad, nor any satisfactory, trusted 
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survey, Poliudov called for concurrent and ongoing “secondary surveys” that made up for the 
lack of a clearly planned route.56 
Poliudov’s long-distance interference may have seemed like the kind of decisiveness 
needed. Instead, his continued attempts to control the road project from afar prematurely set the 
Soviet approach to environmental management of mobility between the capital and southern 
regions to the form of a railroad, and only led to further setbacks in roadwork progress. Though 
Poliudov’s orders Moscow certainly motivated work among transportation agencies based in 
Tashkent and Dushanbe, they did not translate into the speed that he evidently expected. The 
pace of surveying that first leg of the line was so slow that actual construction only started on 5 
December—four days later than Poliudov’s deadline for completion. The consequences of his 
impatience in August were borne out now by a total work stoppage that would cost the Tajik 
SSR and other organizations much money and time. On 19 December, Poliudov announced that 
an entirely new round of surveys and budgeting exercises would be conducted by a new 
commission comprising several union-level organizations and “engineer specialists.”57 This 
meant increased costs and time for several reasons. The first action corresponding to the new 
round of planned exploration was Poliudov’s order to divert the line from the Kofarnihon to 
nearby Lokai Begi (which had been the preferred destination of engineers on site). Karamov’s 
work crews would now extend the tracks three kilometers farther at a cost of 420,000 rubles 
more than planned.58 As discussed in Chapter 1, moreover, work stoppages in general cost Soviet 
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institutions money. This standstill dragged-on for six months, and Tajikistan officials became 
increasingly concerned about the expenses it would engender.59  
Poliudov’s erratic actions reflected Gosplan USSR’s desire to entertain an NKPS 
proposal. The transportation agency wanted to consider replacing the planned railroad with a 
“concrete road” for automotive vehicles on an American model—the highway.60 Its officials 
were motivated by concerns with the stark difference between Tajikistan’s terrain and that of 
most of the USSR. The problem, ultimately, was that techniques that might have worked 
elsewhere encountered under-anticipated environmental challenges here. Unlike in most other 
parts of the USSR, there was no legacy of pre-Revolution tracks on the land for the regime to 
reconstruct. Furthermore, Russia in particular offered few topographical obstacles to the 
construction of railway infrastructure, with even the Ural Mountains offering “numerous easy 
passageways.” Holland Hunter explains that with the exception of the southern edge of Central 
Asia, Western Siberia, and certain eastern regions of the USSR, “in general it can safely be said 
that the USSR is fortunate in the topographical conditions it offers for railroads."61 In the 
mountains of Tajikistan, moreover, the growing consensus was that it was simply easier to build 
automobile roads.62 So, over the course of the winter and early spring months, several agencies 
conducted a variety of surveys, producing reports based on these as well as earlier studies. 
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Although the NKPS proposal was eventually successful, most related reports resisted the 
new perspective on railroads. They argued that the greater initial expenses of constructing tracks 
would rapidly be justified by their far greater cost-effectiveness in use by comparison with a 
highway. Quite simply, these opponents to the change estimated that railroads could carry much 
more freight more cheaply than automotive roads, and that railroads required less ongoing 
maintenance after they were built.63 A February report in favor of the railway argued that its  
greater profitability would “within the next few years offset the difference in the cost of 
construction.”64 A table in this report provided figures that were repeated in many other 
documents on the subject, as reproduced in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Comparative costs of railroad and highway (avto-shosse) construction on a 
Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa route (1930)65 
Key cost indicators (in rubles, unless noted otherwise) Railroad Highway 
Total cost of construction 35,000,000 13,905,500 
Cost per kilometer 360,000 124,000 
Annual operational cost (Ezhegodnye eksploatatorsk. raskhody) 5,426,000  16,558,000 
Operational cost per ton of freight (kopeks) 7.8  20.1 
 
The authors of such documents were conscious of the fact that the surveys serving as the basis 
for these comparisons and planning were only “conducted tentatively,” and rarely gave 
consideration to non-railway possibilities.66 They made up for such uncertainty by focusing on 
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the larger economic context. Proponents of the railroad argued that up-front costs would be 
rapidly repaid by the economic growth of the Qurghonteppa region, as reasoned in another 
report. 
“Considering that the roadless period will go on for several more months and that, in this 
period, shipping cargo will be expensive…and furthermore there are well known 
obstacles to carting transport, and that the construction of roads for automobiles or 
carting is not expedient, it follows that we should choose to construct a railroad.”67 
Authors of studies comparing road types rarely, however, gave such explicit suggestions or 
conclusions. Evidently, supporting one form or the other involved high stakes. Though most 
reports favored railroads over highways because of long-term cost comparisons, they usually 
deferred to the reader with phrases like “the final choice of this type of road or of the other 
presents itself for your disposal.”68 
Officials were drawn to the highway project because of the lesser “technological” and 
labor requirements, its lower costs, and to the fact that they could thus build it faster. Problems 
referred to as “technical” involved construction challenges in the native physical environment, 
which involved the likelihood of wasted resources. These issues of terrain as one RKI official 
explained, resulted in “the lack of a clear plan and the hesitation with respect to choosing 
variants for temporary routes…have created uncertainty concerning the deployment of survey 
workers, and the surveys themselves.”69 Others explained that the considerations that led to a 
Soviet preference for railroads did not suit the actual needs of transportation infrastructure in 
Tajikistan. Freightage within the republic, they argued, was low-intensity by comparison, 
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characterized by relatively light freight and passenger flows on relatively short distances. 
Automobile roads were simply far more rational as instruments of mobility than risky railway 
routes of the low quality that were being built.70 Already while the Stalinabad to Iangi-Bazar leg 
was under construction, for example, laborers unaccustomed to the regional environment 
mismanaged the semi-frozen winter soils making up the bed of the railroad track. An RKI report 
explained that “when this thawed, the road began to come apart…causing almost daily 
derailment of freight shipments.”71 
Ongoing surveys indicated that highways were also a better short-term option for 
managing other challenges to mobility inherent in the physical environment. In fact, water was 
perhaps the greatest ongoing concern and threat to transportation infrastructure. Since the 
establishment of Tajikistan, planners and engineers involved in roadwork and irrigation 
development voiced concerns about their ability to construct effective infrastructure with their 
insubstantial knowledge of water flow patterns in the republic. Roads surveying was conducted 
virtually alongside studies of  “hydrometeorological” data in order to better understand seasonal 
precipitation and the behavior of waterways, especially with respect to assigning bridges to 
particular locations.72  Experts involved in the railroad project warned that the “enthusiasm for 
this non-existent project could lead to problems with the diversion of water” from the structures 
of the railway, and was the reason why many bridges were constructed as the “temporary 
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type.”73 Persistent concerns with the power of water were justified in the summer of 1930, when 
the Tajikistan Central Committee Secretary complained that recent “meteorological events” had 
destroyed bridges, irrigation ditches, and cotton crops, making travel on both roads and in fields 
more difficult.74 Later that year, the Central Asian Affiliate of the Automobile Road Research 
Institute initiated a project to study “hydrometeorological influence on dirt, gravel, and paved 
roads” in hopes of overcoming the environmental challenges to economic growth in Tajikistan.75 
The solid terrain caused surveying engineers even more trepidation. The diversity of the 
possibilities that they considered reflected the challenge that the territory of Tajikistan 
represented the next stage of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa route involved traversing the “high, 
mountainous Rangon Ridge.” Those routes that were most seriously considered traveled by a 
combination of bridge, tunnel, or pass by way of either the Sangarsk Pass, the Zerdoli Pass, or 
their ultimate choice of the Tiuia-Nazar Pass.76 Only in the case of the Sangarsk Pass were 
automobile roads also concurrently considered. Survey results showed that an automobile road 
was a far cheaper and easier endeavor. The cheapest automobile highway (class 6) would cost 
about 124,000 rubles per kilometer. The most expensive of three other possible highway routes 
was just twelve thousand more. Surveyors found that the least costly option for a road was to 
cross the ridge at the Sangarsk Pass, where the landform was narrowest, at an average cost of 
360,000 rubles per kilometer. A railroad going by that route, meanwhile, was double the cost of a 
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highway because the tracks would have to cross the ridge via 1.42 kilometer-long tunnel, rather 
than by a pass.77 
 
A highway for a different Soviet landscape 
The evidence in favor of the highway project swayed the various union level-institutions 
involved in the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road project, and initiated new negotiations for funds 
and planning. Executive approval was important because the project had major implications 
beyond its relevance to the Tajik SSR’s economy. The new plan for the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa Highway would be, based on new discussions with “Americans.” As throughout 
the USSR, American engineers and expertise, as well as equipment, were used to accelerate 
economic growth in Tajikistan, particularly in the development of irrigation infrastructure in the 
Vakhsh River Valley.78 The move to switch road types moreover represented abandoning some 
autonomy in transportation since railroad construction in the USSR was one of the few economic 
sectors where foreign expert advice was not desired.79 Consulting with foreign experts was a 
serious matter, and thus required high-level justification. The key authorities involved were 
Poliudov and M. D. Guseinov, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Tajikistan. STO and RKI were also influential in the adoption of the plan.80 Spurred by 
the news of the change of project, executive members of the Tajik SSR SNK and of TGDT 
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began to negotiate and lobby for more money and on behalf of particular possible routes for the 
highway.81 
The decision in May 1930 to build a highway was thus a major turning point. It was the 
culmination of multi-agency negotiations, and called for a very different approach to mobility, 
involving new foreign participants and methods, To this extent, it was a new start, even if the 
same basic rationales connected the need for a better landscape of mobility to desired economic 
growth. The Tajikistan government went ahead with lobbying to push central USSR agencies to 
officially start construction of the highway that very same May. Their key obstacle was the issue 
of payment to “the Americans.” Khodjibaev succeeded in securing an NKPS contribution of 
eighty thousand dollars to the one hundred thousand dollars required in advance, out of a total 
contracted four hundred-thousand-dollar fee. His appeals were always voiced in terms of larger 
scale objectives and authority, noting this money would justify the 4 million rubles newly 
allotted roadwork, and facilitate the “mechanization of work and transportation on the [southern] 
circle” road.82 He argued that doing so would “realize the Union Government’s objectives [with 
respect to production of] cotton in the Qurghonteppa okrug [being a] part of the Vakhsh issue.”83 
The government was planning a major program of irrigation development for cotton agriculture 
                                                
81 Message addressed to Khodjibaev (SNK Tajik SSR), attributed to Anvarov (in Moscow), n.d., TsGART, f. 18, op. 
1, d. 102, l. 69a (full document is ll. 69a-b). 
82 Message addressed to Khodjibaev (SNK [Tajik SSR]), copy no. 128, attributed to Dadabaev (in Moscow), receipt 
recorded at 13:00 by Alekseev and passed to Avanesov on 3 May (1930), TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 213 (full 
document). 
83 Message addressed to Rudzutak (NKPS in Moscow), attributed to Khojibaev (SNK Tajik SSR in Stalinabad), 
copied to the Representation of the Tajik SSR to the USSR, 5 May 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 219 (full 
document). 
  
96 
in the Vakhsh River valley, where Qurghonteppa was located.84 As this new round of lobbying 
began, surveying continued, as did the acquisition of supplies for road construction. 
In connection to the changing form of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa road, the prestige 
associated with railroad work changed. For officials like Karamov, who had been responsible for 
road construction and management in the republic done so far, this was also a moment of 
vulnerability. The move to change road types was partially brought on by the low quality of the 
tracks laid. May 1930 was thus a turning point in Karamov’s career, and he seized the moment to 
defend his record and to air his concerns about how transportation should be supported going 
forward. As an official who worked in transportation, his appeal to preserve his own legitimacy 
in future operations was firmly based in the Soviet understanding of Tajikistan’s landscape that 
had influenced conversations on economy for more than a decade. He accused the investigatory 
commissions that had cancelled the railroad project of being unfairly critical of not only himself, 
but also of the various experts and laborers on his staff, who had done their best to work hard in 
what he called “conditions that are unbearable for humans… which I will not dwell on here, but 
will detail in personal discussions.” These conditions, he claimed, had led to the deterioration of 
his health, and were the reason why he requested relief from his post, and to furthermore be 
allowed to depart from the region—a desire he strongly expressed in other communications as 
well.85 
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Whatever his real motivation, Karamov was a divisive figure, willing to criticize his 
superiors from the vantage of credibility built on knowledge and experience of working on the 
territory in question. This privilege evidently made him important to various authorities, and it is 
notable that the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa highway project only got properly underway after his 
concerns were observed, and even more so after he became involved as its director. Among his 
supporters was RKI, which recommended his reports to Tajik authorities as they commenced 
planning of highway construction.86 
Key among Karamov’s recommendations was the need to match material support for 
roadwork to challenges of the physical environment. From his point of view, the failure of the 
Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa railroad project was due to “incredible troubles” that were unique to 
the landscapes of southern Central Asia. Here, he found it unacceptable that coordinating 
agencies’ constant demands and expectations that his construction teams should keep pace with 
“tempos tied to processes of socialist reconstruction in the agricultural sectors of the Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan republics.” Karamov explained that “all construction departments, and all 
technical personnel and laborers were busy with the elimination of wash-outs.”87 Unstable soils 
and waters frequently damaged roads after completion, making maintenance equal in importance 
to construction. His operations faced “roadlessness, morass, nasty winter weather, the absence of 
transportation, temporary crossings [bridges], interruptions in supply, periodic productivity 
crises, and above all a lack of materials and a scarcity of technical equipment related to the 
pumping of water, etc.”88 
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Faith in Karamov’s opinion was closely linked with the fate of the highway project, 
which ended up under his management thirteen months later. The year after the new road was 
approved was characterized by a massive reorganization of transportation in the republic 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3). In early 1931, Tajikistan’s SNK began following 
Karamov’s advice, and commenced prioritizing all forms of construction capital (laborers, means 
of transport, and equipment) for the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Highway, since the project only 
currently had about twenty-two percent of the laborers needed, and twenty-five percent of the 
carts needed.89 This effort was so momentous and successful that TGDT sometimes found itself 
with more equipment than it could use.90 In the meantime, Karamov’s supporters worked to 
ensure that he give up his current position with the Termez-Dushanbe Railroad Region to take 
over as head of TGDT. Officially, he took this post on 5 August 1931, though his 
correspondence of the previous month indicates that he did so reluctantly, finding himself caught 
in a turf war between controlling institutions in Tashkent—some of which evidently disliked 
him. Karamov had fully agreed to take the post on 28 July, when the Chairman of the Central 
Asia Bureau, Bauman, personally appeared in Dushanbe to convince him to officially accept the 
job, and to prevent interference by the Chairman of the VKP(b) in Central Asia, Klimenko. This 
party elite was himself the supervisor of the Central Asian railroad region, and was trying to 
keep Karamov as his cadre in Stalinabad.91 
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Karamov’s accession to directorship of TGDT is closely associated with concerted 
progress on the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Highway project, as well as on other roads across the 
republic. One estimate suggests that during the course of Karamov’s tenure at TGDT, from 
1932-1936, approximately eight thousand kilometers of road were constructed. Those viewed to 
be most significant were the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Highway, as well as those from the 
capital to Tashkent, to Garm, and the Great Pamiri tract.92 Some of Karamov’s successes are 
attributable to his aggressive resistance to criticism from coordinating agencies ultimately 
responsible for planning, and his willingness to protect his managers from scapegoating.93 
The time consumed while the Tajik SSR accumulated capital and find a good director of 
construction were major reasons why work on the highway was further delayed. These dynamics 
are based in a history of Tajikstan that turns on Soviet management of the physical environment 
to create a new economic landscape. And it leads to a different, more accurate understanding of 
this railroad project with all its implications, than that provided by other historians. Selective (or 
limited) use of sources leads scholars them to mischaracterize the chronology of the project. 
Nazrulloev claims that work on the road was completed by December of 1932, and that the road 
was opened for year-round passage on the sixteenth of that month. Up to fifty-four work brigades 
had labored on four different legs of the road through the year, and had a major breakthrough 
with the completion of the Tuia-Nazar Pass in February 1932. Where passage between the 
capital and Qurghonteppa had once taken three to four days, it now could be completed in 
several hours by automobile.94 Shapirov simply praises the accomplishments of road work 
during the first five-year plan, implying that this highway was included. “Tajikistan transformed 
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itself from a land of classical roadlessness into one having a well-developed network of ways of 
communication.”95 In the fall of that year, Karamov also estimated that most of the “basic” work 
of the road had been completed during the fiscal year that was ending.96 The Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa Highway, I believe, was probably completed to a point where it was functional 
with regularity sometime between late 1932 and late 1933. 
Other documentation, however, shows that the work that had been completed was not 
sufficient, and that considerable tasks lay ahead. TGDT faced a variety of environmental 
challenges along the way, whose influence heightened the ambiguity associated with completion 
for years to come. Even those legs that had been completed were unable to stand up to the 
increasingly intense interactions of traffic and natural environmental factors. Karamov’s fall 
1932 report explained that economic growth in other sectors “significantly outpacing the 
development of roads economy.” Whereas dirt roads may have been sufficient to local conditions 
and expectations in the 1929-30 fiscal year, the national economy since 1931 demanded roads 
having covered surfaces and new wheel roads (novykh kolesnykh dorog), to replace the pack 
animal transport that still comprised a significant position in transportation in Tajikistan.97 “The 
introduction of carts and automobiles is closely tied to [the quality of] roads. The loessial soils in 
mountainous conditions are absolutely insurmountable for carts during the season of bad roads 
[rasputitsa], and difficult for pack animal transport of horses and donkeys.”98 
The task of overcoming the tension between the character of Tajikistan’s soils and the 
technology used to build roads in them was not a simple matter of the state exerting sufficient 
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effort and resources. Certainly, layering supplies were often in demand, and surveyors were still 
tasked with keeping an eye out for deposits of materials, such as gravel, suited to roadwork. A 
recently established Scientific-Research Institute for Automotive Transport in Dushanbe 
conducted ongoing work was taking place to research technologies for especially appropriate 
surface layers of new roads and highways, often in coordination with the Central Automobile 
Roads Institute.99 Frustrated engineers continued to see parts of roads crumble away in certain 
places when subjected to traffic and to such natural environmental forces as changes in season 
and water levels. A January 1932 memo, for example, requested that a “permanent” paved 
surface be put on the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Highway because the gravel covering it had 
(itself rare in the region) did not stand up to the passage of heavy vehicles like tractors, nor to 
ubiquitous and seasonally variable run-off water.100 
The most glaring challenge to the timeline showing completion of the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa Highway in December 1932 was the need for a bridge across the Vakhsh River, 
connecting the majority of the road from the north to Qurghonteppa. In February of 1932, the 
SNK of the Tajik SSR set the remainder of the fiscal year’s goals for work on the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa Highway. It resolved to have the road between the capital and Uialov 
completed—including roadbed and surface layer, with tarring in some places. Uialov is 
northwest of Qurghonteppa, on the other side of the Vakhsh River. The statement specified that 
plans about the direction and surface materials for this last leg of the road could only be decided 
after the location of a connecting bridge was chosen. Surveying for this crossing, it was resolved, 
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could be completed by the 1 July 1932, so that preparatory work could be done in time to have it 
completed by the end of the following year.101 Nazrulloev confirms that this bridge, constructed 
of wood, was completed in 1933, while a second, iron and stone bridge was built by 1935, along 
with several other “permanent bridges.”102 
 
Conclusion 
The completed Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa Highway connected the republican capital with the 
center of cotton agricultural production under development. The new, Soviet built environment 
of these cities, agricultural regions, and the road connecting them, was a work in-progress, 
emerging in a form and at a tempo mediated by the native physical environment. The state’s 
efforts to impose structures and lifeways in common with the rest of the USSR were impeded by 
a lack of knowledge of this land, and by the unique challenges it embodied. The Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa road and its growing network of connected roads, however, shaped Tajikistan’s 
capacity for economic growth that depended on mobility. The Vakhsh and Kofarnihon river 
valleys became major centers of cotton and other agriculture, where mobility enabled 
resettlement and land reform that permanently changed the economic character of the land.103 
The critical role of roads in these matters was reflected in the acclaim that Karamov came to 
receive over the course of the 1930s, and his rise through the ranks of state and party agencies 
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before his death in 1956.104 Tajikistan’s new, Soviet landscape was composed of a physical 
environment under construction that required further study and continuous management of extant 
elements that could affect built structures. Without ongoing repair of current roads, they would 
become unusable, while water, in the form of rising rivers and unanticipated rains and run-off, 
regularly damaged various legs and bridges of the route.105 The built environment and landscape 
of the state remained a work in-progress in Tajikistan, as basic capacities, such as dedicated road 
repair teams, were established during the years to come.106  
But it would be an exaggeration to suggest, as Shapirov does, that almost overnight 
“Tajikistan transformed itself from a land of classical roadlessness into one having a well-
developed network of ways of communication.” Transportation dependent activities continued to 
be operate at sub-standard levels, frustrating Soviet officials of Tajikistan, as across the USSR. 
In 1934, for example, a letter from Dushanbe took from ten to twenty days to reach Moscow, 
while it required an average of from fifteen to twenty-five days to travel between regions of 
Tajikistan.107 The ability to maintain and improve these routes that affected the exchange of 
information, commodities, and the existence of other built structures of economy. As I discuss in 
Chapter 3, this activity also depended on factors of transportation and logistics that were only 
tangentially related to the roads, especially in locations where infrastructure was still new and 
low standard. Material dynamics working in tandem with roads promoted the Soviet landscape. 
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Some of these, like the horse breeding complex that I discuss in Chapter 4, were means of 
mobility that accommodated the continuous impact of the terrain’s legacy on Soviet goals.
  
105 
CHAPTER 3 
MOVING LIKE A STATE: 
COMMODITY CHAINS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TAJIKISTAN 
  
Tajikistan imported the Soviet Union. Literally. This republic’s economic growth depended on 
capital that traveled by way of the USSR’s commodity chains. The freight included exclusively 
basic supplies sourced in other regions: timber (round and processed), metals and metal products, 
concrete, and even rock, gravel, sand, and food, in addition to animals, people, machines such as 
automotive vehicles, and other things. This chapter will outline the nature of Tajikistan’s need 
for commodities in the 1920s and 1930s, and some ways that this exigency was satisfied by 
networks of material exchange. I examine how capital was imported and distributed, by whom, 
and the way in which the process mediated state building as economic growth. 
The operations of these goods flows were causally connected to the establishment of a 
physical environment for the desired economy. As I demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, a primary 
motivation for the establishment of roads infrastructure within Tajikistan and linking it to other 
Soviet regions was to provide new and needed platforms for transnational cargo exchange with 
respect to the new republic. Infrastructure alone, however, did not make commodity chains, and 
indeed the quality and number of roads in Tajikistan in this period was low. My analysis of 
shipping operations addresses the actors and agencies that participated in transporting 
commodities by using whatever routes were available, and sometimes despite them. I define the 
things moved as primary products, or as “low-value-added,” basic goods, and I approach the 
networks they traveled in terms of the inclusive chain concept of world systems theorists. 
Jennifer Bair explains that this terminology also refers to the idea “that labor power is critical 
input into every commodity chain” and looks at various forms of labor management at sites 
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along a chain.1 I analyze how agents of significance to Tajikistan’s exchange networks 
participated in dynamic material relationships spanning the republic and the USSR. “‘Private’ 
sources of commodity chain power,” as Kate McDonald calls such actors, comprised 
transnational governance. 2 The freightage activities that I evaluate involved physical 
connections between specific actors and locations that illuminate workings and limits of Soviet 
political authority and economic possibility. 
This chapter accounts for some of the ways that the project goals of officials based in 
Moscow, Tashkent, and Dushanbe were translated into material exchange through human action, 
and ultimately into infrastructure construction. To achieve this, I explicitly avoid still dominant 
frames of understanding developed by Cold War-era scholars of economy. They promoted the 
view that the first five-year plan inaugurated the so-called command system, a highly centralized 
state bureaucracy for economic management that changed very little between the early 1930s and 
1957.3 Their body of studies is dominated by a familiar, but confusing picture: nothing worked as 
intended and privation was ubiquitous, and yet enterprises flourished as gargantuan efforts 
continued. So, how did it work? I contend that the daily operations of commodity chains 
successfully supported material changes under socialism because they were characterized by 
market relations. Shipping agencies and their agents, as well as the clients they served, engaged 
in freightage through activities that were frequently outside the plan. Often, deliveries were 
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2 Kate Macdonald, The Politics of Global Supply Chains: Power and Governance beyond the State (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2014), 3-5. 
3 See, for example, Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1992), 214-17; James R. Millar, The ABCs of Soviet Socialism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 26, 29; 
and Joseph S. Berliner, “The Contribution of the Soviet Archives,” in Behind the Facade of Stalin’s Command 
Economy: Evidence from the Soviet State and Party Archives, ed. Paul R. Gregory (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2001), 1–10. 
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solicited or executed on the basis of ad hoc arrangements whereby cargo haulers exchanged their 
services for compensation from the recipient organization. Together, these commodity chain 
actors regularly chose to put supply and demand, and money as a means of exchange, ahead of 
concerns about ideological conformity with large-scale economic and nationalities policies. 
This chapter joins a growing family of studies re-assessing Soviet economic life by 
focusing on how it operated. By engaging state agents, these newer works expand the range and 
type of actors, practices, and policies available for analysis. They also show that the Soviet 
economy was an influential factor of daily life alongside and inside, and not secondary to 
politics; it was characterized by definite causes for ubiquitous phenomena, such as commodity 
“shortages,” that tend to be uncritically accepted as characteristic of Soviet socialism.4 Elena 
Osokina, for example, demonstrates that the Stalin era was characterized by a “symbiosis” of 
planned economy and markets, without which neither enterprises nor individuals could have 
survived—a development to which both individuals and the state contributed.5 Commodity 
chains are an aspect of Soviet economy that historians usually address only indirectly. The messy 
business of transporting goods—“reality,” as Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart refer it —was 
rarely planned in detail by central officials, and was left for lower authorities and sector 
                                                
4 See, for example, articles in the “Stalinism and the Economy,” ed. Andrew Sloin and Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, 
special forum, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 7-124; Kristy 
Ironside, “Krushchev’s Cash-and-Goods Lotteries and the Turn Toward Positive Incentives,” Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Review 41, no. 3 (2014): 296-323; and Serguei Alex. Oushakine, “‘Against the Cult of Things’: On Soviet 
Productivism, Storage Economy, and Commodities with No Destination,” Russian Review 73, no. 2 (April 2014): 
202. For a typical understanding of shortages, see Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Russian and Soviet 
Economic Performance and Structure, 6th ed. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 115, 127. 
5 Elena Osokina, “A Market in a Non-Market Economy” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Historical Association, New York, 5 January 2015); and Elena Osokina, Za fasadom “Stalinskogo izobiliia”: 
Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii naseleniia v gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941 (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998). For 
Soviet-era western studies and understandings of what they call “mostly hidden” economic relationships, see, for 
example, Gregory Grossman and Vladimir G. Treml, eds., The Second Economy in the USSR and Eastern Europe: A 
Bibliography, Paper No. 1 of the Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers on the Second Economy in the USSR (Durham: 
Duke University Department of Economics, September 1985). 
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enterprises to figure out.6 Commodity chain actors who daily operated between source and 
destination mediated the pace and scale of economic growth (probably often unwittingly) in a 
way that central planners and recipient enterprises could not. 
My approach makes their world of logistics and transportation a contingency of Soviet 
economic growth. Commodity chains of the early Stalin period were fragile and improvised, 
easily and frequently disrupted. My analysis of the materials exchange they conducted illustrates 
the complicated cross-sectoral and trans-regional integration of shipping operations. Tajikistan 
elites and lower cadres were together involved in intensively lobbying officials and agencies of 
all sorts, and in multiple other republics, to maximize the chances of needed supplies arriving. I 
evaluate the peculiarities and challenges facing the importation of two kinds of capital: timber 
and human labor. These cases demonstrate that, at least in Tajikistan, even top “central” 
authorities of the republican Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) were involved in efforts to 
move such commodities. My evaluation of the interactions of agents across economic, political, 
social, and regional sectors illuminates operational understandings of the significance of capital 
flows in ways that more “traditional” emphasis on products, industries, or statistical inputs and 
outputs cannot possibly adduce.7 
By focusing on tangible dynamics, this chapter furthermore contributes to new 
materialisms scholarship—including new economic history—that “testifies to a critical and 
nondogmatic reengagement with political economy, where the nature of, and relationship 
between, the material details of everyday life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic 
                                                
6  Gregory and Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance, 102-103. 
7 Raphael Kaplinsky, “Globalisation and Unequalisation: What Can Be Learned from Value Chain Analysis?” 
Journal of Development Studies 37, no. 2 (2000): 128-29. 
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structures is being explored afresh.”8 Most critical analyses of local-global relations within 
commodity chains emphasize how metropoles or agents of capitalist markets exploit peripheries 
of empires, typically, as Jonathan Curry-Machado notes, through capital extraction “in favour of 
the European and North American powers.”9 This reflects the fact that the broader literature on 
commodity chains sees the transportation of capital as a distinctly capitalist issue, tied to 
particular strategies of “competition” in the historical and contemporary advancement of markets 
and world-scale integration.10 More nuanced works, however, address global markets to analyze 
the social construction of “interconnectedness” in transnational history.11 Some postcolonial 
studies, for example, acknowledge that dynamic flows of capital, people, and ideas could be 
mutually constitutive of metropoles and peripheries.12 This chapter proceeds with an examination 
of the endeavor to achieve this kind of profound physical connectedness, and finds that it both 
sustained and confounded the Soviet state in the Tajik SSR. 
I analyze how commodity chains worked through documents produced by officials 
intimately involved in freightage, who had practical knowledge of ways that the economy 
functioned, and how commodities could be transported. Legal documents, reports, and 
correspondence about shipping reveal many of the relationships and dynamics that shaped the 
                                                
8 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” introduction in New Materialisms  : 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 7. See 
also  William H. Sewell, Jr., “A Strange Career: The Historical Study of Economic Life,” History and Theory 49 
(December 2010): 146–66. 
9 See Paul S. Ciccantell, David A. Smith, and Gay Seidman, eds., Nature, Raw Materials, and Political Economy 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI, 2005); and Jonathan Curry-Machado, ed., Global Histories, Imperial Commodities, 
Local Interactions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
10 See, for example, Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994). 
11 See, for example, Kenneth Pomeranz, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 
1400 to the Present, 3rd ed. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2013). 
12 See Gary Wilder, The French Imperial State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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contours of cargo transportation activities. Their inherent value is that they originate beyond the 
limits of scholarly approaches that focus on central control. Thus, while Gregory explains that 
"the five-year plans were a vision of the future with little or no operational significance," few 
scholars have attempted to engage the uncertainty that prevailed in daily activities of economy. I 
am able to account clearly for various participants, along with material and spatial factors that 
influenced the shipping operations and outcomes of southern Tajikistan in the early 1930s.13 
Importantly, many of my sources were produced by officials and institutions assigning or 
debating responsibility for actions related to freightage before, during, and after an expected 
shipping event occurred or was desired. While conversations about fault cannot themselves be 
taken at face value, engaging them on their own terms often reveals agents involved in activities, 
as well as the relationships, histories, and causes that lead to events and indeed a range of 
outcomes.  
Such information demonstrates not only that acquiring supplies for major economic 
organizations of Tajikistan was complicated. It also did not fit with some common views of the 
organization of shipping based on certain cases of Russian organizations. Gregory claims that 
concerns about commodity chains of whatever form led most Soviet enterprises to avoid a high 
degree of specialization. “The chances of receiving materials and other inputs on a timely basis 
through official supply channels were favorable only if they were produced within your own 
organization… The more remote the supplier, such as in another glavk [chief administration] or 
even in another ministry the lower your chances.”14 Such statements do not conform to the 
                                                
13 Gregory and Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 123; and Paul R. Gregory, The 
Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives (Cambridge, U.K.; Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 178. 
14 Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism, 178. 
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possibilities available to economic organizations based in Tajikistan, and they obscure the 
complexities facing agents across the USSR. I have found that in Tajikistan, higher 
governmental bodies were often concurrently critical of and sympathetic to the work brigades 
and laborers because of because of working conditions—perhaps especially so in the case of 
shipping agencies and personnel.15 Enterprises in the many newly defined and settled economic 
regions of Russia also faced complex challenges to supplying and supporting their laborers with 
goods that had little to do with economic projects. 
The chapter begins with a discussion the stakes involved in importing commodities to 
Tajikistan, and the dependency of economic enterprises on specialized shipping organizations. I 
proceed by examining how the need for foreign timber translated into complicated unplanned 
events for couriering it from Russia. I thereafter examine the manner in which timber and other 
commodities were distributed within the republic by shipping services meant to be centrally 
organized, but in reality characterized by dispersed authority and necessary illegal operations. 
Finally, I assess the impact of markets on imported labor, and how Soviet officials worked to 
reconcile this reality with official regulations. 
 
 
 
                                                
15 See, for example, Message addressed to Tadzhikmatlubot, copied to several organizations, attributed to the 
Stroimaterial trust of VSNKh of the Tajik SSR, signed by Kin'shakov (Office Manager) and Kostelei (Secretary), 
received 7 July 1930, Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
respubliki Tadzhikistan; hereafter TsGART), f. 18 (Council of People’s Commissars of the Tajik SSR, 1929-1939), 
op. 1, d. 193, l. 18 (full document); and "Resolution of the Construction Committee of the Sovnarkom of the Tajik 
SSR," no. 7, on 11 July 1930, in Stalinabad, copy with signatures attributed to Sluchak (Chairman of the 
Construction Committee of the SNK Tajik SSR) and Tomti (Secretary of the Construction Committee), TsGART, f. 
18, op. 1, d. 193,  ll. 42-44 (full document). 
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Moving like a state under construction 
Officials across the USSR had seen commodity chains as critical to the survival of the state in 
southern Tajikistan since before the republic was created. This official view of governance as 
enacted by capital flows and investment resonated with a phenomenon that Stephen Kotkin 
refers to as “exchange” in the history of commerce and empire in Mongol and post-Mongol 
Eurasia and the USSR.16 Kotkin observes that regimes of governance in the USSR manifested in 
the managed, multidirectional circulation of capital, although he exaggerates its simplicity under 
socialism as a centrally dominated, “standardized, prefab civilization.”17 In the Tajik SSR, the 
Soviet environmental management state required a steady flow of commodities with which to 
support physical change involved in economic growth projects. Because of this, freightage was 
one of the most significant activities of the republic in the 1920s and 1930s, and its improvement 
was crucial to establishing the presence of socialism. 
As early as 1922, officials believed that they would ensure the security and 
institutionalization of the fledgling regime in southeastern Central Asia by improving what they 
referred to as trade networks for supplying local markets.18 Throughout the 1920s, officials also 
viewed improvement of capital importation as a way to ward off international threats to the 
region’s insecure borders. This concern was expressed particularly strongly following the NTD 
of Central Asia, when People’s Commissariat for Trade (Narkomtorg) blamed foreign interests 
                                                
16 Stephen Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance Across the Post-Mongol Space,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 487–531. See also, for example, Janet L. 
Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 153-84. 
17 Stephen Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth," 457-509, 520-22. 
18 Message addressed to the Central Committee of the Bukharan Communist Party and N. Khojaev (Chairman of the 
All-Bukharan Central Executive Committee), author not noted, copy translated to Russian (original language 
unknown), n.d., Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-
politicheskoi istorii; hereafter RGASPI), f. 17 (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, 1898, 
1903-1991), op. 86, d. 134, ll. 6b-7a (full document is ll. 6a-7b). 
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for its inability to establish “influence on all of Tajikistan’s territory.” Pre-existing economic 
relationships between East Bukhara and Afghanistan were strengthened during the collapse of 
Russian imperial and protectorate authority in Central Asia after the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Private cross-border commerce based largely in Afghanistan continued to impede the 
establishment of poorly supplied Soviet wholesale and retail enterprises through the 1920s.19 
Concerns rose because of the belief that much of this “pressure” was in fact the result of “Anglo-
Indian” goods strategically sent to destabilize Soviet state building and security.20 The flow of 
commodities across Tajikistan’s southern border revealed the government’s inability to manage 
territorial integrity or international relations. As Abdulqadir Mukhitdinnov explained in 1925, 
improving commodity flows to support the economy of southern Tajikistan was critical to 
retaining its independence from foreign influence, and the strengthening of Basmachi rebel 
fighting.21 
Freightage, however, faced many of the same problems that other economic and other 
state activities did, such as lacking the necessary equipment, and labor. Shortages also 
exacerbated institutional difficulties with available human capital. Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, southern Tajikistan was the site of continuous in-migration that was meant to address 
apparent labor shortages. Settlers from other parts of the republic, Central Asia, and across the 
USSR encountered a Soviet world under construction that was unstable and ridden with anxiety 
                                                
19 Report "On work completed in the first half of the 1926-27 [operating] year," attributed to Narkomtorg of the 
Tajik ASSR, n.d., RGASPI, f 62, op. 2, d. 869, ll. 7-8 (full document is ll. 7-19). 
20 Stenographic account of Mukhamediev's report, addressed to Comrade Mukhitdinnov (Chairman of Gosplan "of 
the Tajik Republic" [Tajik ASSR]), no. 566, June 1925, with signature attributed to Mukhamediev, TsGART, f. 19 
(State Planning Committee of the Tajik ASSR, 1925-1929), op. 5, d. 1, ll. 89-94 (full document is ll. 78-110). 
21 Secret message from the Middle East Department to Comrade Krizhanovskii (of the Gosplan USSR Presidium), 
attributed to Karakhan, "regarding the dispensation of materials for activities in the border area of Tajikistan," 7 
January 1926, copy sent to Comrade Mukhitdinnov (Chairman of the SNK Tajik SSR) on 12 January 1926, certified 
by illegible signature, TsGART, f. 17 (Council of People’s Commissars of the Tajik ASSR, 1926-1929), op. 3, d. 
19, l. 1a (full document is ll. 1a-b). 
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and suffering.22 They faced gross and basic insecurities: of food and housing, due to commodity 
chain inefficiencies; and of employment and wages, due to challenges associated with ongoing 
administrative reorganization and state development. As a result, many of these migrants—
sometimes thousands—regularly departed from the republic only months after arriving.23 The 
apparent lack of planning for shipments or corresponding projects underway was a top concern 
of officials. The republic’s State Committee for Construction, Tadzhikgosstroi, for example, 
pointed to the irony that the new homes it built were little comfort to residents because of the 
absence of stocked bazars, stores, or even simple kiosks.24 In some rural regions, shipping was so 
ineffective that road construction teams traveled themselves to “supply points” just to check the 
availability of food.25 Commodity chains were so utterly dysfunctional following Tajikistan’s 
independence that even freightage workers were not provided sufficient sustenance. Because of 
this, as I will show, internal audits warned that officials often felt powerless to discipline laborers 
on the job since so many were delinquent on account of behaviors meant to help them survive.26 
This was a problem shared across economic divisions as a result of the scale of the early 
five-year plans. It was a period of significant structural (and social) transformation across the 
USSR, when shortages were extreme and ubiquitous. The reason for this, according to scholarly 
consensus, is that the Soviet economy was one of “inherent shortages.” The concept seeks to 
                                                
22 See, for example, Botakoz Kassymbekova, “Helpless Imperialists: European State Workers in Soviet Central Asia 
in the 1920s and 1930s,” Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 21-37. 
23 Maya Karin Peterson, “Technologies of Rule: Empire, Water, and the Modernization of Central Asia, 1867-1941” 
(PhD diss., Harvard University, 2011), 443-44.  
24 Message from the Tadzhikgosstroi construction trust to Tadzhikmatlubot, copied to SNK Tajik SSR, signed by 
Borodin (Deputy Manager of the Trust) and Dashevskii (Business Manager), 22 May 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 
193, l. 13 (full document). 
25 Message addressed to the SNK of the Tajik SSR, no. 1464, attributed to Ogorodnikov and Baranov of 
“Aziakhleb,” 25 November 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op.1, d. 102, l. 46 (full document). 
26 Message addressed to Tadzhikmatlubot and the Construction Committee of the SNK of the Tajik SSR, attributed 
to Ivanovskii and Sergeev (Secretary) of the Stroimaterial trust, 28 June 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 193, l. 14 
(full document). 
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capture the fact that despite impediments posed by shortages and other disorder, ambitious 
projects in new settlements nevertheless went forward. The term inherent shortage, however, 
misrepresents what it describes, which is that enterprise officials never knew for certain that they 
would obtain the materials assigned to them by central planners, for a range of reasons. A good 
manager, then, was one who anticipated shortages and prevented disruptions to work by ensuring 
that expected or needed capital was acquired.27 This idea is based on scholarly views of the 
Soviet economy of the post-WWII period, which were themselves based on studies of socialist 
Hungary.28 
This conception of economic operations has applicability to Tajikistan on the eve of its 
independence. As the example of Stalinabad demonstrated, however, unorthodox freightage 
relationships of the republic were the result of absolute regional shortages of various kinds. No 
place demonstrated Tajikistan’s ambition and need for imported raw materials of state building 
more than its capital city. In the fall of 1929, SNK Chairman Abdukadir Khodjibaev described 
the anticipated physical environment that would elevate Stalinabad to its status as the seat of 
republican power. It would include a theater, a park for relaxation (reprieve for laborers from the 
heat and the dust), a building to house labor unions, a telephone system, and many other 
amenities.29 Khodjibaev was, however, aware that the desire to make Stalinabad a “cultural 
center” was attached to considerable practical implications. Before theaters and parks, he 
explained, the state should construct “a building for the government” to replace the indigenous 
‘wattle and daub’ structures currently used. Furthermore, accessible, clean drinking water, and 
                                                
27  Gregory and Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance, 127. 
28 See, Janos Kornai, Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980). 
29 Report on construction in Stalinabad, attributed to Abdurahim Khojibaev (Chairman of the SNK of the Tajik 
SSR), December 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), ll. 156a-157b (full document). 
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new lodgings were needed for growing numbers of officials and laborers. Other infrastructure 
could help overcome poor mobility, characterized by the accumulation of dirt and dust, by the 
low quality of roads and canals, as well as by the absence of sidewalks, bridges, and lighting on 
the streets of the new city.30 Outside Stalinabad, the center of activity in Tajikistan, the 
challenges to planners were even greater. 
The state construction agency, Tadzhikgosstroi, faced the great task of coordinating the 
erection of buildings and most other structures while entirely dependent on other organizations 
for acquiring the capital with which to do so. Because of this, time-sensitive construction 
involved improvisation and temporary fixes. In the fall of 1929, the agency’s workload was 
greatest in Dushanbe. The highest priority work was the construction of housing for government 
offices, and lodging for the large numbers of immigrating cadres and laborers. When timber was 
lacking—as it usually was—alternative materials were used. The floors of administrative 
buildings were made from cement instead of wood, while those of lodgings were left as soil.31 
Migrating personnel frequently traveled through Dushanbe before deploying elsewhere, so 
lodging was seen as a critical good for managing the influx. Since these were short-term visitors, 
however, the quality of their homes was expendable.32 In other cases, shortcuts were avoided. 
The planned construction of an army building in Dushanbe, for example, was delayed because of 
a lack of timber and nails.33 In the past, some basic materials like timber had been gathered 
locally, within the republic. Now, however, Tadzhikgosstroi alleged that it was considering a 
                                                
30 At the time, drinking water was transported from the Dushanbe River to the center of the city by water carriers, 1-
2 versts distance, driving up its cost. TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), ll. 156a-157b. 
31 “Summary Report on Construction in the Tajikistan ASSR, by Construction Agency, in October 1929,” TsGART, 
f. 18, op 1, d. 101 (t. 1), l. 54 (full document is ll. 53-60). 
32 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), ll. 53-60. 
33 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), ll. 57-58. 
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stoppage to the continued extraction of native sand, rock, and gravel, in addition to timber, since 
the overall cost of doing so had risen to be too much higher than imports.34 
 
Economies and “natural treasures”: Importing timber to Soviet Tajikistan 
Tajikistan imported timber from Russia, despite the distance and the many complications it 
entailed. Wood was one of the most important kinds of feedstock in Soviet economic growth. It 
was "a raw material basic to construction, communications, and mining,” as well as a source of 
fuel. But while the USSR had more timber than any country—half of the global stock—
Tajikistan was uniquely lacking in it.35 Experts agreed that importing wood was more 
economical, and more ethical, than harvesting locally sourced wood.36 That exigency meant 
depending on a vast, and complicated, trans-Union network of suppliers and shipping agents 
located as far away as the so-called central regions of Russia.37 This meant that Tajikistan’s 
timber providers were often too far away for republic representatives to influence them in a way 
that would ensure timely and satisfactory deliveries. But acquiring Russian wood was an 
undeniable necessity: officials across the USSR were convinced that they lacked the knowledge, 
                                                
34 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), l. 56. 
35 Russia and “European” regions had far more trees (or stock) than most of the Caucasus and Central Asia. See W. 
David Bowles, “The Logging Industry—A Backward Branch of the Soviet Economy,” American Slavic and East 
European Review 17, no. 4 (December 1958): 426, 429-30; and Walter Donald Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet 
Logging Industry,” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1958), 1, 283, 362-363; and E. A. Rees, ed., Decision-Making 
in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932-37 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 124. 
36 "Explanatory note on the logging estimates researched in the valleys of the Ak-Suki and Shurob-Dar'i  Rivers, and 
in the navigable gorges, riverheads, and tributaries near the cities of Kulob and Kyzyl-Mazar," signed by Tiulin 
(Afforestation Inspector of the Forest Adminstration), n.d., TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 34a-b (full document is 
ll. 34a-35a). 
37 These included the Moscow, Vladimir, Ivanov Iaroslav, Kostroma, Riazan, Tula, Kirov, Gork’ii, Kalinin, 
Velikoluksk, Briansk, Kaluga, Smolensk, and Central Black-Earth oblasts, as well as the Mari, Chuvash, and 
Mordvinian ASSRs. See Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 374. 
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infrastructure, and above all natural resources to efficiently and sustainably exploit wood 
products in the new republic. 
As usual, these material challenges were understood in bureaucratic terms. Forestry 
experts believed that one reason why insufficient lumber was sourced in the republic was that 
their profession had not had enough time and resources to catalogue, administer, and thereby 
develop and protect woodlots. Modern forest management as a practice was very new to the 
lands of Tajikistan. Only in northern regions that were colonized in the period of tsarist Russian 
occupation of Central Asia had it been practiced somewhat systematically. Two forestry areas 
(lesnichestva), in Panjakent and Uroteppa, had employed a total of seventeen foresters (lesnoi 
strazh). Not until 1927 were forest management organizations organized in Dushanbe and 
Qurghonteppa, and then in Kulob and Garm in 1928. By 1929-30, a total of seven such sub-
agencies existed in the republic, along with some auxiliary workgroups, altogether employing 
sixty-three people.38 These personnel and their leaders were hesitant and uncertain about how to 
manage logging because of the widespread view that they still had incomplete knowledge of 
traditional local harvesting practices, regional tree types, age, and location, as well as of how to 
manage and replant them—a situation that was likely not uncommon throughout southeastern 
Central Asia. One official estimated that forty percent of designated woodlots were as yet 
“totally unstudied.”39 
                                                
38 Report titled, "Reorganization of Tajikistan's forestry," signed by A. A. Madisson-Dubrovskii (Director of Forests 
Administration), n.d., TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 95 (full document is ll. 95-114). 
39 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 34a, 96, 110-114.  On the state of Soviet knowledge of forest lands in Central 
Asia, see, for example, Jake Fleming, “Political Ecology and the Geography of Science: Lesosady, Lysenkoism, and 
Soviet Science in Kyrgyzstan’s Walnut-Fruit Forest,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 104, no. 
6 (2014): 1–16. 
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The desire to acquire more information about forests prior to extensive logging was 
partly informed by an ideologically charged conflict among timber resource experts under Stalin. 
In Tajikistan, as elsewhere in the USSR, logging policy was informed by two contradictory 
impulses: the first, a longstanding preservationist and conservationist current with roots in 
imperial Russia and, the second, a zero-sum drive to exploit natural resources to the benefit of 
industrialization. The start of the first five-year plan was exceptional as a period when the 
government, intent on rapid economic change, gave preference to the latter and virtually 
unlimited forest exploitation over moderation. These policies were most relevant in Russia, 
where the vast majority of Soviet logging took place.40 
What may have seemed in Moscow and Russia to be decisive changes to practice in 
1929-1931 were interpreted with greater hesitation in Tajikistan. The forestry experts of the 
Central Asian republic were evidently opponents of unbridled exploitation, concerned that 
unmediated logging would be foolhardy and destructive.41 The forested areas they managed were 
small. These comprised thickets and brush interspersed with nut or fruit and other types of trees, 
and lacking the kind of lumber needed in basic construction. They did not, for example, contain 
the kind of tall, strong trees that were most appropriate for use as telegraph and telephone 
poles.42 Experts argued that some of these areas should be altogether avoided and preserved. 
They claimed that many of these woodlands were “undoubtedly ‘natural treasures’” that, because 
                                                
40 Stephen Brain, Song of the Forest: Russian Forestry and Stalinist Environmentalism, 1905-1953 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 96-117. 
41 Their distance from the halls of Soviet power may have also made them less able to interpret cues of the center as 
identified in some scholarship. 
42 Message addressed to SNK (copied to several sectoral organizations), attributed to the Post and Telegraph Office 
of Dushanbe, signed by Konnov (Director of the Office of Communications) and Lipinskii (Director of the 
Technical Section), 27 June 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 182, ll. 79a-b (full document); and Report titled 
"Findings of the Forests Administration regarding the transfer of forestry [administration] from Narkomzem to 
VSNKh," signed by Madisson-Dubrovskii (Director of Forests Administration), and attributed to Redlikh (Director 
of the Department of Forestry), n.d., TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 163 (full document). 
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of their remoteness and lack of contact with humans, ought to be protected. According to the 
Afforestation Inspector of the Department of Forestry of the republic, remote forested areas 
should have been established “as national parks of the Tajik SSR [to serve] the needs of science 
with…incalculable value of a high order for all the peoples of the USSR.” Evidently taken with 
the perceived opportunity to prevent logging, he expanded his assessment to promote local 
forested areas as locations for the development of “tourism in order to provide the republic and 
its population no small material benefit [profit].” Only after exploring these potentials should the 
state, “as much as possible extract wood from these regions.”43 
The Afforestation Inspector also appealed to more purely financial concerns to do with 
the logistical challenges of harvesting what wood was available in the republic. The forested 
areas of Tajikistan were scattered among the mountains, often in remote regions, where logging 
and transportation could be accomplished only inefficiently and slowly.44 Kulob’s construction 
projects could not, for example, depend on locally sourced wood in 1929-30. The Afforestation 
Inspector explained that difficult or non-existent pack animal trails and unaccommodating river 
ways from neighboring forested regions made timber extraction almost impossible and 
incalculably expensive. “It is important to note the current condition of mountain trails—that is, 
their absolute absence. Forest resources are richest where the roads are poor or non-existent, or 
in very distant populated places on the upper reaches of rivers and streams.” He concluded it was 
financially inadvisable to engineer these routes until woodlot management was established.45 
                                                
43 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 34b. 
44 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 163. 
45 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 34a. 
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The Inspector was likely aware that central planners considered logistics a key aspect of 
logging policy and profitability. These criteria were key measures implicated in forestry 
management reorganization projects underway across the USSR. Other Tajikistan officials 
addressed this explicitly, concluding that the conditions that make “European parts of the Union” 
suited to economical logging and timber transportation did not exist in “eastern Central Asia.”46 
Since the Revolution, Soviet logging policy had increasingly favored focused cutting along 
established transportation routes. Logging was concentrated in central and southern regions of 
Russia that were closer to populated centers and roads—a practice that continued until after the 
Stalin period.47 
In roadless Tajikistan, timber production could not compete for reasons related to the 
legacy of both infrastructure and administration. Statistical data showed that the value of forest 
protection there was “extraordinarily low” compared to other republics. Where its profitability 
per hectare had been only 18 kopeks (k) in Tajikistan in 1927-28, other non-Russian republics 
were already reporting the following values during 1925-26: 6 rubles (r) and 34 k in Ukraine, 7r 
33k in Belarus, 53k in the Caucasus, 77 k in Turkmenistan, and 25k in Uzbekistan.48 
Understanding what these figures meant, exactly, is difficult, though scholars agree that financial 
measures provide one avenue for assessing the Soviet economy.49 Experts in Tajikistan 
hypothesized that the absence of institutional legacy also contributed to its conditions. So, their 
                                                
46 Message "on the issue of transferring management of forest stock of the BSSR, UkrSSR, [illegible], TurkSSR, 
UzSSR, and Tajik SSR from the Narkomzem to the VSNKh of these republics," addressed to the Permanent 
Representation of the Tajik SSR "for transmission to the Council of Labor and Defense," attributed to the Supreme 
Council of the National Economy [VSNKh], copy certified by attribution to the Secretary of Gosplan Tajik SSR 
TsGART, April 1930, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 156 (full document); and TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, 163. 
47 As a result, however, many of these regions took decades to recover, while northern forestlands were not touched. 
See Bowles, “The Logging Industry," 429-30. 
48 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 100. 
49 Gregory and Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance, 115. 
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request that less be demanded of local timber included the argument that regional logging would 
become profitable, manageable, and sustainable only if it was reorganized by combining 
operational models of the Uzbek SSR and the RSFSR.50 
The case for importing timber to Tajikistan gained possibly decisive leverage from the 
fact that it also protected the coexistence of various kinds of settled communities, as 
demographics changed and populations grew rapidly through migration. Southern regions relied 
heavily on imported timber to alleviate the great strain that accompanied the increasing demands 
of resettlement that were involved in ambitious economic growth projects. When growing 
populations of new settlers retrieved wood from surrounding regions, they threatened the 
livelihoods and even survival of pre-existing and remote settlements, where highlanders used it 
for basic construction and heating. One 1930 report warned that “supplying the construction of 
Kulob at their [highlanders’] expense could only lead to the kind of undesirable hollowing out of 
village orchards that happened in the outskirts of Dushanbe/Stalinabad, also as a result of the 
high cost and high demand for timber. Cities must be supplied [instead] with imported timber.”51 
Importing wood would also decrease pressure on the Department of Forestry. Its director, A. A. 
Madisson-Bubrovskii, complained that he could police only 18 percent of Tajikistan’s forests.52 
He claimed that woodlands were being “hacked and destroyed in great quantity” because too 
little imported timber and firewood was reaching settlers and construction projects.53 
The alternative of importing timber to Tajikistan was no easy feat. As with other forms of 
capital, transporting wood from far away involved tremendous levels of coordination of 
                                                
50 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 110-114. 
51 Capital named here as in original. TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 34b. 
52 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 95-96. 
53 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 94, l. 97-98. 
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bureaucratic, material, and human resources. These complicated logistical arrangements reflected 
the challenges of shipping in general on the scale of the Soviet Union. As I demonstrate below, 
however, the process by which enterprises acquired wood for Tajikistan often included 
significant activities outside the plan. Moreover, they involved transportation across spaces much 
larger than that of commodities assigned to more other regions. While capital accumulated 
through this process, all of the factors involved—amounts of timber to be procured, the sources 
of wood, the agencies and personnel involved, as well as the means of shipping—were 
constantly changing, and usually becoming more numerous. The resulting uncertainty promoted 
continued anxiety about how to acquire goods. 
Tracing how timber was acquired through official channels is difficult, in part because 
names of agencies and scales of responsibility changed rapidly during the 1920s and 1930s, in 
most economic sectors. Unlike other capital stock, timber procurement and shipping was less 
often coupled with that of other goods. Agencies and entire “syndicates” took parts of their 
names from “les’,” the Russian word for timber, and were mandated with making wood available 
across the USSR, usually moving it from central regions of the RSFSR to other republics. In 
1929-30, central planners empowered an agency called Lesosnabsbyt’ with most timber 
procurement. This was a subsidiary organization of Logistics Management and Distribution 
(Snabsbyt’), a centrally organized agency responsible for managing and conducting the provision 
of most major commodities for all Soviet regions. Snabsbyt’ coordinated activities with regional 
subsidiaries such as Tadzhiksnabsbyt’, usually on the basis of “direct agreements” with 
destination enterprises like Tadzhikgosstroi. 
Snabsbyt’ claimed that only an “insignificant” amount of timber was sourced through 
other forms of contract. Scholars have, however, shown that at times up to half of the timber 
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available in the USSR may have been logged by small, informal groups of agricultural workers 
and forced labor.54 Of course, untangling exactly what that means is difficult since the same 
scholars have also explained that its labor was highly subsidized.55 
Official documents do, however, show that the logistics of the timber industry—and not 
official plans and regulations—were often the source of Tajikistan’s timber shortages. 
Production does not appear to have been a significant problem. From 1930-1949, tree cutting 
was free-of-cost to logging enterprises. Felling organizations were not obligated to pay stumpage 
fees that the state later imposed to incentivize diversification of source locations. As highly 
subsidized agencies to boot, their work was profitable and productive. Though logging did not 
receive anywhere near the capital investment of other heavy industries in the USSR, its 
productivity increased by three times between 1928 and 1940, mainly thanks to the growth of the 
available labor pool and expansion into new logging regions.56 
Still, Tajikistan and many other regions never received the amount of timber that they 
claimed to need because timber transport depended on shifting and insecure relationships among 
coordinating agencies. Even though Tajikistan was allotted timber by central plans in 1930, 
shipping enterprises were bound by rules and conventions of priority that limited the distribution 
of all forms of products. In the case of timber from Snabsbyt, for example, republics had only 
“fourth priority” as potential recipients. First priority belonged to the railroads agencies, so that 
they could use the wood for any potential infrastructure needs. Second priority belonged to the 
                                                
54 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 689, ll. 2-3;  Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 6-7; and Rees, 
Decision-Making, 125-33.  
55 Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 343-44. 
56 Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 348-349; and Dominique Moran, “Lesniki and Leskhozy: 
Life and Work in Russia’s Northern Forests,” Environment and History 10, no. 1 (February 2004): 90-91. 
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military. The third level favored flagship and shock-work projects of “union significance,” such 
as the Magnitogorsk iron and steel complex of the Ural Mountains in Russia.57 
The reliability of the timber supply was further undermined by the fact that the main, 
official source for Tajikistan’s wood changed on the eve of the first five-year plan. Until then, 
the primary source for Central Asia and Kazakhstan was the central regions of Russia.58 This 
started to change in 1927, when the SNK of the RSFSR began to gradually shift their supply base 
to “western Siberia” in order to “compensate for the [previous] export of timber from central 
regions of the USSR (central Volga, Bashkiria, Ural).” Planners reasoned that these former 
source regions (“especially the Urals”) would then have more access to their own wood, while 
concurrently becoming the main suppliers of timber to “southern regions of European Russia and 
part of Ukraine.” Several regions of western Siberia, such as the upper Ob River region, 
Suzunsk, and Povallikhinsk, were seen as geographically endowed with great wood resources 
that could become timber bases for all of Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan.59 Although the 
transfer was meant to streamline and simplify stresses on provision networks, supply fulfillment 
for Kazakhstan and Central Asia worsened as the responsibility shifted to Siberia. The effect on 
the dependent regions, according to a forestry expert’s report, was that “funds provided for 
                                                
57 "Explanatory note," signed by Lapin (Director of Snabsbyt') and Ianovskii (Director of the Department of 
Planning and Finance [within Snabsbyt']), 28 July 1933, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 689, ll. 2-3 (full document is ll. 2-
5), introduced by cover note no. 2923, addressed to Mikushgu (SNK), signed by Lapin and Ianovskii, TsGART, f. 
18, op. 1, d. 689, l. 1. 
58 “Central regions of Russia” is well-defined in Bowles dissertation, but maybe incorrect based on the period and 
because (consciously) prefers some American alterations. 
59 Report "on the issue of the present state and prospects for supplying Central Asia and Kazakhstan with timber 
from western Siberia," attributed to Solntsev ("Director of the SredazEkoso brigade"; Member of its Presidium) and 
Golovin (Brigade Member), and certified by [illegible], 4 March 1934, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 878, ll. 6-8 (full 
document is ll. 2-29), introduced by cover note no. 4/b30403, and addressed to Comrade Rakhimbaev (Chairman of 
SNK Tajik SSR), signed by  Solntsev (Member of the SredazEkoso Presidium), TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 878, l. 1. 
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construction went unused, construction [projects] dragged on, became more expensive, and 
capital investments froze.”60  
The lack of timber apparently strained daily economic life of Tajikistan as state building 
accelerated in 1929. Stressed enterprises, under pressure to perform, responded by altering plans 
and practices, and sometimes through uncooperative behavior. Tadzhikgosstroi faced an 
inconsistent supply of poplar wood from a state timber supplier, Leszag, and it could not afford 
apparently expensive “private” shipments. It opted to make-do with pine—which was cheaper 
and more readily available—in tasks where poplar was conventionally or technically preferred.61 
Organizations also resorted to legal and illegal competition over available timber. In November, 
Tadzhdortrans persuaded the Tajikistan SNK to give it 3,000 cubic meters of wood belonging to 
the railroad. The appeal explained that a late timber shipment was delaying priority construction 
of bridges at the Dushanbe and Iliak Rivers in the capital city region. The executive body’s 
approval was not, however, enough to prevent the railroad agency’s protest by “withholding 
wagons” that Leszag needed to transport the timber to the construction locations.62 
These conditions only deteriorated as the supply base for Tajikistan shifted to western 
Siberia. Forestry experts complained that logging trusts had not worked efficiently and 
productively enough to move timber, and implied that the work they did complete was for their 
own regions’s benefit. Siberian trusts were ensuring that Siberian delivery quotas were fulfilled, 
                                                
60 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 878, ll. 4, 14-15. 
61 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 101 (t. 1), l. 56. 
62 Message addressed to the SNK Tajik SSR, no. 2785, signed by Semenov (Director of Tadzhdortrans) and Vostrov 
(Director of the Roads Section [of Tadzhdortrans]), 20 November 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 40 (full 
document); Message addressed to Leszag (extremely urgent), attributed to Nikiforov (Managing Director of the 
TsIK of the SNK Tajik SSR) and Abramenko (Secretary), 23 November 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 43 
(full document); and Message addressed to SNK, in response to Message no. 1555 of 23 November 1929, signed by 
the Director and Clerk of Leszag [both illegible], 27 November 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 48 (full 
document). 
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but satisfied less than half of that devoted to Tajikistan and the rest of Central Asia. Of that 
which was exported, Siberian trusts had not lumbered the required percentage, meaning most of 
what arrived in Tajikistan and elsewhere was unprocessed, round timber. According to the 
experts, such circumstances persisted to 1934, with no sign they would change. “Central Asia 
sits without wood, completing what construction it can, [while] a huge amount of cut timber lies 
in [western Siberian] logging areas.”63 
During the 1930s, enterprises attempted to overcome wood shortages by circumventing 
centrally planned procurement and shipping. Tajikistan deployed illegal envoys to seek out 
timber instead of waiting for it. Several subsidiary shipping and transportation agencies sent 
delegations to the RSFSR to seek and secure shipments. The practice was part of a common 
phenomenon across the USSR where production managers of the 1930s faced with lacking or 
delayed supplies deployed “expediters” (tolkachi) to acquire owed or needed capital. In doing so, 
managers initiated a range of activities that were inherently illegal because they were outside of 
central plans. Such errands were also financially risky because "good tolkachi are costly; our 
manager has to pay their salaries, travel expenses, and living expenses, and give them incentives 
to outcompete the tolkachi of dozens of other desperate enterprises."64 Tajikistan’s expeditions 
were part of a broader Central Asian practice involving a variety of organizations. At least as late 
as 1938, "representatives of collective farms in Central Asia (especially in the cotton-growing 
regions)" were deployed to Russia in search of timber.65 
                                                
63 Western Siberia secured for itself 98.3 percent of planned round timber, and 87.8 percent of projected industrially 
processed timber. Central Asia received only 31.8 percent of the former, and 8.4 percent of the latter. TsGART, f. 
18, op. 1, d. 878, ll. 6-7. 
64 Eugenia Belova, “Economic Crime and Punishment,” in Behind the Facade of Stalin’s Command Economy: 
Evidence from the Soviet State and Party Archives, ed. Paul R. Gregory (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), 
133-40. 
65 Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 300-301. 
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The Russian destinations of Tajikistan’s tolkachi were carefully chosen to maximize the 
likelihood that they would succeed in obtaining capital. They often started expeditions without 
knowing where they would find timber, so they based their hunts in the well-established 
economic regions central Russia, where infrastructure and industrial legacy were abundant. 
Bowles, without the benefit of archival sources, states that the phenomenon of Central Asian 
delegations to Russia was part of a broader constellation of “irrational” events within the 
centrally planned economy. Seeing that timber-producing regions sometimes imported wood, or 
that Siberian products moved west to plentiful central regions, he muses that "perhaps the most 
plausible explanation for such cases is that a timber consumer, even in a timber-reproducing 
region may, at times, be unable to purchase in that region; hence, he is forced to obtain timber 
from any possible source.”66 Bowles also notes that the sourcing and destinations of timber cargo 
were often dependent on what forms and units of means of transportation were available.67 This 
agrees more with my assessment of these 1930s expeditions. As the main source of Central 
Asian supplies shifted to Siberia, where the physical and administrative infrastructure was less 
well-established than in central regions of the RSFSR, logistical problems increased. In the 
middle of the decade, timber traveled to Tajikistan by way of the Omsk and Tomsk railroads of 
Siberia, southwards to the Turksib and Central Asian railroad. The two northern lines had far 
worse records when it came to organization, including moving sufficient wagonloads and the 
turnover of empty wagons. Central Asian officials were concerned with improving these 
processes since uninterrupted timber travel on the Tomsk and Omsk routes took about 100 and 
                                                
66 Bowles, “Economics of the Soviet Logging Industry,” 300-301. 
67 W. Donald Bowles, “Cost-Price Relationships and the Location of Soviet Industry: A Case Study,” International 
Economic Review 9, no. 3 (October 1968): 285. 
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110 days, respectively. Avoiding delays was critical because “the main sources of timber supply 
to Central Asia are situated in regions of the Omsk [rail]road.”68 
To avoid the complicated context of Siberian economic growth, Tajikistan’s unplanned 
timber-seeking expeditions were concentrated in central regions of Russia because its better 
developed economic infrastructure was more conducive to various scales of improvisation—or, 
what some call “irregularity.” When, for example, the officers of a Tadzhiksnabsbyt’ trust 
inspected timber stocks at the Batraki railway station, southeast of Moscow, on 7 December 
1932, they enacted a series of relationships needing complicated, time-sensitive, evolving 
coordination with many local, regional, and union-level agencies. Here, their decision to 
purchase “frozen timber on rafts” from a Volga River shipping agency called 
Volzhtranslesosplav demanded considerable unplanned travel and personal risk because they 
lacked centrally mandated arrangements with local organizations. The very preparation of the 
wood for rail shipment required a mammoth logistical effort. It included traveling among far-
flung central Russian cities—including Batraki, Samara, Ulianovsk, and Syrzan’—between 
December and February, to contract labor, food, and equipment. For this reason, the purchase 
agreement for timber signed in Samara on 11 January of 1933 included the promise of six tons of 
barley. In anticipation of the significant labor involved in unhinging pieces of wood that were 
frozen together, the manager himself explained that, “without food [khleb], it would be 
impossible to commence such work.”69 But since the cereal promised was not available at the 
                                                
68 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 878, l. 8. 
69 Report "On the salvaging of frozen timber on the Volga River with Caravan nos. 1, 29, and 54, close to the 
Batraki Station of the Central Volga Region," addressed to to the SNK and Snabsbyt' of the Tajik SSR and others, 
sent from the Batraki Station to the RKI of the Central Volga Region in Samara, signed by Sadov (Representative of 
TadzhikSnabsbyt'), 4 February 1933, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 501, l. 137a (full document is ll. 137a-138a). 
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Batraki station, the trust manager traveled to Ulianovsk, where he obtained obtain 4 tons of flour 
and 2 tons of millet, and also commenced the recruitment of workers. 
Expeditions like this one were desperate measures, demonstrating that timber was valued 
at great financial and human cost to the Soviet state in Tajikistan. This was also in itself a 
massive physical exercise whose material dimensions illustrated its scale. In anticipation of the 
backbreaking work involved with preparing tons of frozen timber for railroad transportation in 
the middle of the Russian winter, Tajikistan’s envoys also purchased critical equipment, 
including 50 steel heavers, 100 steel crowbars, 250 steel ice picks, 100 meters of hemp rope, 20 
nets, 500 leather gloves, 100 leather boots, 15 short fur coats, 50 steel shovels, 200 wooden 
shovels, and 150 hooks. The Tadzhiksnabsbyt’ delegation had not, however, traveled in large 
enough numbers to perform the kind of operation involved here. So it recruited many local 
laborers. By the end of January, it had organized three cooperative work groups, and delivered 
them to the worksite as “Caravan No. 54,” along with food provisions, equipment, and some 
horses. Two other caravans were organized (numbers 29 and 1) in early February, one of which 
consisted of kolkhoz laborers provided by the city soviet of Syzran’. The manager reported that 
“73 unmounted people and 15 horses are at work on ice-breaking and hauling timber six 
kilometers to the railroad,” predicting it would be completed by the end of February. “They are 
hauling from flood zones to a non-hazardous area where they are piling the logs to a volume of 
four thousand cubic meters.”70 
Envoys in Russia also contended with implementing improvised logistics within the 
centrally planned transportation system. Extending Tajikistan’s authority across the USSR to 
ensure that shipments reached the republic rapidly and intact was a complicated endeavor that 
                                                
70 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 501, ll. 137a-138a. 
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faced the task of navigating new relationships with far-away administrations and chartering the 
temporary use of infrastructure. In 1933, the republican subsidiary of the Union for 
Transportation Cooperation (Soiuz Transportnoi Kooperatsii; hereafter Soiuztrans) found that it 
was handicapped in part by the “absolute lack of garages, warehouses…on the [Union-wide] 
Soiuztrans system,” which caused many attendant challenges to the resources that were 
available. In January, it hired a “special agent” to courier a shipment of 1,500 cubic meters of 
round timber that had been purchased in central Russia on credit. Though this payment also 
apparently covered the cost of railroad tariffs, the agent communicated that shipping was held up 
indefinitely because of a lack of empty wagons and platforms on the Moscow-Kazan Railroad. 
Soiuztrans of Tajikistan requested that the republican SNK help it obtain storage sheds—thirty-
five and twenty-five respectively at the Batraki and Alatyr’ stations—to accommodate the wood 
in transit.71 
Such continuous challenges in the transportation of capital designated for Central Asia 
across Russia tend to be seen as a common Soviet problem. With reason, scholarship on the 
economics of Stalinism has characterized planning as a façade constructed by administrators who 
assumed that chaos would ensue in the rush to satisfy goals as much as possible. Moscow’s 
monitoring agencies frequently complained that bad records usually were related to poor 
scheduling at regional and transregional levels, and also made it hard to assess and improve for 
future organization. Complaints like this could not encompass the kinds of timber-seeking 
activities I have discussed above. Central authorities’ persistent complaints and frustration about 
                                                
71 Message addressed to SNK Tajik SSR in Stalinabad, no. 35, attributed to the Tajik Regional Office of Soiuztrans, 
handwritten, signature and attributive stamp illegible, 11 January 1933, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 501, l. 76a; and 
Fact sheet attributed to the Tajik Regional Office of Soiuztrans, handwritten, signature and attributive stamp 
illegible, 31 January 1933, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 501, l. 76b. 
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insufficient records and planning in the regions and economic sectors show the limits of Soviet 
power beyond Moscow and local party organs. Moscow’s inability to significantly alter or 
influence the way that the Gosplans of Central Asian republics and other organizations managed 
their relationships as “clients of transportation” reflected that the state was a very cumbersome 
machine, still under construction.72 
This also shows the degree to which a focus on the views of Moscow and central 
republican authorities promotes misleading interpretations of Soviet experiences as being 
homogenous. Doing so ignores the simple fact that upper-level Central Asian and central Union 
officials were spatially removed from, and thereby often less able to influence, the front- and 
back-ends of the administration and delivery of their promised supplies. When in March of 1930, 
for example, an RKI USSR official observed that no Central Asian republic’s representative “has 
any information or knowledge about the quantity of shipments arriving in Central Asia and its 
republics,” the criticism was immediately qualified by the commodity chain context.73 The report 
suggested that these difficulties were related to trans-Soviet logistical problems as far away as 
the Perm Railroad. It explained that there the “Timber Syndicate” had no plan in place to ensure 
that stations between Ufa and Kazakhstan and Central Asia were prepared to handle an expected 
nine-hundred wagons of timber. It furthermore anticipated failures in basic organizational 
                                                
72 Resolution, signed by Lavrov (Chairman of the Central Asian Committee on Freightage) and Bukin (Secretary), 
16 February 1930, TsGART, f. 146 (Permanent Representation of the Tajik SSR to the Central Asian Economic 
Council in Tashkent, October 1929-January 1935), op. 1, d. 78, ll. 144-145 (full document is ll. 141-45). 
73 Record of proceedings of the 17 March 1930 meeting held by RKI of the USSR "on the issue of the importation of 
agricultural machines, fertilizer, cereals, timber, cement, etc., to Central Asia," attended by organizations including 
SoiuzLes, NKPS, Permanent Representations of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Tajik SSR [Uz 
SSR not listed], TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 115a, enclosed by cover letter addressed to the Narkomtorg of the 
Tajik SSR (Stalinabad) and the Permanent Representation of the Tajik SSR in Tashkent, attributed to from the 
Permanent Representation of the Tajik SSR, signed by Propisnov (Executive Secretary of the Permanent 
Representation of the Tajik SSR), 1 April 1930, TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 115b. 
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matters such as clearly identifying loads slated for irrigation works in Kazakhstan so that they 
were ready for expedient offloading en route.74 
Ad hoc cooperation among agencies and regions across these vast spaces only 
exacerbated already poor bureaucratic practices related to Central Asia. There, more than 
elsewhere in the USSR, administrative and logistical relationships between agencies were as yet 
being worked out during the 1930s, at local, intra-, and inter-republican levels. They had 
difficulty working together because of inefficient nascent administrations of their own. In the 
early 1930s, the monthly meetings of the Central Asian Regional Transportation Commission in 
Tashkent were often inconclusive because too many republican agencies failed to attend. Those 
of Tajikistan were particularly delinquent in this respect.75 
All of the Central Asian republics had difficulty engaging central Soviet institutions 
because of their inability to cooperate well as a geographic bloc. Moscow frequently interfered in 
regional affairs to try to improve these dynamics, but often with opaque motives and results. In 
May of 1930, STO USSR announced it would take over the task of preparing and managing 
transportation related to Central Asia, starting in the fall—a task that was presently managed by 
SredazEkoso. It intended to reform the system of supply by planning shipments according to 
product groups, and by republic.76 By January of 1931, however, timber importation and 
distribution duties for Central Asia (with a few exceptions) returned to SredazEkoso.77 Thus, 
                                                
74 TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 115b. 
75 See, for example, Message addressed to Narkomtorg Tajik SSR (Stalinabad), attributed to Gofman (Deputy to the 
Permanent Representative of the Tajik SSR) and Kolobov (Secretary), 1 April 1930, TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 
116 (full document). 
76 Proceedings of the interdepartmental meeting held by Gosplan of the Tajik SSR, in Stalinabad, 27 May 1930, 
TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 4a (full document is ll. 4a-b). 
77 In fact, STO was clearly not in charge when the economic union took over timber shipping. The duties were 
transferred from taking it over from Lesprom of the RSFSR. Message addressed to the SNK USSR, secret copy no. 
734a, signed by Iakovlev (Lesprom USSR Management), 2 February 1931, State Archive of the Russian Federation 
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi federatsii; hereafter GARF), f. 5446 (Council of People’s Commissars of the 
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inside of a year, this organization was forced to re-establish its relationship with a host of other 
agencies, including the Narkomtorgs of Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, the USSR, 
as well as with the “the Timber syndicate.”78 
The inefficient nature of Soviet transportation exacerbated its inherent discrimination 
against Central Asia—home of the poorest republics—because they were the farthest away from 
sources of critical capital such as woodlands. These contiguous republics often then created 
problems for one another or bickered over the sharing of resources and logistics. In 1930, for 
example, there was much anxiety about usage and management of the Turksib Railroad, which 
was to eventually become the primary shipping artery for capital between Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Central Asia, and the rest of the USSR.79 High-level Kazakh functionaries, such as Turar 
Rysqulov, sometimes leveraged control of the line in disputes with Siberia about degrees of 
responsibility for supply to Central Asia. In practical terms, however, all three regions frequently 
jockeyed for a share of railroad usage and traffic, usually through interdepartmental and 
interregional conglomerates, with ultimate mediating authority reserved to Moscow authorities, 
especially Gosplan USSR.80 
The fundamental bureaucratic challenge facing all of these organizations was provision, 
coordination, and sharing of physical resources. Wagons, locomotives, and the personnel who 
                                                
USSR and Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1923-1991), op. 12a, d. 1036, l. 4 (full document); and Internal report 
(secret) addressed to Comrade Rudzutak (Deputy Chairman of SNK USSR (Moscow), attributed to the Chairman of 
SredazEkoso, 24 January 1931, GARF, f. 5446, op. 12a, d. 1036, l. 6 (full document). 
78 The Central Asian Regional Committee's [CAZ RK] tentative plan for road freightage for the 3rd and 4th quarters 
of 1929-30 beyond April [of 1930], 6 March (1930), TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 139 (full document is ll. 138-
140). 
79 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 878, ll. 2-3. 
80 Message "on the issue of coordinating the economic plans of regions gravitation to the Turksib," from STO USSR 
and Gosplan USSR, sent to Gosplan Tajik SSR, copy attributed to Kviring (Deputy to the Chairman of Gosplan 
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could operate them were always lacking in Central Asia at a degree greater than elsewhere in the 
USSR. Locomotives were particularly valuable because they drove the trains, and there was 
never enough of them to meet demand. The Turksib Railroad administration of 1930 did not 
have permanent staff qualified to maintain the locomotives. So when engines and other 
specialized parts malfunctioned, such other railroads as the Omsk supplied the mechanics. It 
could take up to two weeks for help to arrive, and then from five to ten more days to complete 
repairs.81 Whereas the mobile means of shipping involved careful coordination across vast 
spaces, the infrastructure they depended on was just as much of a technical concern. In the early 
1930s, the Turksib, and especially its southern reaches, was stressed beyond capacity because of 
central planners increasing demands of its lines. The Semipalatinsk junction’s expected traffic of 
350 wagons per day was limited to 150. But junctions across the line could not be enlarged until 
other basic facilities were improved to accommodate existing traffic. The Turksib’s stations 
needed more space for unloading and storage, better water supply and enlarged locomotive 
parks.82 
If the trans-Soviet logistic networks used to supply Tajikistan were thoroughly flawed, 
those within the republic were still worse. In 1929, shipping was so disorganized and under-
planned that it often took place in ways that the state was unaware of until after the fact. As with 
transportation problems elsewhere, economic and Party agencies based in Stalinabad, Tashkent, 
and across the USSR, tended to understand these as an administrative challenge. The Regional 
Transportation Commission of Central Asia, for example, judged that the difficulties of 
transportation in Tajikistan in 1930 were exacerbated by poor planning, interdepartmental 
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communication, and record keeping. “Currently, there is no inventory of forthcoming internal 
shipping by cartage.” The commission called on Tajikistan’s governing bodies to “strictly 
regulate transportation,” and to seek ways of systematizing and planning “immanent” traffic to 
regions and projects that were under development.83 
As usual, the language of bureaucracy obscured (and surely was often uninformed by) the 
dire physical conditions resulting from the disorganization of commodity chains within 
Tajikistan. The poor planning for immanent, and recent, imports in the summer of 1930 resulted 
in a colossal mess of wood and other cargo that wasted away on the grounds of the capital city. 
Arriving shipments overflowed beyond the unloading areas of the Stalinabad railway station, 
piled on a sloping path that was two kilometers long. Officials could not monitor the timber, or 
protect it from theft and rot. They increasingly worried about fire as wood continued to arrive 
into the height of summer. The Narkomtorg USSR was outraged by the apparent wastefulness, 
and threatened to embargo the republic by offloading other shipments in Tashkent.84 
SredazEkoso recommended that the SNK of Tajikistan alleviate the situation by hiring “an 
energetic and competent person, who should be entrusted with the command of means of 
transport and a labor force.”85 This cheery suggestion, although well-intentioned, did not account 
for the comprehensive nature of shipping problems in Tajikistan in 1930. 
Once timber was procured and delivered, no reliable system of freightage existed yet for 
moving it from the capital to other regions that needed it, even though timber was seen as critical 
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to the realization of most economic growth projects.86 The problem was compounded by the fact 
that the very infrastructure needed to support such networks was substandard or non-existent, 
and whose construction often required timber and other imported resources itself. For example, 
the existing road from the capital to Kulob, with its rough, ungraded surface, twisted and turned 
so sharply (often on mountain cliffs) that hauling most types of cargo was difficult. Moving 
larger objects was almost impossible. Until a new road was constructed, it would be particularly 
challenging to transport long, heavy logs of the sort used as support poles for telephone and 
telegraph lines. In fact, imported poles were seen as the key to establishing permanent 
communication with Stalinabad in the summer of 1930. Those used until then were made of 
unsuitable and “old” wood that did not behave as line operators desired. They allegedly caused 
wires to break, and many fell or washed away with seasonal waters.87 Improving infrastructure 
depended on the importation of adequate timber, regardless of the challenges to mobility and the 
high cost. 
The extraordinary efforts and improvisation that characterized the acquisition of foreign 
timber for Tajikistan were a daily reality of commodity chains within the republic, and they are 
the subject of the next section of this chapter. In the case of this particular shipping challenge, 
Soiuztrans agreed to attempt to haul new poles for the telegraph line from Stalinabad to Kulob. 
The organization may have taken the job to move timber on the road to Kulob because no other 
agency was in place to do so, or because none was willing. In Tajikistan, the negotiations and 
uncertainties that characterized and interfered with Soviet freightage were particularly acute. If 
the work of the tolkachi was illegal, then the more or less unplanned daily operations of 
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Tajikistan’s hauling agencies of the early 1930s were entirely outside the law by their very 
nature. Moreover, where the underplanned character of supply flows across the USSR were 
symptomatic of the weakness of the state there, the chaotic way they worked in Tajikistan 
reflected an even greater degree of disorganization, material instability, and diffusion of power. 
Soiuztrans surely took on the job of hauling timber on the road to Kulob because it was after all 
its job to do so. But it only accepted the contract on the condition that it first receive forty 
additional carts for the job.88 
 
Shipping, officially: A distinct sector of the economy in Tajikistan 
At the start of the 1930s, most of the land-based shipping within southern Tajikistan was 
conducted by small groups of laborers who primarily used animals to move cargo between 
settlements and worksites. These agents used horses, camels, and donkeys to carry goods or pull 
vehicles loaded with them. Increasingly, they used trucks, too, as greater numbers were imported 
and roads became more drivable, though automotive vehicles remained rather uncommon until 
later in the decade. I focus on people who worked in land-based (non-railway) shipping in 
Tajikistan’s southern regions. Their job, in short, was to pick up all sorts of cargo from one point 
and move it to another. These so-called transportniki delivered commodities available within the 
republic to enterprises needing materials for construction or production of some sort. The vast 
majority of these shipping agents were laborers between the ages of nineteen and forty. They 
were involved in varied tasks, including loading and unloading and transportation, and 
sometimes in basic administration. Most of them were illiterate, and very few were members of 
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the Communist Party. Their nationality, as I discuss later, differed by workgroup; importantly, 
many freightage agents were of foreign origin. Many of these men (according to the data, they 
were mainly men) lived, and sometimes traveled, with their families, which usually included 
three to six members.89 
Transportniki were organized mainly in cooperative workgroups called “artels.” This 
term referred to diverse forms of “voluntary labor collectives” with roots in the Russian empire. 
Starting in the late 1920s, the Soviet state began dissolving them, because their operations 
contradicted Soviet principles of governance and modernization. These groups generally 
operated outside the control and influence of labor unions and industrial management, preferred 
non-mechanized activity, and worked for collective wages. The artel disappeared as a type of 
organization across most of the USSR in the 1930s.90 In southern Tajikistan, however, shipping 
artels continued serving economic growth until at least the later part of that decade. They took 
orders and jobs from various parties—central administrators in Stalinabad, as well as lower-level 
managers and foremen of freightage and economic enterprises—and operated with a fair degree 
of independence. 
The artels of southern Tajikistan were unaffected by attempts to reform commodity 
chains in 1930. At the height of the first five-year plan, the Soviet administration conducted vast 
restructuring efforts across the USSR. During the spring, the details of the massive institutional 
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and legal reorganization of the shipping sector in the new republic signaled the ambitions and 
challenges facing the state there. As I show, it was an effort to control the relationships involved 
in commodity mobility to harness their potential contribution to economic productivity. Upper-
level officials revised regulations defining the hierarchy of authority and responsibility of 
shipping agents. They believed this would allow them to gather information about how 
transportation resources and commodities were used and by whom, in order to allow them to 
improve future planning and coordination of inter-sectoral operations. They furthermore 
attempted to make it easier to collect such information by concentrating the means of 
transportation in Tajikistan among its shipping agencies. The terms of this reorganization 
reflected an effort on the part of the republic to streamline and reinvigorate the hierarchies 
governing commodity mobility that served economic growth within its borders, at a time when 
significant changes to transportation administration were taking place across the USSR.91 
Gosplan of Tajikistan held an interagency meeting on 4 February 1930, where 
participants decided the reorganization and scheduled its implementation to take place over the 
course of the year. The gathering resolved to establish an organization called the Union for 
Transportation Cooperation (Soiuztrans), which would begin operations in April. By the fall, this 
republican subsidiary of Soiuztrans USSR would be responsible for managing and supervising 
all shipping within Tajikistan’s borders, including subordinate firms and even individual artels.92 
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This was an explicit effort to improve the governance of freightage, which was 
commonly viewed as ineffective. Until this point, the republican Narkomtorg had managed 
shipping within Tajikistan. The institution had been, and remained, responsible for mediating the 
commodity needs of enterprises and communicating them to agencies that delivered cargo. It 
received requests for goods from economic organizations, evaluated them, and then passed them 
on to the appropriate supplier. (Direct requests were not officially allowed.) The responsibility 
Narkomtorg would now hand over to Soiuztrans—overseeing the logistics of commodity 
distribution within the entire republic—had been within its purview since 1928. The February 
1930 meeting removed this responsibility as an open indictment of incompetence. Allegedly, 
Narkomtorg had failed to investigate and rectify shipping problems or facilitate the work of 
hauling agents through establishment of, and support to, storage bases and stopping points on 
transportation routes.93 
Soiuztrans’s adoption of Narkomtorg’s logistical responsibilities effectively made 
shipping a distinct economic sector within the republic. Specifically, Soiuztrans would manage 
and supervise two subordinate agencies, the Tajik Automotive Transport Joint Stock Association 
(Tadzhikskoe avto-transportnoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo; hereafter Tadzhavtotrans) and the 
Producer’s Transportation Cooperative Union (Promyslovo-transportnyi kooperativnyi soiuz; 
hereafter Promkooptrans), facilitating cooperation between them by acting as a dispatcher and 
providing storage facilities such as warehouses.94 Any other freight hauling organizations were to 
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be officially disbanded.95 These specialized shipping agencies acquired duties through 
agreements with so-called economic organizations that managed activities in construction, 
agriculture, or industry. Soiuztrans also presided over the formulation and enforcement of 
shipping in these relationships, charged with ensuring they were handled effectively. Now that 
shipping was a distinct jurisdiction, the cargo transportation agencies exclusively had the duty to 
execute import and export activities within the republic, as well as enterprise-level needs (such 
as transportation of cargo at worksites).96 
The broader goal of reforming the shipping sector in this way was to improve how it 
served planning and implementation in the wider economy. To that end, Soiuztrans was now 
responsible for collecting, managing, and creating information about shipping. Knowledge of 
trends and rates of implementation of projects provided the critical data for the formulation of 
the shorter-term agendas within the five-year plan. Gosplan USSR encouraged agencies 
everywhere to improve their records of shipping at this time: amounts, origins, junctions, and 
destinations, as well as means of transportation, duration of trips, costs incurred, etc. During the 
period of transition to Soiuztrans’s authority over Tajikistan’s logistics, information management 
reform was a key concern to higher administrators because Soviet planning was often little more 
than making adjustments based on achievement of previous targets.97 In June 1930, a Tajikistan 
commodity chain official complained that the “lack [of] a clear count of means of transportation, 
of the development of trucking, of the state of freightage” to individual points as well as on the 
scale of the republic made anticipating and addressing inefficiencies of supply very difficult. Nor 
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did they have a sense of the degree to which organizations were failing to report on shipping. 
“Without these [data] it is not possible to assemble a plan that even approximates reality.”98  
The reforms in shipping were intended to enable effective information management and 
freightage by the three empowered agencies by giving them sole authority over all means of 
transportation within the republic. Gosplan officials assigned each cargo hauling organization 
jurisdictional priority over certain resources. Tadzhavtotrans became the primary operator and 
manager of the entire automotive vehicle fleet of the republic.99 Soiuztrans was to have sole 
authority over “donkey cooperatives,” and it shared management of horse-drawn wagons and 
carts, and “camel cooperatives,” with Promkooptrans.100 Each one’s jurisdiction was 
accompanied by their right and duty to appropriate all of the means of transportation from other 
entities. An official system of priority had existed in Tajikistan since September 1929 which had 
obligated any available carts and carting labor in the republic to serve the Soviet government.101 
This so-called trudguzhpovinnost’ recalled older forms of transportation coordination that had 
been used in the former Russian empire.102 In the later sources analyzed here, “obligation” 
(povinnost’) was not invoked as a justification for acquisition of transport means or services. 
Rather, the language emphasized jurisdiction over tools of mobility.103 Now, other euphemisms 
served state ambitions. Upper-level officials encouraged Tajikistan’s governing bodies to 
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“energetically enact measures to actively recruit all those owning means of transportation.”104 It 
was a way of acknowledging that shortages of all forms of movement inside the republic would 
exacerbate the pressures of economic planning and distribution on the republic’s uniquely 
challenging terrain. In the summer of 1930, for example, Gosplan Tajikistan officials knew that 
their estimated needs in transportation for the coming operating year of 1930-31—an additional 
1,230 automotive vehicles, 5,840 wagons, 6,900 camels, and 6,350 donkeys—could never be 
met by imports. Accordingly, their agency resolved to initiate “cooperativization” of the means 
of mobility, “in the interest of being economical.”105 
This was part of a comprehensive effort across the USSR to consolidate authority among 
and between economic sectors, pressuring all levels of society.106 During the first five-year plan 
and part of the second, Gosplan started to take over the economic planning functions of VSNKh, 
the leading Soviet economic planning body of the 1920s, as the Soviet state became more 
centralized.107 The preceding era of the 1920s New Economic Policy (NEP) had been 
characterized by a significant degree of independence among enterprises. “They combined into 
trusts and marketed their output through syndicates, only loosely controlled by planners."108 
Starting in 1928, however, they were gradually reclaimed by ministerial and regional authorities. 
In the meantime, the former operational freedoms fo the economy became officially subject to 
the central plan, which ordered what to produce, and to whom to deliver, and at what prices. In 
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Tajikistan’s reality, however, efforts to amalgamate the resources and governance of mobility 
under shipping agencies constituted an inelegant ongoing, inelegant process. It was no simple 
reshuffling of bureaucratic duties and rights enabled by the transfer of capital to transportniki. 
The republic’s three freightage companies were responsible for actively taking these assets from 
organizations or individuals. The hauling firms were effectively assimilating others’ now former 
jurisdictions. These complicated administrative and material processes were usually quite 
cumbersome because they involved incorporating transportation duties and property that 
economic organizations managed. 
For this reason, Promkooptrans often encountered reluctant cooperation from such 
entities. When it implemented the acquisition of the Transport, Land, and Construction 
Organization’s (Transzemstroi) shipping operations during the summer of 1930, it requested that 
officers “agree [to comply with the terms] in a way that has positive meaning for us.” 
Promkooptrans evidently expected resistance to its rather invasive requests for the transfer of 
“agency-level” and wider transportation duties and effects. It demanded the transfer of property 
related to transportation, most notably wagons and horses. The shipping cooperative also 
demanded “advances [of funds] sufficient to cover the current contract between us” that took into 
account “the capital you have lost.”109 Handing over means of shipping and related information 
could have exposed vulnerabilities or problems that would threaten the positions of personnel 
within Transzemstroi and other economic organizations. Non-cooperation could have been a way 
to avoid or forestall discovery of deficiencies, or to protect interests related to enterprise 
                                                
109 Message addressed to Transzemstroi, attributed to Kosachev (Operations), Shchegolevatykh, and Denichenko 
(both Executive Committee), 1930, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 20, l. 2 (full document). 
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jurisdiction over transportation. Organizations and persons likely had a variety of independent 
stakes in retaining control of their ability to manage resources and move their own commodities. 
Economic life in Tajikistan did not easily lend itself to upper-level officials’ desire to 
make shipping an efficient and distinct sector. Inside a commodity chain, moving goods involved 
complex relationships among many actors. The daily reality was very different from 
pronouncements on systemic change. As I will demonstrate, however, official and unofficial 
aspects of freightage were in fact flexible enough to accommodate many challenges to 
establishing a new economic life in the republic’s southern regions. 
 
Everyday shipping 
The everyday operations of shipping in southern Tajikistan embodied Soviet experiences that did 
not fit neatly into categories of strong state effectiveness and oppression or social participation 
and resistance. In the spirit of scholarship on “everyday life,” this section addresses some of the 
ways that mid- and lower-level administrators and laborers coped with their conditions through 
practice. Everyday shipping refers to how agencies and agents managed the duties and challenges 
in cargo transportation that they faced on a daily basis. It is a way of addressing their lives as 
state actors who performed their work by navigating institutional relationships and negotiating 
legal contexts but also in the pursuit of food, shelter, and personal stability. And while the 
quotidian is associated with the ordinary and minute, Jeff Sahadeo and Russell Zanca point out 
that “everyday life actually is not so routine, but something that we constantly re-make and 
reorganize as we go through various phases in our lives.” It can be “so unfamiliar, frequently 
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seeming not to make very much sense.”110 I will show how agencies and agents involved in 
shipping conducted their affairs to fulfill certain duties of their employment while shirking others 
according to the limits and needs of economic life in southern Tajikistan of the early 1930s. 
From the perspective of everyday shipping, the Soviet state appears different from the familiar 
historiographical portrayal of a centralizing administration that demanded great efforts from its 
subjects on unreasonable terms. Instead, we see a prudent government that managed its 
endeavors with a view to accomplishing priority tasks in ways that were viable, even if not 
aligned with wider policy. 
The Soviet state in southern Tajikistan acknowledged and accommodated the 
considerable material limitations facing the people who served it. Various upper-level officials 
expressed concern about work conditions.  At the start of 1931, a republican Gosplan committee 
concluded that the “discrepancy” between the three responsible agencies’ expected and real 
shipping performance was caused by a lack of support supplies and services, as well as of a 
suitable built environment. They needed more saddles, bridles, bulk fodder for animals, work 
clothes for laborers, tools, food supply, mechanics, and spare parts for automotive vehicles. 
Furthermore, these firms could not “guarantee 100% coverage for shipping in the period of 
spring planting campaigns, namely January, February, March, and April” due to the poor 
condition of the means of mobility and of the infrastructure. Transportniki could only 
“theoretically use the automobile transport on hand” since most of it was in need of repair, and 
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because rains expected in the spring would cause road conditions that only pack animals could 
navigate.111 
In this complicated material context, upper-level officials could plainly see that their 
economic formulas would be distorted indefinitely, regardless of any data collected about 
shipping. The matter of the unforeseeable and unintended within the plan also puzzled western 
commentators of the Soviet era.112 How could central administrations make large-scale agendas 
involving multiple entities that surely had equipment, materials, and labor of widely differing 
quantity and quality, all of which could encounter a range of challenges during plan execution? 
The state did so by operating in a manner that accommodated or encouraged various forms of 
unplanned activity in shipping in order to maximize the completion of tasks. On the larger scale 
of Tajikistan’s southern regions, sometimes the solution promoted for contending with 
challenging roads and paths was simply to attempt to increase the overall number of available 
working animals and unmechanized and machine vehicles, as well as people moving the 
cargo.113 As I will demonstrate below, however, the official terms that accompanied the 
reorganization of freight hauling, defined in various kinds of documents, acknowledged that 
agencies and agents needed the capacity to improvise in everyday shipping. The actual language 
that defined the new hierarchy of agencies allowed upper-level officials to operate as if they had 
                                                
111 Record of proceedings no. 4 of the 17 January 1931meeting of the Transport and Connections Section of the 
Gosplan Tajik SSR, in Stalinabad, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 18, l. 17. 
112 See, for example, Martin L. Weitzman, “Material Balances under Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
85, no. 2 (May 1975): 262-82. 
113 See TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 125; and Record of proceedings of a 3 March 1930 interdepartmental 
meeting held by the “Representative of Narkomtorg USSR in Central Asia,” TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 135 
(full document is ll. 135-137). 
  
149 
control of activities in the name of socialism in southern regions of the republic while de facto 
sanctioning practices that would be considered illegal.114 
The reorganization of shipping taking place in southern Tajikistan granted license to 
necessarily unpredictable daily practices. The republican Gosplan and its subsidiary 
organizations prescribed rules for commodity chain cooperation that may have been purposely 
vague. In fact, the May 1930 meeting in which they defined the roles of the three shipping 
agencies resolved that the actual work of shipping was to be conducted according to 
“conventional agreements.” These were route-specific arrangements of freightage agencies with 
each other, or with economic organizations, about the routes and means of transportation, as well 
as cargo amounts and tariffs. Although the nature of these agreements was not specified in the 
record of this meeting, it is clear that they could not have been very specific because of the 
manner in which actual shipping was organized. The gathering’s proceedings included a 
resolution stating that the three shipping agencies would enter into conventional agreements to 
“generally decide: the distribution of received cargos” for shipment; acquired forms of 
transportation and fodder; “the distribution of routes and roads among transportation 
organizations”; issues related to tariffs; and “the standard plan of contracts for cargo 
transportation.” According to this record, Soiuztrans retained ultimate authority for forming 
delivery contracts with economic organizations. 
This client relationship was not defined in a manner that necessarily dictated the 
organization of shipping. The artels operating under the three shipping firms were expected to 
cooperate in the accomplishment of  duties and also to share animals, wagons, and automotive 
                                                
114 On horizontal dealings of the 1930s that were, “by definition, illegal because they were outside of the plan/law,” 
see Gregory, Political Economy of Stalinism, 146-48. 
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vehicles.115 Flexible, unique agreements were used because they were perceived as an easier way 
to get things done on behalf of the state. Paul Gregory has explained that activity outside the plan 
was a norm of relations between enterprises, and especially in cargo hauling, on the basis of 
“fragile preliminary agreements that could be changed at any time.”116 But he does not account 
for why that is, or the impact it had on daily business. I argue that such arrangements inherently 
dispersed authority among organizations and actors well beyond any center. 
The sanctioning of conventional agreements, furthermore, made it hard to ensure 
accountability for work in an already complicated, evolving commodity chain. The economy was 
characterized by a division of labor that perpetuated ambiguous conditions and persistent 
problems that were hard to resolve. While the three aforementioned shipping agencies hauled 
goods, the availability of cargo for transportation depended on other organizations. Narkomtorg 
managed most supply to larger settlements, while the Tajikistan Consumer Cooperative, Tajik 
Matlubot served many work and construction zones in the early 1930s. The complicated 
overlapping responsibilities could be confusing to supervising officials. They often were at a loss 
for where to start identifying operational problems. In 1930, Narkomtorg’s reported investigation 
of insufficient material and food supply to construction of the Kulob and Samarkand roads found 
no clear culprit: “Neither Aziakhleb nor Tadzhikmatlubot could respond with comprehensive 
data to our inquiry about the missing flour supply for the workers of the Kulob and Samarkand 
roads.” Narkomtorg closed the issue by requesting that the two organizations report more 
frequently and give greater attention to accountability in such matters.117 
                                                
115 See TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, l. 4b. 
116 Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism, 199. 
117 Report addressed to the construction committee of the SNK of the Tajik SSR and copied to others, attributed to 
Shevtsov (Deputy [Chairman] of Narkomtorg Tajik SSR) and Kuz’min (Director of the Department of 
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This picture is different from that which studies have found in other contemporary Soviet 
settings. Some argue that accepted violations of work norms and poor recordkeeping were sorts 
of silent agreement between planning bodies and enterprises. Such conventions would have 
allowed executive bodies and individuals to avoid responsibility for inevitably failing to meet 
productivity targets, while they facilitated the privacy lower-level agencies needed in order to 
engage in illegal acts.118 In southern Tajikistan, activities that differed from overarching Soviet 
policy were sanctioned by legal documents defining shipping operations. The result was a 
convenient, if confusing, situation where illegal activities were in some ways legal, distorted 
lines of responsibility, and interfered with problem-solving. When problems were addressed, 
authorities were often concurrently critical of shipping labor and sympathetic to its working 
conditions. From this perspective, one factor challenging deliveries was the incompleteness of 
the larger program of economic growth in southern Tajikistan. 
A dispute from 1930 exemplifies the paradigm of global responsibility and how it bred a 
unique culture of explanation related to freightage. During the fall, Promkooptrans held 
interdepartmental hearings to resolve tensions between its artels and the state construction 
organization, Tadzhikgosstroi. The two sector outfits had officially had a dedicated freightage 
agreement since July.119 The Promkooptrans executive officers, and even leaders of its 
                                                
addressed to the Construction Committee of the SNK Tajik SSR, attributed to Kin’shakov and Kostelei (Secretary of 
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Construction Committee of the SNK of the Tajik SSR “On supplying foodstuffs to workers engaged in civil and 
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118 See Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism, 145-82. 
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Soiuztrans, Tadzhikgosstroi, and transport artels,” 6 July 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 182, l. 273a (full document 
is ll. 273a-b). 
  
152 
cooperative workgroups, were sympathetic to the construction organization’s allegation that 
shipping agents frequently invented complaints against Tadzhikgosstroi in order to avoid 
punishment for losses incurred as a result of their own mistakes in transportation. There was 
sufficiently good evidence, for example, to suspect that one artel’s employees invented a problem 
to cover up the loss of goods and cash during a river crossing when better judgment would have 
shown that the water was too high.120 
Promkooptrans officials also, however, felt persuaded that Tadzhikgosstroi often made it 
hard for transportniki to execute their duties. Its foremen were disorganized, often frustrating 
activities by directing shippers to wrong locations for loading or unloading. Other times, 
however, they added to confusion about jobs through long unexplained absences from work sites. 
When they were present, these personnel carried out their duties slowly and outside norms. In 
this “chaos,” the Novyi Put’ artel leader noted, sometimes “cigarette rolling papers are used for 
documentation.” More urgently, freight haulers claimed that jobs went unfulfilled because the 
construction agency—allegedly well-stocked compared to most republican organizations—
denied them “promised” supplies, including work clothes and food. Employees of the Trudovik 
artel claimed that, in one case, “fifteen horse-drawn wagons stood still for two whole days 
without fodder or money. People [and horses] were hungry, so work did not get done.” Foremen 
added to the stress of these conditions by verbally abusing haulers. Allegedly, artel members 
sometimes escaped these conditions through “desertion.”121 
Ultimately, Promkooptrans officials came to explain and understand this dispute in terms 
of market relations that were interwoven with the planned economy of southern Tajikistan. To 
                                                
120 Record of proceedings of the 17 August 1930 meeting of transport artels of Promkooptrans together with 
representatives of Tadzhikgosstroi, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 18b (full document is ll. 17a-19b). 
121 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 17a-b, 18b. 
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them, the main source of “spiteful relations between the artels and Tadzhikgosstroi [was] the 
shortage of fodder and clear rates [for services]” on the scale of the republic.122 The issue of rates 
and expenses was part of the larger challenge to regulating and systematizing the relationships 
between shipping and economic organizations through the standardization of distribution. 
Economic organizations were expected to now recognize the distinctiveness of the freightage 
sector by paying for shipping according to state rates, contracted in advance.123 The manner of 
satisfying payables, however, remained confusing. Sometimes, payments were due to one of the 
three cargo hauling organizations at regular or pre-determined intervals. In other cases, payments 
were due to artels on completion of individual shipments or jobs. Economic organizations’ 
frequent failure to pay on time, or at all, further complicated accounting and often was an 
obstacle to shipping firm operations, depending on their levels of credit. As a 1933 Gosplan 
report alleged, “Promkooptrans [artels] of all republican regions are, without exception, forced to 
work outside the laws prohibiting commercial crediting of freightage [in service] for 
organizations owing large debts for previous deliveries.”124 Such statements make it difficult to 
unravel the dynamics of the significant stress that Tajikistan’s freight hauling agencies and their 
clients were experiencing. Furthermore, historiographic disagreement over the nature of money 
usage in the early 1930s precludes conclusive explanatory frameworks.125 What is clear is that 
                                                
122 Ibid., ll. 18b-19a. 
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money and credit were crucial to everyday economic life, including the viability of various kinds 
of enterprises, as well as personal and group ability to obtain sustenance. 
Agencies were poorly equipped to track who used or owed how many funds, and they 
found it hard to map plans onto work that fell into overlapping spheres of responsibility. 
Soiuztrans sometimes did jobs originally allotted to Promkooptrans. Economic organizations still 
organized transportation in-house, but they were also expected to account for its cost and confer 
that to a designated service agency.126 In this reality, accounting practices across organizations 
were conducted in a manner that did not adequately refer to budgets, creating planning problems 
in jurisdiction, compensation, and material support. These conditions promoted an array of 
supply and logistical problems that organizations, groups, and individuals needed to overcome 
on a daily basis. 
Promkooptrans’s explanation of artels’ inefficiency and Tadzhikgosstoi’s failure to 
provide material support to transportniki anticipated a widely held view that was repeated 
throughout the 1930s. It presented such issues as part of a constellation of continuing systemic 
challenges to laborers en route: shipping firms were less effective than planned because of a lack 
of caravanserais, forage corrals, and red teahouses (krasnye chaikhany) where drivers, drovers, 
and their animals could rest and recuperate and where equipment could be repaired.127 Various 
other agencies, including Narkomtorg and Soiuztrans, had failed to establish support 
infrastructure, so shipping firms such as Promkooptrans were not accomplishing the work that 
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economic organizations like Tadzhikgosstroi had contracted. Artels and their individual 
members, meanwhile, were not provided sufficient food or shelter, nor the monetary 
compensation with which to acquire it. 
 
A Soviet market for shipping services 
In early 1930s Tajikistan, central plans for supporting economic projects floundered. As I will 
demonstrate, a market for shipping supported planning where it was failing by facilitating 
exchange of materials and money for services and labor.128 These conditions of mobility also 
perpetuated challenges to the desired command economy. Many scholars agree that by the 
middle of the decade, executive Soviet officials had come to see the existence of illegal and 
semi-legal markets and the use of money as a necessary complement to or support for the 
planned, material economy.129 S. G. Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies argue that the explosive 
growth of the Soviet economy starting in 1930 “was based not on market pressure but on a 
planning process covering an increasingly complex economy.”130 In Tajikistan, however, the 
daily trials of economic reform on the ground levels of commodity exchange administration 
depended on the perseverance of a market for shipping services that also interfered with the 
transition to planning. Non-government labor arrangements, outside the plan, were officially 
illegal, and supervisory organizations often declared or implied that they wished to prevent such 
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activities. Their explanations for not doing so, however, indicate broad systemic agreement about 
the benefits of permitting a market for commodity mobility, as I discuss below.131 
Such justifications were likely predicated on the fact that some of the legal documents 
governing day-to-day shipping operations promoted temporary, market-like relations. The 
operating charters of the three freightage organizations appeared to be flexible in order to 
provide for contingencies. Soiuztrans, Tadzhavtotrans, and Promkooptrans had considerable 
powers of independent operation, including establishing contracts for their services. While 
Soiuztrans acquired powers of oversight in mid-1930, it is not clear how it affected the other two 
officially. Shipping practices from that point forward suggested that all parties continued 
operating as if Tadzhavtotrans and Promkooptrans had significant rights to autonomous action 
outside the plan that was clearly authorized by their own charters. These founding documents 
indicated that both agencies could enter into any contract relevant to their work and perform all 
forms and services of shipping, as well as tangential activities such as the sale and transfer of the 
means of transportation. Article 5 of the Promkooptrans charter is explicit in this respect. Its 
spacing within the document changes to double rather than single in order to highlight the 
agency’s rights, as follows: “The union can use all legal means to acquire or dispose of property, 
conclude any kind of contract, including to secure the construction or leasing of an enterprise, 
land or other property, to take on contracts and delivery of goods…to hand out bills of exchange 
and any kind of commitment.”132 Just so, each firm’s documented right to govern its own 
                                                
131 Stephen Kotkin discusses some evidence of a “private” market for various transportation services in 
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activities and resources promoted conditions in which upper-level authorities had limited 
jurisdiction in daily activities (at least theoretically). 
In the case of Promkooptrans, the scope of its self-governing ability was supported by the 
manner in which daily shipping work was de-centralized. Until 1932, various agency offices 
across the republic had considerable authority to administer very large areas with little “central” 
oversight by the Promkooptrans executive. Offices in Qurghonteppa and Kulob served the 
southern regions going by those names but had little contact with the office based in Stalinabad, 
which also served the central Hissor Valley.133 A 1933 Gosplan of Tajikistan audit showed that 
the form of separation of duties and activities among regions had promoted a situation bolstering 
a market for shipping services. The regional organization of Promkooptrans governance had not 
only meant “non-recognition of this [republican transportation] union.” It also was a situation 
that enabled laborers “doing [unofficial] work on the side, etc.”134 Evidently, economic 
organizations were arranging ad hoc shipping services that were supposed to have been already 
contracted. These clients operated as if they had the right to hire transportation for cargo outside 
the plan in order to fulfill work targets. 
The republican reorganization of Promkooptrans in September 1932 created smaller, 
better-governed regions, but former problems persisted. Shipping in southern Tajikistan of the 
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early 1930s was a service for sale, whereby economic organizations frequently employed 
freightage labor for ad hoc tasks. The cotton sector enterprise Khlopstroi, for example, regularly 
hired shipping artels, including “camels, donkeys, and carts” for “independent” jobs.135 Such 
arrangements were usually improvised on short notice, with enterprises sometimes enlisting 
cooperative workgroups or individual laborers to do additional duties in exchange for unplanned 
wages.136 Although such a market for shipping services was officially undesirable, it was 
inevitable in regions where economic growth was concentrated. Tajikistan’s southern valleys 
were the site of enormous state investment for establishing a productive cotton agricultural 
sector. Projects here were more ambitious than those of central and northern regions because 
they had less of an economic legacy to build on and poorer infrastructure. These conditions 
created operational needs that only the market for shipping could satisfy. 
In Soviet data, coded in terms of central planning and control, this situation appeared as a 
contradiction. Economic growth moved forward rapidly in southern Tajikistan even though its 
local shipping agencies in the Qurghonteppa and Kulob regions had far lower rates of plan 
fulfillment than those of central and northern regions.137 Had supply to the economic enterprises 
here stopped? To the contrary, freightage served them through activities that were outside the 
plan and explicit central control. Moreover, these operations were conducted with state property 
at times when officially planned activities were to be taking place. This market for shipping 
services was essential to achieving economic growth targets of “local” enterprises that had the 
material and monetary resources with which to obtain labor for cargo hauling. In the late fall of 
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1930, Promkooptrans officials found that the members of artels in Qurghonteppa were “taking on 
unauthorized contracts” in such great number that it became nearly impossible to use transport 
resources to fulfill planned shipments.138 The market for shipping thus also may have impeded 
work that might have been conducted in the mandated way. 
The justifications that upper-level personnel usually used to explain shipping work 
outside the plan focused entirely on the laborers and rarely on whether agencies had the right to 
employ them. A late October 1930 Promkooptrans meeting agreed that the “chaotic condition” of 
artels in the Kulob region was the result of the fact that they “have no fodder, no living quarters, 
nor much for inventory.”139 Officials considered the Qurghonteppa region to be the most in need 
of reform in shipping, and successive reports of the early 1930s concluded that the situation 
would not improve if material support to artels did not become better.140 In the spring of 1931, 
the Promkooptrans regional administrative office in Qurghonteppa had just one  “recently 
acquired” caravanserai, having an area of 50 by 100 meters. It could not hope to accommodate 
even a fraction of the eighteen artels serving the city—totaling more than 600 people, 630 
horses, 600 camels, 180 wagons, and 260 bullock carts that might might have been directed to 
it.141 In fact, Promkooptrans had difficulty maintaining even this modest establishment. Lacking 
sufficient timber, the place did not have a proper dwelling space for humans or animals, so most 
would sleep in an open camp. Moreover, the Promkooptrans laborers of this region received no 
                                                
138 Proceedings of “the organizing meeting of artel representatives with Promkooptrans commissioners of the 
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more than half of standard quotas of most supplies. Only tea was supplied to specified norms. As 
a result, transportniki looked for food, and even adobe bricks for constructing shelters, in 
unofficial markets.142 This demonstrates that the commodity chains serving southern Tajikistan 
of the early 1930s were so utterly dysfunctional that even the laborers who worked in shipping 
were not provided sufficient food and housing. 
The undeniable challenges to daily life in Tajikistan also served managers and other 
officials as a justification for leniency in an era of purges across the USSR. The state was 
concerned with the market for labor in freightage because it reflected authorities’ inability to 
control economic relations. In the 1930s, Soviet officials enforced some adherence to 
regulations—even in locales where conditions were harsh—by enacting regular “cleansings” of 
the personnel of all organizations.143 But in Tajikistan, various audits of the three official 
shipping agencies and other supervisory organizations showed that officials often felt unable to 
compel labor because transportnkiki were so concerned with simple survival.144 Artels that 
performed a wide variety of tasks for a large number of agencies, hauling everything from 
cereals and other food products to gravel and rock and cotton for export, all faced problems with 
supplies. It affected all of them differently depending on what they had as a result of their work 
histories. Even those that were well stocked with goods like food or boots found the need to seek 
other items in markets. These transactions, allegedly, sometimes involved commodity exchanges 
and other times money acquired through services or sale of goods—including those from 
                                                
142 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, ll. 80-81, 84. 
143 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 20. 
144 See, for example, Message addressed to Tadzhikmatlubot and the Construction Committee of the SNK Tajik 
SSR, attributed to Ivanovskii and Sergeev (Secretary) of the Stroimaterial trust, 28 June 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, 
d. 193, l. 14 (full document); and TsGART, f. 146, op. 1, d. 78, ll. 125-27.  Paul Gregory and Mark Harrison argue 
this was a phenomenon common across the USSR. See “Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in Stalin’s 
Archives,” Journal of Economic Literature 43 (September 2005): 753-54. 
  
161 
shipments.145 Official explanations emphasizing that laborers were forced into this situation by 
general privation also enabled the continuation of a market for shipping and survival. As one 
report pointed out, the result of inadequate food and equipment supply to transportniki was that 
“whole groups [of them] were abandoning artels to provide private charter services (in 
Stalinabad, Qurghonteppa, etc.)” in order to survive.146  
Officials’ reluctance to mete out punishment to shipping personnel in southern Tajikistan 
was also informed by the existing market for labor itself. Authorities were unwilling to discipline 
transportniki because of a shortage of suitable replacement laborers.147 In fact, the very actions 
taken to reorganize shipping in 1930 were guided by this kind of reasoning. One example 
involved how Promkooptrans spared newly joining freightage teams the full audit required by 
incorporation procedures. An agency representative deployed to Shahrinav, west of Stalinabad, 
explained that he judged it best to forego obliging local agents to provide the kind of records 
normally expected in the process of association. They were well-established providers of services 
to local enterprise, but they had used procedures that were outside the plan and policy and 
without proper documentation. Most of them, he explained, did not even belong to a formally 
organized artel. They were, however, experienced haulers who had worked in shipping locally 
for a long time. The Promkooptrans representative emphasized that this would make them 
valuable agency affiliates, worthy of breaking the rules of incorporation.148 
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These particular transportniki were also valued because of their nationality. Most of them 
were Tajiks and Uzbeks, while most Promkooptrans land-based shipping personnel in southern 
Tajikistan were identified with other nationalities.149 The presence of a greater number of Tajiks 
and Uzbeks helped the agency comply with Soviet regulations governing the demographics of 
state organizations. This so-called nationalities policy required that all economic and government 
sectors employ a ratio of ethnic and national groups that reflected the demographics of regions 
and republics in which they operated. The policy, though it went through various forms and 
iterations in the 1920s and 1930s, is a cornerstone of all scholarship on Soviet and post-Soviet 
Central Asia. It was responsible for the creation of the republics in the region and also, some 
would argue, for the definition of local identities. Nation and nationalities policy were a key 
context for every Soviet endeavor in early independent Tajikistan.150 
The representative to Shahrinav was pleased that most of the shipping agents in the area 
were appropriately Tajik or Uzbek because the wider organization’s personnel demographics 
violated Soviet regulations in a manner that was typical throughout Central Asia. In the early 
1930s, most Promkooptrans artels were composed of individuals from outside the region. 
Individual workgroups were relatively homogenous in makeup: they included few locals or other 
identity groups.151 The majority of these transportniki came from “European” regions of the 
USSR. The largest national groups were Russians and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians. Following 
them, well-represented groups included Ossetians, Turkmen, and Tatars. Tajiks and Uzbeks were 
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least numerous in official documents.152 The national composition of the Promkooptrans artels of 
the Qurghonteppa region in November 1930, for example, was 60 percent Ossetian and 30 
percent Russian, with only the remaining 10 percent identified vaguely as “local nationality.”153 
This shipping sector reflected a larger pattern of labor demographics across Central Asia of the 
1920s and 1930s. Studies have shown that, statistically, Russian or “European” cadres 
monopolized most of the highly skilled and high-wage jobs in the region. The phenomenon is 
typically seen as part of a wider colonial relationship wherein foreigners could ensure stability 
and enable the harvesting of primary resources for processing outside Central Asia.154 This view 
of an exploitative settler imposition corresponds to general agreement that “policies were largely 
determined in Moscow, and local interests were subordinated to all-Union goals.”155 
Such large-scale characterizations ascribe intentions to authorities in Tajikistan that 
should be reconsidered. Promkooptrans documents reflect that many officials desired the 
realization of nationalities policy but believed that the nature of the market for shipping labor 
made it difficult to alter personnel demographics. Upper-level officials’ decision not to force the 
implementation of nationalities policy was informed by an unwillingness to endanger ongoing 
daily activities in commodity exchange. They believed that interfering in the norms of freightage 
operations would threaten wider economic growth projects. From this perspective, a practical 
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appraisal of the market for shipping services helped obstruct the anti-colonial ideological 
imperatives of nationalities policy. 
This is striking because some Promkooptrans officials were resolved and motivated to 
honor the central mandate. Even more surprising, some authorities favored the affirmative action 
process for the distinctly practical and strategic benefits that they imagined it would afford. At 
one level, they believed that employing more native residents would be a way of weakening the 
“anti-Soviet element”—notably, the Basmachi guerrilla  fighters—that obtained support from 
natives by identifying Soviet governance as a foreign occupation.156 At the center of this appeal 
to the “hearts and minds” of regional peoples, however, was an even more important, economic 
calculation: employing laborers who were deemed natives was cheaper than hiring ones from 
outside the region. Much of the work of shipping was low-skill tasks that officials judged 
appropriate for people identified as local residents because, allegedly, they usually lacked 
foreigners’ training and experience. Nationalities policy across all economic sectors in Tajikistan 
meant saving the state money because less proficient individuals could be paid less. The 
unidentified author of one report explained that “qualified Russian workers demand higher 
wages.” Laborers from the native population, “because of their lack of experience, do not earn 
even the official established normal [amount].”157 To executives at a Promkooptrans meeting, 
extending local jobs to the majority native population would help accommodate the “tense 
financial situation of the Republic.”158 
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In this respect, transportniki were little more than means to an end for the upper 
Promkooptrans officials. They were a form of human capital used to fulfill an economic 
function. The failure of nationalities policy among shipping personnel in Tajikistan in the early 
1930s was the result of upper-level officials trying to carefully manage their view of the 
discontinuities between planned economic growth and the real, local capacity for reaching those 
aims. Under Tajikistan’s dependency regime, most of its capital—human or otherwise—was 
essentially donated by other regions of the USSR. Since organizing the training and support 
required to employ large numbers of Tajiks or Uzbeks in the hauling sector was complicated and 
expensive, officials opted for the easier path of using what they had amassed through 
importation—as with timber, metal products, and all manner of other materials. Comparing this 
explanation for the demographics of freightage labor in Tajikistan to a similarly foreign upper 
cadre across Central Asia is difficult without more data or a clear policy or other explanation. 
The Promkooptrans perspective recommends avenues for reconsidering the demographics of 
those higher officials in terms of staffing operations as they were discussed by specific 
organizations’ administration. Explorations of evidence about personnel management from 
within institutions may illuminate rationales, motives, relationships, and discourses that are 
unfamiliar in the scholarly literature. 
Transactions for shipping services involved a labor market that comprised inequalities. 
Officially, freightage managers discriminated against national groups that were legally entitled to 
greater representation. On the less official side of the market for shipping, economic 
organizations were suspected of taking advantage of cargo haulers through means other than 
exchange. The influence that came with the ability to compensate transportation providers also 
included the power to sometimes obtain services through forms of coercion. Upper-level 
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shipping officials were concerned that some ad hoc shipping service activities were the result of 
intimidation or force. Some economic organizations allegedly engaged in the practice of 
“detaining caravans and wagons in order to put their drovers and drivers to work for local 
interests.”159 
This possibility points to another instance of “symbiosis,” to borrow from Osokina, 
between market and central control in 1930s Tajikistan. My analysis of the supervisory practices 
and rationales associated with everyday shipping shows that managers were often most interested 
in the ends afforded by workers at a time when forced labor now existed alongside wage labor in 
the USSR.160 This context raises questions about officials who identified privation as the cause of 
ineffectiveness in cargo hauling. Were their words genuinely sympathetic? Instead, they may 
have been carefully calculated assessments that implied limited opportunities for coercion in 
freightage practices. 
The complicated ethical context of the market for labor in shipping services is especially 
salient in cases where such workers were themselves imported. When humans were treated as a 
form of capital to be imported and then employed, Soviet officials encountered familiar 
challenges that had very different implications for daily economic life. As I will show, shipping 
and other organizations tried to apply similar administrative practices to imported labor, but 
found that human capital often interfered with state imperatives in ways that it did not anticipate, 
and could not control. Humans had independent agency and—being alive—required 
accommodation that other kinds of capital did not. While timber could rot or catch fire if left in 
an unattended pile for weeks, humans could die or fail to work efficiently if they were 
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mishandled or unfed for a couple of days. Some would flee or refuse to work if they thought this 
was a possibility. The reality of independent travel as an option to laborers in response to their 
conditions demonstrated the insufficiency of scholarly understandings of migration and 
settlement in the southern regions of Tajikistan. In the 1920s and particularly the 1930s, 
hundreds of thousands of people migrated to Tajikistan’s southern regions, voluntarily, semi-
voluntarily (because of incentives or contracts), and as a result of state coercion. Most of them 
traveled from other parts of the republic to settle southern agricultural regions.161 Some of them 
were return-migrants who had fled to Afghanistan during the post-tsarist wars. (Indeed, 
identifying who was native in southern Tajikistan is difficult.) One “resettlement” campaign in 
January 1930 involved the migration of more than 2,500 households from Uzbekistan and 
northern Tajikistan (Khujand, Panjakent, and Uroteppa regions). Because of transportation 
problems between Termez and Dushanbe, more than five hundred households were forced to 
travel on foot.162 Due to such conditions, and severe insecurity (of employment, sustenance, etc.) 
departure rates of settlers were quite high—possibly as much as equal to a third of immigrant 
numbers each year.163 Transport workers shared many of the same experiences and attributes, 
though their nationality was more often foreign. Their experiences were characterized by 
considerable difficulty and fragility in service of a state that barely held itself together. 
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The case of one particular group of laborers imported in 1930 is emblematic of the 
manner in which humans were often treated as capital. Soiuztrans contracted them near 
Petropavlovsk in northern Kazakhstan, and had them travel to Stalinabad where many of them 
found a hard fate including extreme poverty, abuse, illness, and death. Most of what I know 
about them is based on documentation of an artel that at least some of them formed, called 
Sibirskii Transportnik. This workgroup was only active for three months before it was liquidated, 
leading to a control commission’s investigation. The investigation found that Soiuztrans and 
other state agencies were responsible for the starvation and desertion of many of the members of 
this new artel. Rather than recommend substantial procedural revisions or punitive actions of 
responsible officials, however, the control commission closed the matter by accounting for the 
inventory of the labor cooperative, and setting out a way to balance its accounts. 
From the start, the endeavor of acquiring the laborers from Petropavlovsk was conducted 
like a negotiation for any other physical goods. Soiuztrans enacted a complex operation, whereby 
it engaged republic agencies in lobbying various other Union institutions, as well as by 
deploying its own tolkachi to Kazakhstan to draw up contracts and arrange the logistics of 
transporting the laborers to Tajikistan. At least three delegates were in Petropavlovsk by 
February, to hire labor and to help coordinate lobbying efforts based in Stalinabad. Such labor 
envoys were frequently used to help ferry laborers across vast distances, ensuring they obtained 
supplies, while chartering passage and transportation, and helping them navigate the multitude 
semi-legal and illegal arrangements needed to do so.164 One of those in Petropavlovsk was later 
alleged to have lied about his status as a representative of the Tajikistan SNK to appear more 
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credible.165 Reporting by telegraph, he and the others ascertained the availability and cost of 
laborers, as well as their horses and carts, and sought contracts with assembled artels workgroups 
willing to work in Tajikistan. By March, the head Soiuztrans envoy, named Boiar, had succeeded 
in acquiring signed agreements for an unknown number of “diggers” (grabari).166 
The group consisted primarily of peasants who were natives of the Petropavlovsk 
region.167 These so-called “volunteers” were actively involved in the process of recruitment and 
the decision to go to Tajikistan, though it is not clear how much influence they had over the 
situation. During a 6 April 1930 meeting, a majority of them or their representatives voted to 
approve the move, as well as the officers of the group to travel. They explicitly did so because 
Boiar promised them housing, food, and wages, in in exchange for work.168 This was not a 
simple matter of forced migration. 
Even so, agencies from across the USSR were heavily involved in mediating the laborers’ 
ultimate departure, demonstrating that agreements signed in Petropavlovsk did not necessarily 
guarantee travel. In April, Tajikistan officials felt obliged to make significant lobbying efforts to 
ensure that the volunteers would arrive. Soiuztrans convinced several higher republican 
institutions to demand that “central Moscow organizations” interject.169 Tolkachi progress 
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reports had alerted them that Kazakhstan authorities were interfering with the labor transfer, 
contradicting recent resolutions of the SNK of both the USSR and the RSFSR. The Tajikistan 
SNK responded by aggressively courting multiple bodies of the USSR and the RSFSR, and 
accusing their comrades in Kazakhstan of hoarding. In one case, the SNK Chairman strongly 
urged his counterpart in Russia, the eminent Kazakh, Turar Rysqulov, “to instruct Petropavlovsk 
to stop getting in the way.”170 
One of the key rhetorical strategies used by Tajikistan lobbyists was to draw attention to 
the fact that their northern neighbors were disproportionately privileged. As I demonstrated in 
Chapters 1 and 2, Soviet conversations about matters of economic growth, and that which was 
desired for Tajikistan, were already characterized by a global awareness of the relative lack of 
infrastructure and other legacies of the republic’s physical environment. Here, Soiuztrans 
officials and others relied on a teleological framing for spatial and resource inequality within 
Central Asia, as throughout the wider USSR. The laborers that they contracted had just been 
used in the construction of the Turksib Railroad. This touted symbol of Soviet progress in Asia 
extended through Kazakhstan, from Siberia to Tashkent. Most of the work on it was done 
between 1928 and April of 1930.171 Tajikistan officials pointed out that the Turksib was all but 
finished, and argued that they now needed its construction resources more than Kazakhstan; it 
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was now Tajikistan’s turn to advance economically. The implication was that Soviet officials 
who willfully hoarded resources, including labor, made Tajikistan a victim of geography, 
exacerbating its vulnerability on the edge of the USSR. Kazakhstan, they claimed, benefitted 
disproportionately from closer proximity to Russia, and thereby the sources of established 
commodity chains. Soiuztran officials intended to use the new laborers to support road 
construction. As late as the end of April, they complained that Kazakhstan authorities 
“systematically undervalue the need to effectively appraise the evident importance of supporting 
and securing the highways of our borderland.”172 
The laborers finally arrived in Stalinabad during the first week of May 1930, expecting 
their contracts to be fulfilled. Instead, local officials offered them neither housing nor food, 
demanded work beyond their means, and withheld the wages they had been promised in 
Kazakhstan. Officials later concluded that these material problems had were rooted in a 
dysfunctional, complicated bureaucracy, with ultimate fault lying with Soiuztrans. None of their 
assessments, though, observed that Tajikistan agencies were unprepared to handle the incoming 
laborers in early May because they were unaware of their immanent arrival. The migration from 
Petropavlovsk was most likely already underway by the time that Tajikistan agencies complained 
in late April that Kazakhstan was continuing to interfere. The laborers traveled with their 
families, horses, and equipment, some of which died on the way.173 Altogether, they comprised 
1,678 people, of whom 1,200 were laborers, accompanying them were about 1,500 horses.174 
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The special commission later recounted that when the group arrived, unprepared officials 
directed it to lands on the outskirts of Stalinabad. There, “under the open sky”, they got there 
“just as heavy rains arrived, and since people had no apartments, tents, nor [appropriate] 
clothing, they lay in the mud.”175  Because of these conditions, disease started to affect the 
migrants, as well as their horses, almost immediately. 
These stressful circumstances were made worse by the disorganized work environment 
the laborers encountered. Large numbers of them formed the artel called Sibirskii Transportnik 
within the Promkooptrans system by 5 May.176 At a practical level, their labor activities were 
characterized by confusion that stemmed from the lack of clarity about authority. They were 
subject to at least two organizations besides Soiuztrans. At a time when Promkooptrans was 
gradually becoming the dedicated shipper for Tadzhikgosstroi, Sibirskii Transportnik worked for 
the construction agency in the transportation of rock, sand, and gravel in a road project, partly in 
cooperation with TGDT.177 Having several new managers in a new place led to confusion over 
who the laborers worked for, and who should pay them. In the meantime, Boiar and Iudin, two of 
the tolkachi who had contracted the laborers in Kazakhstan were now assigned as advisers to the 
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artel, with the responsibility of for ensuring that they acquired food and fodder, equipment, and 
housing, as well as expert personnel—a task they failed to fulfill .178 
The control commission would later find that ultimate responsibility fell with Souiztrans, 
though fault lay with all of the agencies involved. As in other cases of freightage management, 
lines of authority were often vague, a situation that led to wasted resources and failing projects. 
The investigation concluded that transportation union was guilty of not only poor planning, but 
also of outright abuse in some cases where the artel protested its conditions. 
They [the laborers] asked Soiuztrans about the temporary availability of some barracks or 
tents, but they were always denied.  The [Stalinabad] manager of Soiuztrans, Comrade 
Bizenkov, once traveled to [where they lived]…They surrounded him, asking him for 
assistance in finding apartments to use during periods of rain, at least for the little kids.  
To these requests, Bizenkov replied: with apartments, you’ll be working off your debts 
for twenty-five years.  And with that, he drove off, trailed by their curses.179 
The commission report, however, misrepresented the intentions of Soiuztrans officials, painting 
the situation as a far simpler case of negligence than it was. In fact, they were distressed about 
this situation, but felt limited by rules defining jurisdiction over types of administration. They 
frequently communicated their concerns to the Tajikistan SNK because, officially, the kinds of 
basic provisions needed by the artel were supposed to be provided by the “State Insurance 
Agency”, Gosstrakh. This organization refused to act without direct official orders from higher-
up. When those orders finally arrived, it refused to cooperate on account of a shortage of 
financial and material resources.180 Tadzhikgosstroi, meanwhile, paid the laborers only eight or 
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nine rubles each per unit of work, while their contracts vaguely assured compensation of from 
“twenty to thirty rubles.” The construction agency also allegedly demanded too much work 
relative to feed for the horses. Compensated an apparently low 4 kilograms of hay per cubic 
meter hauled, the horses were unable to keep up, and gradually became mostly incapable of 
working.181 
The members of Sibirskii transportnik responded to these dire conditions by taking 
matters into their own hands, and by reneging on their commitments to Soiuztrans, as well as to 
each other. Early on, the desperate situation encouraged theft among laborers. Allegedly, a small 
number who had access to collectively held money refused to share parts of it with certain other 
workers. This was possible because the artel—in traditional fashion—received payment as a 
group, which was held by a few representatives responsible for distributing wages. But when it 
came to money received from Soiuztrans in Kazakhstan, and from Tadzhikgosstroi in Tajikistan, 
many laborers alleged that they received nothing from artel leaders. To earn money, many 
transporniki began to hire themselves out to other departments’ projects, where pay was better 
and unmediated, and where more feed was given their horses.182 Such semi-legal and illegal 
behavior of artel members was the result of their having been illegally mistreated by upper-level 
officials. Without food and fodder, workers turned to private markets where their search for basic 
subsistence was rewarded. They turned to Soviet agencies that were not authorized to hire them, 
and paid money for work unlike the labor they had officially been contracted to do. 
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These were survival strategies that still did not make up for the profound lack of support 
to Sibirskii Tranportnik. Instead, they only seem to have accelerated the ultimate dissolution of 
the artel. The continuing shortage of sustenance and board encouraged conditions for the spread 
of disease among humans and animals. Horse deaths became common. The trauma of their 
situation led members of the artel community to seek more extreme ways of surviving, which 
investigators later called “a wild state of being.” Government agencies concerned with hygiene 
saw the workgroup’s living conditions as a danger to the wider public, and by mid-June 
transferred the laborers down the Dushanbe River, four kilometers beyond the city limits.183 
“Finding themselves in such conditions,” investigators would explain, “members of the artel 
were driven to disband.”184 Some of them took shelter in the compounds of other departments. A 
sizeable number, however, trashed or sold the property in their possession, stole money, escaped 
“to who knows where.” Many were never located. The state, for its part, waited until mid-August 
to officially declare Sibirskii Transportnik a failure and liquidate it. Boiar reappeared in the story 
now as head of the liquidation commission, and took stock of what was lost in terms of material, 
animal, and human resources, and reintegrated the remaining inventory into other artels.185 
This administrative practice of liquidation, reclamation, and reintegration was the 
common way that interdepartmental governance reconciled ambitious projects with failure in an 
effort to account for resources at their disposal. In December, a control commission investigated 
the case of Sibirskii Transportnik, as well as several other Promkooptrans artels liquidated for 
violations of the law and general disorderliness. Such investigations were efforts to understand 
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human tragedies in terms of their effect on the economy. While some of them were differentiated 
by specialization in means of transportation, they shared in common the experience of working 
in a wide variety of capacities, and under the direct authority of agencies ranging from Dorstroi, 
to Vakhshstroi and Tadzhikgosstroi—sometimes all of them and others—and hauling everything 
from cereals and other food products, to gravel and rock, and cotton for export. More 
importantly, they all faced problems with supplies that they overcame through illegal activities. 
The market for shipping services supported artel members’ needs to acquire materials in ways 
that were beyond state control. Even those that were well stocked with certain goods, like food or 
boots, found the need to seek other items in unofficial markets, often finding the funds to pay for 
them by selling some of their own property, or even part of their shipments. 186 The December 
commission knew that material stresses had forced the artels into these situations, and it directed 
much of the blame at the supervising shipping agencies. In the case of Sibirskii Transportnik, it 
found that, not only was Soiuztrans ultimately responsible for what had happened, but also that a 
fake SNK representative it had deployed to Petropavlovsk, a Comrade Surin, had knowingly lied 
about what his employer could offer the migrants on arrival.187 
The control commission’s primary concern, though, was always with closing the account 
books of every artel. It found that, at the moment of liquidation, Sibirskii Transportnik was 
12,500 rubles in debt, aside from 50,000 rubles owed Soiuztrans.188 Debts to organizations were 
often transferable to parties at the other, usually receiving, end of a shipping event, and could be 
recovered if the artels accounts books were adequately kept. Despite several artels having left 
large debts after liquidation, the control commission agreed that, as in the case of Novaia Sibir, 
                                                
186 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, l. 89-95. 
187 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 103; and TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 10-11. 
188 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 103; and TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 94, l. 10. 
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dissolving them and redistributing their property was usually more “profitable” following 
significant desertions.189 
 
Conclusion: Exchange and material change 
At the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in January 1935, the Deputy 
Chairman of the republican SNK, Maksumov, commented on the progress commodity chains 
had made in the country. He pointed to the impressive growth of “commodity turnover” as 
closely linked to Tajikistan’s great strides in industry and social welfare. “If you look at the 
overall figures on the growth of commodity turnover in Tajikistan, they show that where they 
amounted to about 71 million rubles worth in 1930, they came to 214 million rubles in 1934—a 
rise of about 300 percent.”190 He congratulated the personnel involved because they had helped 
build up the Soviet project by improving the quality of life and “happiness” of each citizen. 
These and other measures, he explained, were “characteristic of the way that commodity 
turnover is unfolding, of the growth of the material well-being of the laboring masses, and of the 
extent to which industry is satisfying their needs.”191 Major economic growth projects were 
underway throughout the republic. Tajikistan was changing so fast in the early 1930s that one 
report claimed: “It sounds like a paradox, but there were in fact months when you could not find 
a plot for construction in Stalinabad and in other locations.”192 The capital’s population had 
                                                
189 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 103; Findings of the Liquidation Commission regarding the Novaia Sibir' artel that 
operated in the Iangi-Bazar region, copy dated 10 November 1930 in Stalinabad, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 105 
(full document; handwritten original is at TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 108a-b); and Statement of the Liquidation 
Commission regarding the Novaia Sibir' and Krasnyi Transportnik artels of Promkooptrans, attributed to Iudin, copy 
dated 10 December 1930 in Stalinabad, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 14, l. 106 (full document). 
190 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1274, l. 109. 
191 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1274, l. 109. 
192 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1140, l. 8. 
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grown to about 40,000 people. In the course of the decade various buildings were built to house 
such educational organizations as a medical school, a technical school for women, and a 
pedagogical institute. In 1937, the city enacted the construction of the first “multi-story 
buildings” for lodging.193 
The success of the republic’s commodity chains was real and yet paradoxical. They had 
undeniably led to significant economic growth desired by planners, but operated in a manner 
what was at odds with ideology and law. I have argued that the Soviet commodity chains that 
supplied projects to alter the physical environment of Tajikistan were characterized by material 
exchanges that were beyond central control. Freightage within the republic and across the USSR 
supported the environmental management state through activities enabled by varying degrees, 
and sometimes the absence of, legality. Furthermore, I demonstrated that Soviet institutions and 
relationships were often organized in ways that created ambiguity about hierarchy and law. This 
opacity facilitated the unorthodox daily operations of cargo transportation; it was critical to their 
functioning, and ultimately to economic growth. 
If authorities tolerated unofficial and illegal freightage practice earlier in the republic’s 
existence on the grounds that it was necessitated by regional conditions, they later viewed it as 
an integral part of the way that the economy worked. This is partially attributeable to the fact that 
state ambitions in economic growth only expanded, and commodity chains were simply too 
poorly organized and inefficient to keep up with the rapidly growing needs of the local economy. 
Maksumov’s speech acknowledged that while comparisons with the first year of the republic 
                                                
193 M. Ubaidulloeva, ed., Istoriia goroda Dushanbe (s derevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei) (Dushanbe: Isp. organ 
gos. vlast. goroda Dushanbe i akademii nauk resp. Tadzhikistan, 2004), 238-40. 
  
179 
were remarkable, current operations had only reached about eighty-nine percent of the target.194 
In the mid-1930s, officials pointedly complained that constant delays and non-fulfillment of 
shipping orders is “wrecking construction of facilities of the city of Stalinabad (warehouse, a 
school, a theater, special works, etc.).”195 Others, however, were sympathetic to the fact that the 
work of shipping was difficult in a context where construction projects progressed without clear 
plans, and months in advance of expected “contract campaigns” for official arrangements with 
banks, hauling agencies, and other organizations.196 
In this context, the diverse interests involved in commodity chains kept the markets for 
freightage services that had sustained first efforts for economic growth within operations because 
they worked. Karamov, for example, reported that many organizations of the mid-1930s did their 
best to circumvent official procedures at the Stalinabad railroad station. They did so to avoid 
working with “Tadzhtrans,” which had been responsible for loading and off-loading at the 
Stalinabad railway station since 1933. Enterprises awaiting cargo instead employed their own 
couriers to hire a car or other unplanned transport.197 The unofficial nature of shipping operations 
was no secret. Maksumov even appealed to freightage workers in his speech in hopes of 
inspiring more legal practices. He called on them to stop engaging in corrupt practices, including 
improvised services and stealing.198 Laborers and their managers on both sides, he stated, were to 
                                                
194 Speech to the evening session of the discussion of reports from Tadzhiktorg/Tadzhikmatlubot, transcript with 
handwritten redactions, attributed to Maksumov (Deputy Chair of SNK), 1935, TsGART, f. 18, Maksumov (Deputy 
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195 Record of proceedings of the 15 January 1935 interdepartmental meeting with Comrade Perskii, the SNK Tajik 
SSR Consultant on Transportation, signed by Perskii (Chairman), TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 931, ll. 132-134. 
196 Report “on the organization and preparation of construction in 1936,” copy, addressed to Shadunts (Secretary of 
Central Committee of the KP Tajik SSR), and Rakhimbaev (Chairman of the SNK Tajik SSR) and Kaktyn’ (Deputy 
Chairman of the SNK Tajik SSR), signed by Dubrovitskii (Deputy People’s Commissar of Public Services of the 
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operate according to planned relations, and observe government set prices. Even so, he also 
acknowledged that many of them were simply operating according to older norms of transaction 
within the aspiring planned “command economy.” Many of the personnel of especially client 
agencies still had not become accustomed to “not negotiating [the prices] for goods.” Good 
Soviet laborers follow the rules, Maksumov explained, so “take what they give you, and say 
thank you.”199 His negotiating tone, however, reflected that authorities like him were not 
resolved to end unofficial practices in shipping. The way freightage operated was intrinsic to the 
way that commodity chains and the larger economy of Tajikistan functioned. 
A consequence of the persistence and importance of markets to shipping operations 
within commodity chains was the normalization of shortages and competition for goods among 
economic enterprises, and related outcomes such as wasted, spoiled, and lost cargo.200 This 
situation also led to the the de facto special status of shipping organizations. In 1935, for 
example, the Commissar of Finance complained that “a basic transportation organization like 
Tadzh[dor]trans [still] has no budget that is then reviewed by Gosplan and approved by higher 
organizations. The trust governs itself.” 201 Larger economic problems persisted too. For its part, 
Tadzhdortrans could claim significant, continuing material challenges. Some were self-evident 
challenges in the physical environment that agencies of Tajikistan had become accustomed to 
finding fault in. Shipping organizations could blame seasonal roads access problems of the fall 
and spring for the shortages of bricks, alabaster, and nails for school construction in Kulob, 
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200 See, for example, Message addressed to Molotov (STO) and Andreev (NKPS) in Moscow, copy attributed to 
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Kyzyl-Mazar, and other regions.202 Remoteness of settlements was also a continuing challenge to 
shipping and economic growth in Tajikistan throughout the decade. In 1935, cereal exports were 
restricted to the period between June and October, as SNK Chairman Rakhimbaev explained. 
“During the winter, when the best form of transport—sledding—is used in central regions of the 
Union, our roads are entirely closed to transit.”203 
Improved infrastructure and accumulation of capital that facilitated greater mobility and 
economic capacity also led to new problems that contributed to a situation where daily 
improvisation in shipping supported construction and larger goals. As I discuss in Chapter 5, 
following the confusing history of improvised freightage can lead to a ground-level, operation-
based understanding of not only how things were done, but also what projects succeeded while 
others failed in the making of economy and regions. So, while more laborers and means of 
mobility were imported to Tajikistan, the scale of production and logistical challenges also 
increased. Transportation capacity remained strained. In 1934, the small window of time during 
which mass transportation could connect more remote regions of the republic to mobility 
resources, 150 automobiles, 300 carts, and “more than 8,000 heads of pack animal transport” 
were mobilized at the expense of ongoing work in several agricultural sectors.204 As I will 
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discuss in the next chapter, animals commonly dominated cargo hauling, adding another 
environmental dimension to the management of economic modernization in the republic. Such 
problems persisted into at least the end of the 1930s, when growing productivity still outpaced 
freightage ability. In 1937, storage and transportation capacity were a massive concern of SNK 
Tajik SSR and its all-Union counterpart. Rakhimbaev explained that “the Kulob group of regions 
in the Tajik SSR (Kulob, Kyzyl-Mazar, Kolkhozobod, and Dzerzhinskii MTS) is isolated from 
others for a significant period (fall to spring) [when] contact by automobile transportation 
closes.”205 
The seemingly simple act of transferring cargo from one enterprise to another, and from 
one place to another, was wrought with complications that highlight the profound contingency of 
economic growth in Soviet Tajikistan, and elsewhere. Though the material capacity of the Soviet 
state in Tajikistan had changed considerably, many trans-Soviet logistical problems persisted. 
Information management across the USSR was considerably better, though data for Tajikistan 
was still poor. Central planners produced big-picture statements about timber passage on Soviet 
railroads, where information about Central Asian traffic volume and destinations was mostly 
absent.206  
Measurable change in system effectiveness did occur in central Russia, taking some 
pressure of Tajikistan couriers who normally sought out capital closer to Moscow. By 1937, 
logistical planning on west-Siberian railroads for the transport of timber to Tajikistan was much 
more detailed and organized, and audits were much more successful. Because of concurrently 
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growing needs of the republic’s economy, though, the execution of planning was still an absolute 
failure from the perspective of Tadzhiksnabsbyt. In March, for example—the most successful of 
the spring months—only 131 of an expected 475 wagons of timber arrived from their sources on 
the Tomsk, Kranoiarsk, and Kuibyshev railroads of Siberia. As much half of the timber delivered 
to Tajikistan was still sourced in the central regions of Russia, however.207 Tajikistan’s 
experience, in the 1920s and 1930s, of depending on the timber supply for its built environment 
demonstrates the degree to which the Soviet state was founded on material exchange. 
I have argued that the practices that supported the cargo flows undergirding economic 
growth were unplanned, ad hoc activities that do not conform to prevailing historiographical 
characterizations of the Soviet economy as centrally commanded. In practical terms, economic 
officials and enterprises were responsible for ensuring that commodities arrived. Overcoming a 
large host of unpredictable factors and parties that could intersect and interfere with their 
endeavors in the vast space between Moscow and Tajikistan, as well as the smaller ones among 
its settlements and work sites. Soviet commodity chains and the exchange of fundamental capital 
like timber and labor were contingent on great physical exercises of improvised cooperation. I 
think that further study of the day-to-day operations of commodity chains across the USSR can 
promote better understanding of the specific reasons for capital flows and shortages. It is a way 
of addressing the profound, physical connectedness of Soviet regions while acknowledging 
space, legacy, and wealth that separated them.
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CHAPTER 4 
SOVIET MODERNIZATION: THE HORSES AND CAMELS OF THE TAJIK SSR 
 
“Naturally, Central Asia is in need of fast, reliable, and economical transportation, which 
specifically is automotive transportation.” So began a 1926 report on the state of automotive 
mobility submitted to a “Conference on the Study of the Productive Forces of Central Asia.” The 
document outlined the current state of machine transportation in the region, how it differed from 
that in the rest of the USSR, and explained why its authors believed more motorized vehicles 
were needed. The central argument connected mechanized road mobility to the strongest global 
economies, particularly “in the life of governments of western Europe and America.”1 Acquiring 
and using machines, however, was no easy matter. Motorized vehicles of all sorts were by and 
large imported from prosperous countries that also produced them. The wealthiest states were an 
important material as well as ideological point of reference for Soviet officials concerned with 
the relationship between transportation and economic growth ambitions throughout the USSR. 
This chapter analyzes the role that means of mobility played in Tajikistan during the 
ensuing decade of societal change. I will demonstrate that there was nothing “natural” about the 
need for motorized vehicles, and that using them was often the slower, less reliable, and more 
expensive option for moving goods or people on this particular terrain in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Often, the use of machines was not even possible, and for various reasons. Accordingly, this 
chapter analyzes the contribution of animal transportation—particularly of horses and camels—
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along with that of trucks and tractors. I will show that the Soviet regime’s desire for a particular 
form of productive society on an abstract, global model of mobility was not—and could not be—
implemented in Tajikistan because of its specific landscape. Economic authorities pursued 
modernization in this republic by using familiar, non-mechanized means of movement within the 
limits of material legacy and possibility.  
Few Soviet officials involved in managing Tajikistan’s or Central Asia’s economies had 
any illusions about the ease with which a revolution in transportation could be rapidly 
implemented to change local society. Their assessments of how these regions, and even the entire 
USSR, corresponded to rich-world models of economic growth in the 1920 and 1930s led them 
to believe that the peculiar conditions of the new socialist state presented as much of a natural 
obstacle as a natural need. As the 1926 report pointed out, “modern, standard automotive 
construction in western Europe and America does not make the kind of machine that would fully 
satisfy the working conditions of the USSR, and specifically in [the republics of] Central Asia.” 
To the author, the problem was that foreign machines were made for the built and natural 
environments in which they were produced. “And since no state with a developed automotive 
industry has road conditions as bad as we do, it follows that it is hard to find a suitable machine 
among them.” Machines would still be sourced abroad, but “in order to obtain an appropriate 
machine, it is necessary to make a special order specifying distinct norms drawn up by us.”2 
While the USSR and Central Asia imported many machines over the coming decade and-a-half, I 
am not aware of any such requests. The statement, however, demonstrated that Soviet officials 
endeavored to translate modern sciences and aspirations for mobility into a form that suited their 
own land. 
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As they worked to create new transportation infrastructure in Tajikistan, they used 
available forms of mobility in a way that accommodated the republic’s physical environment. I 
explained in earlier chapters that officials often found pack and draft animals were the means of 
movement best endowed to navigate the territory’s routes, some of which were not at all passable 
by mechanized or non-mechanized vehicles. In this chapter, I argue that Soviet modernization of 
the use of horses and camels served economic growth. This view is based on the way that 
agencies endeavored to increase animal capacity in movement through methods of mass 
mobilization and production, as well as technological control. Soviet officials furthermore used 
the modern practice of breeding to adapt these living means of mobility to the republic’s terrain. 
Breeding allowed the environmental management state to identify, multiply, and enhance 
characteristics of its animals that made them better able to navigate native material legacy while 
growing their numberss. Modernization in Tajikistan, as elsewhere, was an endeavor that prized 
machine transportation, but was characterized more by that of ungulates. 
This chapter considers the history of economic life in the early Tajik SSR from the 
perspective of modern horses and camels. The republic’s dependence on growing numbers of 
working animals was similar to the rapidly growing economies of the modern era, where a sharp 
rise in the use of especially draft horses accompanied the proliferation of railroads, steam-
powered ships, and urbanization. In much of nineteenth century Europe and North America, 
horses were primarily used for economic purposes in freight or human transportation (by cart or 
wagon) beyond the railroad, as well as in construction (hoisting, dock and harbor work)—and 
comparatively little in horseback riding, contrary to common assumptions.3 Beasts in 
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modernizing historical contexts were treated much like machines.4 
My emphasis on the material context leads me to a very different analysis from most 
studies of animals as objects of modernity. These prioritize cultural interpretation of beasts, 
whether by scholars or historical actors. Humanistic examination of animals in the Soviet Union 
and elsewhere tends to reflect a broader scholarly understanding that relegates them to rapidly 
decreasing economic significance when automotive vehicles became more common at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Studies that model modernity in economic life of the rich world, in 
particular, perpetuate the view that motorized vehicles came to rapidly and decisively dominate 
transportation during the interwar period, though this did not happen in most other regions.5 The 
study of animals as linguistic and visual symbols also often perpetuates such perspectives 
because culture often reflected anxieties and ambitions rather than the material realities of the 
majority of the global population.6 Late imperial Russian cultural expressions already associated 
horses and other animals with an unchanging, idyllic village life, opposite to the perpetual 
uncertainties of a modernizing and urbanizing world—even though this too was characterized by 
ubiquitous animal labor. This kind of understanding found various artful and popular iterations 
throughout the twentieth century in the USSR.7 It also leant ways of considering the animals of 
history in a way that John T. Coleman argues “reveals the human politics of animal 
knowledge…the contests people [in historical contexts] wage to assert their definitions and 
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categories.”8 Sarah Whatmore, however, cautions that privileging such cultural approaches over 
others often “serves primarily to reaffirm intellectual prejudices and identities.”9 I show that 
modern use of animals in Tajikistan was different from other places because of the region’s 
distinct physical environment. 
The cultural representations privileged in the existing scholarship on animals universalize 
visions of modernity through frames of interpretation that ignore regional specificity, and which 
assume homogenous dynamics of historical material change. Ann Norton Greene observes, for 
example, that despite US society’s desire for the automobile at the turn-of-the-century “the 
transition from animal to automotive power would prove to be gradual, complicated, and 
troubling. Assertions of its inevitability are misleading and irrelevant.”10 So too are such claims 
about the changing technology of the USSR, where draft animals were often crucial to small-
scale transportation throughout its history.11 Soviet officials in Tajikistan would have preferred 
to use machines, but two factors prevented them from doing so to the extent desired: first, an 
absolute shortage of machines, and the need to import them from elsewhere in the USSR; and, 
second, the limited usefulness of automotive vehicles on the contemporary landscape of 
Tajikistan. The republic’s experience shows the importance of also considering the 
environmental challenges to animals acting according to human intention. But this case diverges 
from Greene’s portrayal of the American story. She argues that the push to prioritize machine 
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transportation over animals was “the result of cultural choices made about energy consumption 
at the turn of the century.”12 Though the Soviet move to foreign models of modern in mobility 
also involved culturally-informed decisions, the assertion does not explain why draft animals 
were used more than machines in southern Tajikistan, and how their labor supported economic 
growth in the republic. 
I show that horses and camels were crucial tools of modernization for the Soviet 
environmental management state. In so doing, I also demonstrate the usefulness of extending 
such analysis to economic life of other socialist and global regions. What was the degree of 
correspondence between politics and reality in discussions about modernizing mobility? What do 
we learn from studying the beasts of the history of productivity? By illuminating animal 
participation in humans’ endeavors, I furthermore portray the experience and scale of mobility in 
early Soviet Tajikistan that was sometimes unique to beasts and other times shared with their 
masters. The presence of so many horses and camels among humans who were also 
malnourished and over-worked, anxious, and in perpetual motion, implies a world of sounds, 
smells, and physical contact that is a window on the character of toil in the new republic. Even 
though my sources provide little of this kind of detail, they shed light on a transportation 
workscape inhabited by subalterns.13 This chapter engages the constant labor and migration that 
animals were subjected to in conditions of insecure food and shelter. The sheer number of 
ungulates—many thousands—was itself illustrative of the scope and intensity of their activity in 
Tajikistan. Because working animals were used in virtually all sectors, my research touches 
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briefly on topics that are still rarely discussed in Central Asian studies, including the presence of 
the military and police, institutions dependent on horses for transportation beyond machine 
navigable roads.14 My juxtaposition of animal and automotive vehicle labor in the service of 
modernization as a rich-world model of economic growth provides a picture of daily challenges 
and possibilities. 
The institutionalization of draft animal breeding in Tajikistan put the Soviet state in a 
position to manage two legacies of the physical environment in the pursuit of economic growth. 
First, the production of horses and camels at home made the republic less dependent on imports 
of means of mobility from other parts of the USSR. Second, a larger, stable supply of animals 
would help the state accommodate and exploit a landscape of mobility that did not yet conform 
to its desired platform for automotive vehicles. This chapter analyses these two factors, 
examining different experiences associated with introducing machines and masses of ungulates 
offered to Tajikistan, and the different challenges to each form of mobility. The chapter then 
proceeds with a discussion of how modern camel and horse breeding allowed the state to 
overcome various challenges associated with both the terrain and with reliance on foreign 
commodity chains. 
 
A landscape for animals 
Animals and machines were both closely involved in the work of altering the physical 
environment of Tajikistan to support shipping operations and economic growth. Officials 
                                                
14 On the importance of animals in policing in norther regions of Central Asia, see, for example, Sarah Isabel 
Cameron, “The Hungry Steppe: Soviet Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 1921-1934” (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 2010), 152. 
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considered them in surveys and assessments of possibility for construction, and used them to test 
infrastructure. In general, they concluded that the economics of managing this environment 
meant that animal transportation was the better short-term option on most routes. Moreover, at 
the same time that camels and horses shaped the landscape of Tajikistan through their mobility, 
they also defined networks of movement through their increasingly large presence. This section 
analyzes how dynamics of importing of means of motion impacted the physical environment, 
and contributed to a desire for producing horses and camels within the republic. 
The exact number of ungulates and automotive vehicles present in Tajikistan in the mid-
1920s is unknown, and there is probably no way to know it. As I noted in Chapter 2, the first 
ever automotive vehicle in the republic arrived in late 1925, but just for a visit. Meanwhile, Tajik 
ASSR officials avoided studying the actual numbers of working animals within their borders out 
of concern for stability. As peace returned to the land in 1927, the number rose, but SNK 
authorities felt that conducting a census of horses would lead native residents to feel their 
livestock was at risk of being stolen.15 Horses had often been confiscated in the preceding years 
of revolution and war, and their populations decreased as the economy collapsed. In fact, animal 
holdings throughout all of formerly Russian Central Asia were devastated. According to one 
estimate, the total number of horses in Turkestan dropped from 2,063,300 in 1914 to 672,000 in 
1920.16 By 1926, that population dropped even farther to 226,000.17 Although the number of 
                                                
15 Resolution no. 1 of the record of proceedings of the 4 Dec 1927 meeting of the SNK of the Tajik ASSR on the 
question of “delivery of horses, wagon train, and related gear to the army on the republic’s territory should they be 
mobilized,” secret, Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
respubliki Tadzhikistan; hereafter TsGART), f. 17 (Council of People’s Commissars of the Tajik ASSR, 1926-
1929), op. 3, d. 12, l. 1 (full document). 
16 “Long-term plan for Horse Breeding in the Turkestan Republic for the Five Years of 1924-1928,” RGAE, f. 4372 
(State Planning Committee of the USSR), op. 15, d. 452, ll. 26b-a (full document is ll. 26b-7b). 
17 The figure refers to much of Central Asia, but it it hard to be sure: the report cited accounted for “Turkestan” in 
1924, though it included regions of Bukhara, and also projected figures for the region up to 1928. Its author may not 
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draft animals was far larger than the 360 “automotive units” present in Central Asia that year, the 
trend among machines was opposite: their number had actually grown significantly. Officials 
estimated that, at the start of World War I, as few as a dozen automobiles were present in the 
whole region.18 
The scarcity of means of mobility—whether living or mechanized—in Central Asia was a 
great concern to officials administering shipping organizations. Their anxiety over the small 
holdings of Tajikistan on the eve of independence reflected the weakness of the Soviet state 
through its lacking ability to manage movement. Some officials went so far as to recommend 
postponing the NTD process that would split institutions currently shared with, and based in, 
Uzbekistan. Doing so, a Tajik ASSR representative argued in the summer of 1929, would allow 
time for appropriate material preparations to be made within a shipping organization called 
Uzavtopromtorg that currently used 86 machines to serve both republics. He explained that “the 
delimitation of Avtropromtorg of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan now [will leave] Tajikistan in a 
worse situation.” The portion of the fleet that was to be given to Tajikistan comprised vehicles 
that were older, “almost exhausted units.” The official identified various problems I covered in 
earlier chapters. He anticipated many months of delays in the anticipated arrival of new units due 
to commodity chain problems. Meanwhile, the physical environment would complicate their 
delivery—the coming winter would inhibit arrival, and a deficit of constructed and stocked 
garages would challenge capacity for machine maintenance. The key problem was that “for 
Tadzhikavtopromtorg, the period of the delimitation will begin right at the start the dead period 
                                                
have understood the implications of contemporary delimitation negotiations taking place. See RGAE, f. 4372, op. 
15, d. 452, ll. 19b-a. 
18 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 41, d. 368, l. 14b. 
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of  November to March, i.e. at the moment when mobility stops [in December].”19 Tajikistan 
faced similar challenges to its animal stock when it became independent. It continued receiving 
donations of horses from Uzbekistan that were explicitly related to the NTD for at least up to a 
year.20 
Tajikistan’s dependency on the rest of the USSR for means of mobility meant relying on 
foreign sources for the capacity to conduct cargo transportation within its own borders. As I 
showed in Chapter 3, central plans for satisfying the republic’s projected transportation and other 
needs would never function as wanted or expected. Using and sharing the mobility resources of 
the republic was a complex management problem that exacerbated operational stresses within the 
Tajik SSR related to the allocation of transportation capital, whose managers often shared with 
several organizations. Some of these secondary users accused others of unpredictably taking and 
using machines. Transzemstroi’s rightful use of a truck, for example, was twice interrupted in 
March 1930 when two other organizations, on separate occasions, borrowed it without 
announcement, and left no notice of where they left it later.21 Elsewhere in southern Tajikistan, a 
frustrated Narkomtorg official complained that artels misallocated animals and cargos. “Along 
the road from Kulob, I came across around 100 camels and several carts, carrying 
canvas…[rather than] tools for cotton production.”22 The market for shipping here ignored a 
                                                
19 Message addressed to Comrade Sluchak (Deputy Chairman of SNK Taj ASSR), attributed to Schastnev (Deputy 
Representative of the Taj ASSR to the UzSSR, on 14 August 1929 (filed on 19 September 1929 (noted as having 
been sent by telegraph), “secret-personal,” TsGART, f. 17, op. 3, d. 42, ll. 11, 12 (full document is ll. 10-12). 
20 Extract from the record of proceedings of the 5-6 March 1930 meeting of the Central Asian Regional Committee 
for Freightage in Tashkent, attributed to Lavrov (Chairman) and Bukin (Secretary), TsGART, f. 146 (Permanent 
Representation of the Tajik SSR to the Central Asian Economic Council in Tashkent, October 1929-January 1935), 
op. 1, d. 78, ll. 126-127 (full document is ll. 125-127). 
21 Note addressed to TGDT and other organizations, attributed to Korkhavin (Foreman) and Sviderskii (Deputy KP 
Rep) of Tranzemstroi, 3 April 1930, TsGART, f. 18 (Council of People’s Commissars of the Tajik SSR, 1929-
1939), op. 1, d. 102, l. 180 (full document). 
22 Message addressed to Comrade Sluchak (Deputy Chairman of the SNK Tajik SSR), attributed to Narkomtorg, 
signed by Shevtsov, 6 August 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 182, l. 194 (full document). 
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complicated official schedule that SNK officials tried to restore by message from Stalinabad. 
“Camel transport that has carried grains from Kulob to Qurghonteppa should be used to transport 
manufactured goods from Sarai-Kamar.”23 
Since transportation resources were shared across organizations, planning services for 
them were complicated, and involved understanding how to adjust for continuous shortages. For 
example, the Deputy Director of the Vakhsh Group of Sovkhozes’ budget report of 1931 
endeavored to estimate labor hours per kilometer of 1.5 ton trucks, but he did so on the 
assumption he would receive a large number. The collectives he managed needed fifty of these 
machines for heavy-duty shipping, but they presently had only five. This situation was even 
worse when it came to “intra-economic conveyance,” which he estimated would require 350 
horses. The 198 horses that the Sovkhoz group currently used in such transportation were 
actually meant for field work, but would be shared with transportation if the number requested 
did not arrive.24 
The number of horses desired may have seemed reasonable because animals were easier 
to acquire than machines. Horses, mules, and camels were sourced in Central Asia, closer to 
Tajikistan than automotive vehicles coming from Russia. Republican agencies could deploy 
couriers to seek draft animals in places as diverse and distant as  Baku, Bek-Budi, Ashkhabad, 
Tashkent, and Andijan, all in one trip.25 The necessity of using unofficial means to acquire the 
                                                
23 Message addressed to Comrade Goffer (Soiuztrans), copied to Comrade Shevtsov of Narkomtorg), attributed to 
Sluchat (Deputy Chairman of SNK Tajik SSR), 8 August 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 182, l. 193 (full document).  
Sarai-Kamar is presently referred to as Panj. 
24 Message addressed to the Transport Section of Gosplan Tajik SSR, attributed to Petrov (Deputy Director of the 
Office of the Vakhsh Group of Sovkhozes) and Koval’chyk (Secretary) on behalf of the Cotton Sovkhoz No. 6 (aka 
“Khloposovkhoz”), 10 May 1931, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 273 (full document). 
25 Record of proceedings no. 32 of a 10 December 1930 meeting of the Management Board of Promkooptrans of the 
Tajik SSR, signed by Fazilov (Chair) and Ivashchenko (Secretary), TsGART, f. 93 (Producer’s Transportation 
Cooperative Union of the Tajik SSR), op. 1, d. 14, ll. 136-39 (full document). 
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needed units, though, did not increase the certainty that they would arrive. In April 1930, a Tajik 
SSR organization sent “our agents” to various locations in order to “contract and purchase” up to 
a total of 2,500 horses from the Turksib operations that were winding down.26 These agents 
informed Stalinabad that despite a surplus of carts, local authorities obstructed purchases and 
exports.27 
Part of the reason for such non-cooperation was that animals had also been very 
important to transportation throughout Central Asia in the recent past. The transportation 
infrastructure of all the regional republics had been severely damaged in the post-tsarist period. 
Because of the combination of a lack of automotive vehicles and poor roads, working horses 
were the primary means of transportation while infrastructure was repaired.28 Animals were also 
a more expedient tool of shipping in Uzbekistan, but the legacy of its physical environment was 
very different from Tajikistan, where conditions meant that the dirt road from Termez to 
Dushanbe that preceded the railroad was primarily traveled by pack and draft animals. Its quality 
was so low that military-grade trucks sometimes took two days to travel its distance of 250-300 
kilometers.29 Uzbekistan’s land was far flatter on the whole, and had more roads to begin with. 
Foreign officials often lacked awareness of such differences, and it led to problems involving 
external management of Tajikistan’s internal transportation. In 1928, for example, SNK officials 
                                                
26 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 209. 
27 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 209. 
28 Message addressed to the Central Asian Section of Gosplan of the USSR (Copied to Narkomzem), attributed to 
the Presidium of the Economic Council of the Central Asian Republics, 5 October 1924, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 15, d. 
452, l. 37 (full document); “Report on regional transportation to the conference on the study of productive forces of 
Central Asia,” attributed to Pospelov, Engineer and Head of the Central Asian Regional Transport Section of NKPS, 
20 April 1926, RGAE, f. 1884, op. 41, d. 368, ll. 37a-b (full document is ll. 38b-18b); and RGAE, f. 1884, op. 41, d. 
368, l. 15b. 
29 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 41, d. 368, l. 14a; Internal report on camel transportation from Guzar to Dushanbe, 
handwritten, 29 June 1925 (Received 23 July), no attribution, TsGART, f. 19, op. 1, d. 496, ll. 24a-b (full 
document); and TsGART, f. 19 (State Planning Committee of the Tajik ASSR, 1925-1929), op. 1, d. 506, ll. 30-34. 
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of the Tajik ASSR lamented that an agency called Transport, based in Uzbekistan, “was unable 
to properly undertake the organization of freightage in Tajikistan” because its planning was 
administrative, and assumed conditions of movement would be similar to that of Uzbekistan. Not 
having considered the orographic and climactic peculiarities of the country, Transport was 
“unable to fulfill its contracts with economic organizations, which resulted in an interruption in 
the planned work.”30 
Accommodating this reality of mobility had urgent relevance to wider projects for 
economic growth in Tajikistan. I already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 that animal paths were 
preferred for many routes where the territory posed too great a challenge to timely construction 
of higher capacity grades. A central challenge of managing transportation was the ability to 
anticipate the correspondence of means of mobility to the reliability and quality of roads. 
Smooth, easily navigable roads were a necessary improvement of the modern era. They promote 
economical transportation because they minimize wear to machines, or injury to animals, and 
maximize speed.31 Movement on infrastructure that was lacking or in need of repair could have 
counter-productive implications for state investments across economic sectors and, most 
urgently, shipping. But the opposite was also true. As idealized and powerful as machines were, 
they were more demanding of their terrains than animals. Automotive vehicles were more likely 
to destroy new roads, while beasts instead tended to be vulnerable to the effects of poorly built or 
                                                
30 Here, the joint-stock company “Transport” reported that it took on the reponsibility accorded by “EKOSO” to be 
responsible for transportation “on the territory of Tajikistan.” And it made a priority of “concluding contracts” with 
economic organizations in order to execute its duties.  See Message addressed to Central Asian Economic Council in 
Tashkent, absolutely secret, attributed to Melkumov (Deputy Chair of the SNK Tajik ASSR) and Porokhin (Deputy 
of the Secret Section and Secretary of the SNK Tajik ASSR), 7 February 1928, TsGART, f. 17 (Council of People’s 
Commissars of the Tajik ASSR, 1926-1929), op. 3, d. 9, l. 3 (full document). 
31 Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 14. 
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damaged routes. The different relationships these forms of transportation had with the physical 
environment of early Tajikistan were part of what made its landscape unique. 
A key consideration of planning new infrastructure building was to anticipate and avoid 
problems related to use by animals and machines. Bridges were a top concern since they often 
crossed water or other breaks in the terrain that were otherwise treacherous or impossible to 
maneuver around. In the fall of 1929, officials warned that delays in repair or construction of 
bridges traversing rivers in several important economic regions threatened ongoing projects, as 
well as means of motion. 32 Tadzhigosstroi officials, for example, demanded action on “our 
repeated memos” regarding the need to repair a structure over the intersection of the Dushanbe 
River and the Shakhmansur Canal. Their appeal included the usual warning that deferring this 
would resulted in stoppage of construction activities, but also emphasized dependence on horses 
and concern with their vitality. “The bridge is on the brink of total destruction, and horses run the 
risk of being crippled.”33 
Soviet officials endeavored to create infrastructure that was safe and passable, but they 
rarely made it useable by all forms of transportation. Though the ideal was that newly built 
routes would be increasingly used by automotive vehicles as they were imported to the republic, 
this was often simply not possible in Tajikistan. A conflict over tractors using dirt roads 
exemplified some of the consequences of idealized mobility encountering material reality. In 
                                                
32 Message addressed to the SNK Tajik SSR, copied to Narkompromtorg and Tadzhdortrans, no. 1477, attributed to 
Kurochkin (Head of the Tajik Office of Uzavtopromtorg), 2 November 1929, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 29 
(full document); and Message addressed to Dadabaev (Tadzhikdortrans) and copied to Shadrin (Tadzhikkhlopok), 
attributed to Khojibaev (Predtsntroposevkoma) and Tomti (Secretary), received on 14 January 1930, TsGART, f. 18, 
op. 1, d. 102, l. 92 (full document). 
33 Message addressed to Gorkomkhoz, copied to RKI Tajik SSR, attributed to Naumov (Trust Director) and 
Dereviagin (Secretary) of Tajiki State Construction Trust (Tadzhikgosstroi), 20 October 1929, TsGART, f. 350 
(People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate of the Tajik SSR, 1929-1932), op. 1, d. 62a, ll. 
96a-b (full document). 
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October 1930, the director of a mill near the village of Shahrinau complained that tractors 
traversing his enterprise’s estate were destroying his roads. He appealed to higher-level 
authorities because tractor drivers serving other economic projects felt entitled to disregard his 
protests and attempts to stop them. The official desire to modernize the economy of mobility 
made machines prestigious, and even gave their drivers an air of authority in daily transactions. 
So-called traktoristy felt entitled to using mill lands as a shortcut between refueling sites in fields 
nearby. The mill road may never have been intended to serve machines at all. This episode 
occurred during the first year of Tajikistan’s independence, when officials were coming to terms 
with the need to adapt ideals to the limits of material possibility in daily operations. Often, 
machines could not travel roads that were built at the lowest cost and standard that made them 
passable. Although versatile vehicles like tractors might be able to traverse them, agencies 
sometimes restricted access because the weight and movement of machines was especially likely 
to disrupt surfaces. The mill director complained that the damage these machines did to his road 
and bridges in a single pass inhibited the travel of horse-drawn carts serving his venture.34 
Though the tractors threatened his entire enterprise, however, only when the mill obtained 
support of top officials did the tractors’ management stop the trespassing.35 
Machines also destroyed routes explicitly intended for them, and tractors were especially 
likely to do this because of their size and weight. These automotive vehicles were meant more 
for field work, though they also were sometimes employed in shipping, especially for 
particularly heavy cargo. Much of their road travel, though, happened because economic 
                                                
34 Report addressed to the Manager of the Stroimaterial Trust, attributed to P. F. Kin’shakov (Director of the 
Khanaka Mill), 13 Oct 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 408a (full document is ll. 408a-b). 
35 Message addressed to the SNK Tajik SSR, attributed to Chudnov (Deputy Manager of Stroimaterial Trust) and 
Masteliak (Business Manager of Stroimaterial), received 16 Oct 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 407 (full 
document). 
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organizations in different locations shared them. In those situations, there was no alternative to 
machine passage, and the burden of the damage was transferred to road crews that were charged 
with repairing and rebuilding. In 1930, for example, SNK closed the southeasterly road from 
Stalinabad to the village of Danghara for over a month to allow Tadzhdortrans to repair it.36 The 
immediate effects of tractor travel exposed ways that the road was poorly situated in the physical 
environment. Authorities also instructed the construction crew to seek alternate routes for certain 
legs to avoid the flood lands of the Tair-Su River and other particularly “serious obstacles to the 
passage of tractors.”37 Officials worried the tractors would themselves further damage the more 
southerly road through Sarai Kamar and Farkhor.38  
Assessments of working animal routes often carried similar concerns about state 
investment in them as means of motion. Tajikistan’s physical environment was an even greater 
danger to animals, especially when mobilized en masse for pack hauling, laden with heavy loads 
of cargo. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, however, the republic’s roads were often built at the 
lowest standard in order to complete them as quickly as possible. The paths built for camels and 
horses were even lower quality because they traveled spaces that automotive vehicles might not 
go at all. Such surfaces created greater potential risk to the animals, and to the economies 
depending on them. The path from Iangi Bazar to Garm, for example, held up freightage 
operations of thousands of camels for much of 1930 and 1931.39 Persistent problems with 
adequate supply of tens of thousands of rubles in credit and “cash money,” equipment, and 
                                                
36 Message addressed to Oduch’ (presumably of Tadzhdortrans), copied to Zernotrest, attributed to the Secretary of 
the committee for highways and dirt roads and automotive transportation of the SNK Tajik SSR, 5 Jan 1930, 
TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 96 (full document); and TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 93. 
37 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 96. 
38 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 94. 
39 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 173. 
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laborers, delayed the work, and resulted in a very low quality path.40 Although work on the Obi-
Garm-Garm leg was completed on 10 June 1931, a subsequent assessment warned that it was not 
ready for mass travel.41 Investigators recommended seemingly basic improvements to the trail: 
set bridges along the entire route; build gutters and drainage; “soften the profile of the 
serpentines [winding path] and rid them of collapsed portions”; clear the entire route of small, 
sharp stones and collapsed portions.42 As in the case of modern, scientistic administrative 
language used to characterize challenges to road work that I discussed in earlier chapters, 
however, the solutions promoted for making the Obi-Garm to Garm route safer obscured the 
scale of danger that camels faced. 
These assessments were based on the trial passage of 217 camels driven on the route. The 
experiment’s economic significance was reflected in the fact that, upon arrival in Garm, the test 
group was held along with an outbound shipment of wheat pending resolution of the problems it 
experienced. The trial’s importance was further signified by the large number of animals and 
investigators implicated, as well as by the detailed account of the challenges to camel travel. The 
trial group represented just a fraction of the thousands of camels that would normally make up 
caravans traveling the route. Meanwhile, no less than fourteen individuals participated in the 
                                                
40 See Message addressed to Dadabaev (Director of TGDT), attributed to Sluchak, the deputy chair or SNK Tajik 
SSR, received on 24 September 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 102, l. 373 (full document); and Message addressed 
to the Manager of Gosbank, copied to SNK Tajik SSR, attributed to TGDT, October 1930, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 
102, l. 400 (full document). 
41 “Personal opinion” of the Assistant to the Foreman of the Obi-Garm-Garm Road project, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 
216, ll. 340-341 (full document). 
42 Statement addressed to Soiuztrans, signed by members of an investigatory commission—being representatives of 
the GPU of the Obi-Garm RaiIspolkom, the Oblast office, Soiuztrans (Bogdanov), the Central Planting Committee, 
the 6th Garage Operations Zone (Liubman), Assistant Foreman of Dorstroi for the construction of the Obi-Garm to 
Garm Road, the Head of the Oblast Office Concerning Export of Grains, a Correspondent of Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, and several representatives of the  Caravan of 3000 Camels  (Akhmat-Artukov, Abdul-Mengleev, 
Tair Klich, Sirkulov Adil’ Aidabaev, Shabrait Uramov), 22 June 1931, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 343 (full 
document is ll. 342-343). 
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test-run, including road construction officials, caravan drivers, and a newspaper representative. 
Their analysis indicated multiple, complicated dangers facing animals on this route. Inclines 
were a particular problem. On a winding section, the slope “causes difficulty to the ascent and 
descent of camel transportation.”43 Water was the greatest challenge, causing an array of dangers 
to the animals. Recent downpours had strewn large numbers of rocks and pebbles on the steep, 
winding part of the path that made walking cumbersome. These stones required clearing, and 
would likely be a problem again after more rain. To avoid similar problems, the investigators 
recommended that “the path from Obi-Garm to the serpentine [winding] descent before the 
second bridge requires gutters for dealing with runoff from springs in several places.”44 They 
faced a more complicated challenge where two fords crossed the Obi-Garm and Khoi-Dora 
Rivers. These, officials deemed, were unfit for camel travel because the estuary was “packed 
with sharp rocks, and the current is so fast that it rolls large rocks along the riverbed that crash 
into the camels’ legs.”45 Their report concluded that the low quality of the route “and the 
subsequent damage by passing rains caused the unproductive standstill of 3,000 heads of camel, 
which threatens the transport of grains, and which already significantly interrupted the supply of 
equipment to Garm Okrug.”46 
Though challenges such as these were great, the establishment of good paths for animals 
were great, they represented a safer investment on the whole for state management of mobility. 
Animal paths were less complicated objects of construction and maintenance than those for 
mechanized vehicles. Moreover, beasts were easier to obtain from abroad. Administration of 
                                                
43 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 342. 
44 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 342. 
45 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 342. 
46 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 216, l. 343. 
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animal acquisitions could be relatively specific about availability or approximate timelines. 
Officials organizing imports of machines were more often uncertain of what to expect from 
“union organs,” and when.47 This situation perpetuated a sense of helplessness among 
organizations needing or allotted machines by some level of administration. As I discuss in the 
next section, the transition to producing animals within the republic created an even greater 
disparity of ease of using animals in transportation by comparison with machines. 
 
Modern animals for a modern economy 
The establishment of working animal breeding as a formal institution of the Tajik SSR 
empowered the state to overcome the republic’s physical legacy of remoteness and problematic 
mobility. Beginning in 1931, the establishment of Soviet stud farm No. 41 to supply the 
mountain cavalry initiated the process of naturalizing animal means of modern mobility in the 
republic. Having a growing domestic source of transportation helped Tajikistan grow less 
dependent on imports for its ability to communicate and distribute cargo between points. 
Furthermore, it represented a fundamental material change to the landscape of mobility. This 
section analyzes various ways that the institution of modern camel and horse breeding helped the 
Soviet state manage inherent challenges of Tajikistan’s geography and terrain. 
The establishment of such farms in Tajikistan was a major historical accomplishment that 
signified and anticipated successes in the advancement of economic modernization. Breeding 
pack and draft animals is a modern practice that became particularly successful and specialized 
in the Euro-American world of the nineteenth century, particularly in the case of horses. Equines 
                                                
47 See, for example, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 18, l. 3. 
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were altered through processes similar to technological innovation, which resulted in significant 
changes to their speed, strength, and size.48 The appearance of farms for working animals 
therefore represented a major change in not only the nature of economic life in Tajikistan, but 
possibly also of Central Asia. The breeding of specialized domestic animals throughout this 
region historically had been practiced only locally and sporadically.49 Imperial Russia established 
large-scale horse farms throughout colonial Central Asia, but these institutions collapsed before 
the Bolshevik Revolution, and Central Asia’s horse stock declined significantly as a result. By 
the mid-1920s, key horse regions—concentrated in Kazakhstan and the major centers of 
Uzbekistan, in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand, and including one near Kyrgyzstan’s lake 
Issyk Kul—were still recovering from years of social, political, and economic upheaval.50 Their 
farms were in such dire financial condition that some resorted to supporting themselves with the 
revenues “from the selling of defective horses,” which comprised around 10 percent of 
population.51 
Tajikistan’s horse farms provided the republic a degree of control over mobility that 
extended beyond the animals themselves. Modern use of pack and draft animals was a 
complicated affair involving large numbers of beasts that needed to be fed, and which were 
controlled with specialized tools and equipment. The presence of places where horses were 
concentrated for use locally by expert handlers meant that related supplies, even imported ones, 
                                                
48 McShane and Tarr, The Horse in the City, 12. 
49 Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, trans. Julia Crookenden, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1994), 49. 
50 “Explanatory note on the long-term financial plan of the department of horse breeding of Narkomzem of the 
Turkestan Republic for the 5 years of 1924-1928,” attributed to the Director of the Horse Breeding Department and 
the Director of the Special Section and the Economic Department, n.d. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 15, d. 452, ll. 36b-34a 
(full document). 
51 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 15, d. 452, l. 36b. 
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were more likely to be planned and accounted for, and available when needed. In fact, officials 
saw the growth of Stud-farm No. 41’s herd from 93 to one of 2,262 in 1936 partly as a result of 
its home-grown expertise and self-sufficiency. Most of its 63 horse handlers had been with the 
institution since it was established. Moreover, its dedicated farming equipment—including 29 
tractors, 3 combines, 3 threshers, 12 tractor hay mowers—enabled managers to grow most of the 
food it used on its own large parcel of land.52 
Institutions like this clearly helped Tajikistan overcome the complications associated with 
the magnitude of its dependency on other regions. Acquiring working animals abroad was only 
one step towards productivity since animals did not necessarily arrive with the tools needed to 
manage them. All the usual problems of funding, planning, and logistics affected the importation 
of saddles, reins, rope, and other equipment.53 Such tools, Sandra Swart points out, are modern 
implements of control that make it possible to exploit animal labor.54 Thus, in the summer of 
1931, Promkooptrans officials lamented their inability to use camels obtained in Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan. “From the moment they arrived, it turned out that it would be impossible to 
begin using them because of a lack of fodder, [related] equipment, saddles, rope, etc.”55 
The physical presence of institutions dedicated to animals also made it easier to provide 
for the general well-being of Tajikistan’s herds. Animal illness and death in the republic was a 
constant  concern to officials. The most significant cause was related to supplying fodder—
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especially acquiring it at all.56 Commodity chain dysfunction, as I have shown, often led officials 
like animal handlers to seek feed in markets, such as informal bazars. Upper-level authorities 
were concerned that, besides the illegality of this practice, it also decreased the state’s ability to 
control on the quality of food consumed by animals.57 Although both horses and camels are 
hardy animals able to eat a variety of kinds of food, their work capacity is limited by the type and 
amount of fodder they receive. The freshness and nutrition of feed, meanwhile, could make 
beasts vulnerable to disease.58 At times, concerns about fodder were so great that administrators 
even tried to delay the arrival of animal imports. In December 1930, the Promkooptrans 
executive resolved to try forestalling the arranged delivery of camels from Kazakhstan. They 
hoped these animals would not arrive before “the month of April 1931 in view of the fact that 
Tajikistan’s roads (pack animal paths) are closed during the winter period, and we do not have 
any grass fodder for the sustenance of camels during the winter.” These officials invoked a 
common rhetorical strategy, highlighting the two regions’ differences, and even hypothesized 
that camels “can be at pasture during the entire winter in Kazakhstan.”59 
The stables and other housing of Tajikistan’s growing farms also provided shelters, 
which encouraged the vitality of animal labor. This was a major development because, until at 
least the late 1930s, the state could scarcely even provide lodging to human capital. Historically, 
stables were a complicated logistical matter for organizations managing large groups of draft or 
pack animals. In the modern era, they became efficient stations that often also stored feed, spaces 
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for shoeing, and various equipment facilities. The multifarious nature of these complexes also, 
however, required sophisticated management and design to ensure, above all, cleanliness and fire 
safety.60 Officials charged with building stables of Tajikistan—which were far more modest than 
the grand structures supporting Euro-American urbanization in the nineteenth century—warned 
that timber shortages resulted in small, less hygienic structures. They would encourage animal 
illness instead of supporting better health and economical transportation.61 
Finally, the presence of farms in the republic also had a positive effect on the relationship 
to personnel. These institutions depended on the people who managed animals daily. Handlers 
were responsible for ensuring the health and safety of horses and camels, but prior to 
establishment of farms, such employees regularly harmed or killed their charges through neglect 
or abuse. Drovers made draft animals sick by working them too hard, by starving them, by 
beating them, or by keeping them in unsanitary conditions.62 In early 1930, for example, 
members of the Udarnik artel at work in the Qurghonteppa region —settlers from “Siberia”— 
allegedly worked and neglected their horses to death. A Promkooptrans official reported that the 
shipping agents had killed seventeen horses in just one day. After completing a job, two of the 
animals died “in the road,” while the remainder died in a “courtyard” meant for them to rest in.63 
Farms helped prevent such occurrences because they had clearer duties for employees, the state 
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could better control them, and these personnel also had better access to the resources needed to 
do their jobs. 
Farms also helped avoid the risks involved with handling the importation of animals. The 
act of shepherding large caravans between republics also commonly led to their demise as a 
result of poor handling. The botched importation of over 800 camels by train in 1932, for 
example, was judged an avoidable disaster. They received “so little attention,” in the form of 
feeding or other care, “that 50 percent of them became sick during the trip.” Of these, 200 died 
on the way or shortly after arrival. According to an official report, “dissection shows that all of 
them had rotten lungs.” The camels had been destined for irrigation works in the Vakhsh River 
region. Only 300 of the remaining animals were capable of labor, and were to be used in the 
transportation of food.64 
Rooting a cadre of animal handlers in the Tajik SSR also helped overcome the need to 
import individuals who had expertise in managing caravans, or other aspects of draft animal life. 
In the 1920s and early 1930s, the republic recruited drovers and other animal handlers from parts 
of Central Asia, especially among Turkmen and Kazakh ethnic groups. Often, such individuals 
were contracted by expediters along with herds of horses or camels. Because of their foreignness 
and the circumstances under which they were contracted, these handlers drew various forms of 
suspicion. Employment in a sector that involved constant travel could complicate confirmation 
of a person’s background. Moreover, Tajikistan often commissioned couriers to hire drovers, and 
the arrangements involved in the resultant market transactions broke laws including on the 
regulation of identifying documents. Such was the case of the importation of 2,000 camels, along 
with drovers, from villages near Bukhara city in 1926. It exemplified the uncertainty that could 
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surround animal handlers, and even their charges. As the republican People’s Commissar of RKI, 
Shohrinshoh Shohtemur, reported, Tajikistan authorities had sought support for the contract from 
upper-level  Uzbekistan officials “considering the feebleness of the organizations with whom 
contracts” were made.65 Representatives of two village councils in Uzbekistan, however, 
appeared in Stalinabad to protest the caravan’s move. It may be that, so soon after the NTD, lines 
of authority or markets for animal labor were not yet well established and caused confusion 
between higher and lower officials. The upheavals of recent Central Asian history also pervaded 
the crew of the camel drivers, several of whom were apparently former residents of Jilikul, an 
agricultural center of growing importance in Tajikistan’s Vakhsh River valley. They had fled 
their homes years ago in the wake of conflicts involving Basmachi rebels. Now, Tajikistan 
authorities investigated their backgrounds and questioned their reasons for returning.66 Despite 
the regularity of such confusion, republican officials continued to recruit foreigners experienced 
in handling large numbers of working animals. Retaining these individuals or having them train 
others, however, apparently was not common. As late as 1930, republican authorities would 
report that the republic had no native residents who were skilled in the driving of camel 
caravans.67 
The confusion surrounding the business of managing imports of animals and their 
drovers, as well as their activities in Tajikistan, was often strong evidence of the weakness of the 
Soviet state in the republic. One of the clear causes of this frailty was the very mobility that the 
camels and horses were used to generate, moving cargo and people in ways that were hard to 
track. Means of mobility shifted locations and routes of work frequently, increasing the difficulty 
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with managing them. For example, reports of ill and dying camels in southern Tajikistan during 
the winter of 1930-31 illuminated the complicated world of managing animal mobility. In 
December, the Promkooptrans artel “Kazakh” lost most of its 150 camels to death or illness, 
while similar problems in the 350-camel artel called “Piatiletka v 4 goda” (“the five-year plan in 
four years”) led to its complete disbandment. A Soiuztrans investigation reported that these 
troubles might have been related to an individual involved in contracting the animals for import 
from Kazakhstan. “This very day saw the loss of thirty-two of the artel’s camels, and there is no 
guarantee that all of them will not die.”68 He speculated that each group of sick camels might 
have been imported through dealings with a single individual named Koshmatov Omarbek. If 
proven, the man’s role in the transfer would “border on sabotage. We are now facing the 
question of [whether to] forbid any future organization of artels from [among the holdings of] 
Kazakhs.”69 
The possibility of wrecking in the market for Kazakhstani camels was never resolved. 
Instead, Soiuztrans and Promkooptrans became embroiled in a controversy about the legitimacy 
of their investigative officials and the corruption of their artels. In January and February, a 
dispute arose over the issue of the sickly camels that exposed the lack of state control over 
personnel involved in animal management. A Promkooptrans investigator, Mansurov Zaur-Bek, 
sparked the problem by disputing the earlier Soiuztrans report. His accounts portray the 
operating atmosphere I analyzed in Chapter 3, characterized by the absence of law and 
accountability. He criticized shipping agents of southern regions of selectively dismissing 
assigned jobs, taking on passengers instead of assigned cargo, and of even working where they 
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wished.70 More important to this discussion, he contested the reliability of reports about the 
camel losses because of his perception of pervasive corruption. He reported that the alleged 
illness of the “Kazakh” artel’s camels and other “abnormal statements coming from the artel” 
could not be confirmed because of the fact that the representative of the workgroup was “hiding” 
during the investigation.71 In the case of the loss of thirty-two camels in Qurghonteppa, 
corruption—not suppliers from Kazakhstan—was more clearly to blame. Of the total lost, he 
only confirmed that twelve had indeed died. Fifteen others “lost on the road” were later 
recovered in Stalinabad, while the remaining five were outright stolen “by people who scattered 
to Afghanistan.”72 
Zaur-Bek too, however, was an import, whose own background, credentials, and right to 
criticize came under attack immediately. Promkooptrans officials in Stalinabad responded to his 
reports by questioning his identity, and demanding information about it from the Qurghonteppa 
office that had hired him—explicitly hoping it would be amenable to his dismissal. Their motive 
most likely was to undermine his open discussion of systemic problems in the management of 
animal mobility, or to his observation of Soiuztrans’ abuse of its authority in the use of 
transportation resources under other organizations. Zaur-Bek was aware of these concerns and 
also tried to allay them in the same message where he asked to be removed from his post. “I have 
been courier…I have been an agent, I have been a stableman, I have been an instructor, I have 
been a representative, and today” management is asking me in what capacity and post I have 
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been assigned to Qurghonteppa.73 He also hypothesized that he was now under attack because of 
having disagreed with several officials on how much money and equipment was needed, in 
addition to condemning the operations of most local artels.74 The confusion surrounding this 
case—the lack of clarity about his identity, his job title, attempts of officials in Qurghonteppa 
and Stalinabad to understand the causes of reported camel illness and death, who was 
responsible, how to remedy it, and whether any of it really happened—illuminated continuing 
state inefficiency in the business of managing animals.75 
Despite the ubiquitous corruption in shipping, and transportation more generally, officials 
who worked with camels did their best to overcome mobility challenges associated with 
shortages. At times, these were especially creative efforts that reflected the endeavor to include 
animals in modernization of the economy. In the summer of 1930, for example, officials 
intended to alternate camels for a herd of Samarkandi horses whose arrival in the republic would 
be delayed two to three weeks. The substitutes would enable the use of 300 carts recently 
imported from Petropavlovsk. Gosplan officials decided to take this opportunity to raise “the 
scale of freightage facilitated by camel transportation, [whereby] it is necessary to convert it 
from pack animal to wheeled [hauling] on various routes.”76 These authorities resolved to 
conduct experiments in order to find a way to harness the camels to carts. Apparently, they were 
unaware that models of such practices already existed in Central Asia, despite enlisting of camel 
                                                
73 Message addressed to Promkooptrans management, attributed to Mansurov Zaur-Bek, handwritten, 15 Jan 1931, 
TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, l. 33a (full document is ll. 33a-b). 
74 TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, l. 33b. He specifically identified Jilikul is the place with the highest degree 
disorganization among drivers and camel drivers. See TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, l. 33a. 
75 Message addressed to Efelov Director of Promkooptrans’ Qurghonteppa office), no. 2-2-74, attributed to 
Promkooptrans’ Stalinabad office, signed by Fazilov (Management) and Andreev (Organizational Bureau), 1 
February 1931, TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 64, l. 32 (full document).  
76 Record of proceedings of a 8 June 1930 interdepartmental meeting held by Gosplan Tajik SSR in Stalinabad, 
signed by Barshchevskii (Chair) and Sigai (Secretary), TsGART, f. 93, op. 1, d. 18, ll. 1-3 (full document). 
  
212 
drovers from across the region.77 As Bulliet explains, “camels have been used to draw carts in 
Central Asia since the earliest domestication of the two-humped [Bactrian] species.”78 Given the 
Slavic names associated with this resolution, the officials’ foreignness is attributable to their 
ignorance of traditions of camel-powered vehicles in Central and South Asia, and the Middle 
East. It is a common mistake, especially in places where camels were less used.79 
The possible inexperience of upper-level officials with this animal may also be the reason 
for the lesser emphasis they gave to developing and using its stock. The high point for 
Tajikistan’s camel population was 1932-1933, when it totaled 6,000-7,000. Within two years, the 
population dropped by about half due to export. The reason is unknown.80 It may be that as the 
state endeavored to establish institutions for breeding—within the larger effort to control means 
of mobility discussed in Chapter 3—it concurrently closed native and local camel breeding 
activities throughout the republic. Diverse kolkhozes and sovkhozes bred Bactrian and 
Dromedary camels until 1936, when the state replaced them by establishing three new republican 
camel farms, which took acquired bred animals and some from dissolved artels.81 By this action, 
Tajikistan joined the fringes of a larger project of experimental breeding with camels in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus—the USSR being the only place in the world conducting such exercises 
with these animals in the 1930s.82 
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By comparison, the farming of horses had been a much more structured activity in 
Central Asia and Tajikistan, benefitting from greater state investment. By the mid-1930s, such 
institutions had multiplied within the republic to include establishments throughout the southern 
and northern regions of the republic. Usually, breeding activities were associated with a 
collective farm of some kind, beginning operations with horses confiscated from local bais or 
from liquidated artels.83 Successes in horse breeding also led to the opportunity to make mules, 
which were hardy working animals. Thanks to a large number of births at “the 41st” in the 
summer of 1935 (133 offspring), more than 100 of its studs and mares were combined with 63 
mule mares imported from the RSFSR to establish a “mule farm” (mulozavod) called the 126th, 
on “territory B of the dairy farm.”84 A reporting official viewed this as an especially significant 
accomplishment since the entire republic contained only 27 mules at the time, 10 of which were 
at the new mule farm. “Mule breeding is a completely new sector in Tajikistan.”85 
The combined number of horses across all farms was still in the hundreds, but officials 
were positive about their prospective growth. This bright outlook was derived from the fact that 
there were already, by the mid-1930s, signs that Tajikistan’s breeding operations were 
surmounting various equine health challenges. In addition to farms’ inherently promoting better 
treatment of animals, they were making progress in improving the physiology of the horses 
through proper care and breeding across generations of animals. One of the key measures used 
by Central Asian horse management for gaging the vitality of their horses was height and form. 
When horse stocks were depleted in the mid-1920s, authorities reported that malnutrition and ill-
                                                
83 Report on “Horse Farms in the Tajik SSR,” signed by S. Butovskii, 9 August 1936, TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1541, 
l. 80 (full document). 
84 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1541, l. 77. 
85 TsGART, f. 18, op. 1, d. 1541, l. 77. 
  
214 
use led to their shrinking size. To them, animal health was a clear reflection of the bad state of 
the economy and exacerbated it. Where the average height of the Kyrgyz breed had, for example, 
been 2 arshins, it dropped to 1.13 arshins in the mid-1920s. Their suitability to use in various 
activities is lacking, cannot be considered for agriculture, nor for remount services,” in addition 
to its overall lower “productivity.”86 Ten years later, Tajikistan officials boasted that the average 
height of their horses had reached the original Kyrgyz mean, and were consistently getting 
bigger as they got older. Jumping ability, too, was identified as a sign of capability and health, 
and officials bragged that Tajikistan horses distinguished themselves among Central Asian ones 
in competitions. One horse from the Yovon region, called Tukhachevskii, allegedly won two first 
and two second place prizes out of four tries at a competition in Tashkent.87 He, like others from 
the republic’s farms, was taught this and other skills at the training center for horses 
(“trenkoniushniu”) in Sharhrinau—the first of a planned growing infrastructure of such 
institutions.88 
These symptoms of health and sophistication were part of the broader project of altering 
physical characteristics in horses that could serve economic growth. To do so, they needed the 
ability to perform certain kinds of labor, such as handling various cargos, while having the 
ability to do so within diverse material environments. To the officials administering Central 
Asia’s horse stocks in the mid-1920s, the main regional breeds suffered additional health defects 
because they had been uprooted from the regions and lifestyles their biology disposed them for. 
Of the three most common kinds—the Karabair, the Kirzhiz, and the Turkmen—the latter, now 
only 2 percent of the total population, suffered especially. “They are disappearing in hundreds 
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since it is a kind of horse with narrow specialization, determined by breeding in a bounded 
region, having a particular natural and economic historical conditions (Turkmenia, Khorezm, 
Persia).” The economic landscape of its native land was changing from nomadic to settled and 
agricultural forms of life.89 “Its lack of mobility has affected the exterior form and internal 
quality [of these animals] extraordinarily unfavorably,” including “angular form” and  
“disproportion.”90 
Soviet officials of the mid-1920s focused their hopes on the Karabair breed because they 
believed it was most likely to thrive in multiple economic sectors and tasks across Central Asia’s 
varied terrain. It made up 37 percent of the population, and also was the hardiest of the three 
despite the fact that its stock also suffered in current conditions.91 The Karabair’s abilities 
corresponded most closely to needs projected in one report as a horse that was “strong, 
sufficiently grown, having good endurance, comparatively inexpensive,” and able to work in 
agriculture. It hoped that this kind of horse would go hand in hand with the planned growing 
fleet of machines that would enable more intensive farming, and replace animals traditionally 
used in tillage. “At the same time, Turkestan’s immense mountainous spaces and roadlessness 
allow only surface travel that requires saddle [rideable] horses for supplying above all the army.” 
The report concluded that Turkestan needed a single, versatile breed, suited to draft work in 
agriculture, to hauling artillery and supplies, as well as to riding.92 
Tajikistan’s horse breeders defined their needs in very similar terms, and that is why one 
of their two primary types was the versatile Karabair. The republic also, however, produced a 
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horse called the Lokai because it was even more adapted to the uniquely mountainous 
conditions.93 Like the Karabair, it could pull, carry, and be used in service of military on variable 
and especially mountainous terrains. Soviet officials believed that the Lokai was formerly seen 
as part of the Karabair breed. But they now saw this noticeably smaller, often curly haired 
variety as its own breed of horse. They may have been unaware that the Lokai horse had already 
been bred in the southwestern region of Tajikistan going by the same name for several hundred 
years.94 Preceding inhabitants bred an animal to facilitate mobility in this landscape. As a 
republic official explained, “for mountainous regions of Central Asia, the Lokai is the best saddle 
and pack horse to which it is unlikely that any other cultivated species could compare.”95 By 
1936, then, Tajikistan had established the means to produce horses suited to transportation in its 
unique territory, in addition to already possessing a large number in use. 
The security represented by this situation contrasted sharply with the continuing 
dependence that characterized attempts to improve the fleet of automotive vehicles, and related 
capital. The machine transportation sector had grown rapidly since the late 1920s, but it could 
not keep pace with the constantly rising targets and scale of change within the republic. Where 
only 17 machines could be found in the entire republic in 1928, their number grew to 366 in 
1930, 487 in 1932, 804 in 1934, and 1,500 by the start of 1935.96 An SNK Tajk SSR report 
explained that “the republic’s “fleet of automotive vehicles is growing rapidly, though it 
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[growth] is carried out in a spontaneous (disorganized) manner, lacking a balanced, focused plan 
for transportation, lacking a corresponding equipping of the motor deep and garages….and 
finally lacking a sufficient number of qualified cadres.”97 To the report authors, the scattered 
nature and spontaneous growth of the fleet made it hard to assess, and that it also caused the 
following problems: lack of garages and mechanics; lack of plans for shipment; a corresponding 
lack of control over assignments; lack of systematic upkeep and repair; lack of account of 
operations such as usage of machines and labor; breaking of standards for usage and repair; lack 
of standards in the selection of cadres as drivers (including technical and social standing).98 Of 
the 225 individual fleets in the republic at this time, only 10 percent had a repair shop.99 As I 
explained in Chapter 3, unplanned and illegal relationships continued to dominate shipping and 
the use of means of mobility in general through the 1930s. The report concluded that “the 
negative situation of the automotive economy is mainly the result of criminal and impractical 
behavior of agency drivers and separate economic organizations entrusting them with valuable 
state property.” 100 These problems, combined with the pace of change in the republic, created a 
mobility environment unfavorable to mechanized means of mobility. It was the opposite of the 
situation under development in animal mobility. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that Soviet ambitions for the modernization of transportation, and the 
economy as a whole, were accomplished by horses and camels, rather than by machines. 
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Ungulates were a more reliable mode of mobility from the perspective of availability because 
they could be bred within the republic, or imported and cared for more easily than automotive 
vehicles. In fact, the manner in which they were used, through mass mobilization and 
technological control for the purpose of economic growth was comparable to other modernizing 
contexts of the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Breeding for specialized 
functions and abilities was also a characteristic of these situations. In the Tajik SSR, breeding of 
camels and especially horses deemed suitable to the republic’s particular physical environment 
was an endeavor of modernization. It also, however, was a way of accommodating—or 
managing—the particular landscape of mobility in the republic, being that ungulates could do 
most of the work that machines could to enable that state pursuit of goals in economic growth. 
While the Soviet desire to entirely mechanize freightage was impossible, locations and 
enterprises throughout the republic could be served by animal transportation of cargos on the 
difficult terrain. 
These finding indicate that further study of the use of pack and draft animals throughout 
Central Asia and the USSR might encourage reconsideration of the meaning of cultural and 
symbolic endorsements of machines—whether by socialist officials or scholars. Foregrounding 
and exploring the historical presence of camels or horses in state endeavors can lead to fuller 
understandings of how economic tasks, forms of communication, or other transport-dependent 
activities were accomplished at large and everyday levels. Not all regions of the USSR possessed 
or had access to the same levels and means of transportation. The implications of a whole 
republic, such as Tajikistan, using predominant animal mobility were politically greater than they 
were for an area of lesser status. In either case, though, the inhabitants and enterprises of such 
regions experienced economic and political life very differently from those of spaces where 
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machines were more prevalent. They were lesser known regions that related to ideology and 
propaganda, as well as to other places in ways that might not be well reflected in studies that 
focus on better known areas or on machine transportation. As I discuss in the next chapter, 
Tajikistan officials also found that badly needed mechanized mobility infrastructure and 
resources were also intrinsically harder projects to delimit. Because of this, planners were not in 
full control of the location and tempo of large-scale settlement and economic growth, nor how it 
would occur in places where transportation capital acquired unique, unanticipated status among 
individuals and organizations who engaged in shipping every day. 
When it came to animals the entire constellation of activities related to supporting 
mobility also became more vulnerable. Beasts can die and become ill, which were high 
possibilities in Tajikistan’s dependency regime. Furthermore, working animals do not fare well 
in situations of regime crisis, as the case of the declining Central Asian horse stocks of the mid-
1920s exemplified. Tajikistan’s growing security in the access to, use, and production of pack 
and draft animals in the later 1930s, therefore, reflected a better established, stronger Soviet 
state, even if it was differently mobile and differently modern from the way that was desired.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPING GEOGRAPHY UNDER STALIN: 
LOGISTICS AND THE VAKHSHSTROI RAILROAD 
 
This chapter analyzes why a service railroad became the most important economic thoroughfare 
of the Tajik SSR’s southern regions of the 1930s, and how it came to shape the geography of 
Soviet life there. I will argue that its fate as the unintended primary road of the Vakhsh River 
valley is comparable to other postcolonial international “aid” and development contexts, and 
thereby suggests approaches to enhancing understandings of the grand projects of the Stalin-era. 
In the 1930s, the Vakhsh valley was a top recipient region of Soviet capital investment in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia. The importance of the railroad, however, was under-recognized 
until the end of the decade. As a secondary priority, this narrow gauge track (uzkokoleika, in 
Russian) was so poorly constructed that trains traveling faster than twenty-five kilometers per 
hour risked an accident.1 But its unanticipated, rapidly growing role as a channel for commodity 
mobility strengthened Soviet presence by facilitating conditions for economic growth, and 
creating a physical environment for the state. 
This chapter demonstrates the global relevance of this story by drawing on a multi-
disciplinary body of studies addressing roads projects in postcolonial contexts. I engage 
Tajikistan as a Soviet “aid” recipient in order to analyze the complicated relationships and power 
imbalances that characterized and ultimately drove everyday governance within its borders. 
Doing so, I argue, frames socialist governance as an early model of “international development.” 
                                                
1 Record of proceedings of a 31 March 1937 meeting with the Chairman of Gosplan of the Tajik SSR, Central State 
Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv respubliki Tadzhikistan; hereafter 
TsGART), f. 20 (State Planning Commission of the Tajik SSR (Gosplan Tajik SSR), op. 2 (1930-1947), d. 943, l. 4 
(full document is ll. 4-9); and Report “On the state of the narrow gauge railroad,” addressed to the Chairman of 
Gosplan Tajik SSR, attributed to V. P Osadchii (Chief of the Vakhshstroi Railroad), received 28 October 1936, 
TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, l. 50 (full document is ll. 41-62). 
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It is a historiographically unfamiliar example and perspective on this global phenomenon 
because it lay outside the Euro-American imperial world. By conceiving of the Tajik SSR as an 
object of foreign aid projects, I furthermore avoid limiting the factors and lessons of this story as 
yet another direct evolution of ideas, categories, and relationships borne of colonialism.2 Rather, 
it allows me to evaluate social and economic dynamics by accepting and engaging their 
productive nature and energy, and the real, lasting change they generated. 
The railroad I am discussing was first conceived and intended as a support line for 
operations to establish a cotton agro-industrial complex in the Vakhsh valley (please see attached 
maps). This so-called Vakhshstroi was a grand Stalinist mobilizational project that—rather 
unlike its railway—did not achieve the lofty ambitions of its planners. Conceived in 1929, and 
added to Tajikistan’s first five-year plan in 1930, the Vakhshstroi’s mission was the construction 
of hundreds of kilometers of new canals to irrigate mostly new fields for cotton cultivation, all 
while establishing new farms and settlements, cotton gins, and hydroelectric dams to power the 
enterprise and the region.3 During its first year in operation, from 1931-32, it became the largest 
economic development project in Central Asia, touted as promoting the cotton independence of 
the USSR at a time when the product was mostly imported from the United States.4 By 1939, 
however, the plan to irrigate one hundred and ten thousand hectares had fallen short, at only 
                                                
2 On the importance of considering alternate views of post-tsarist Central Asia, see Adeeb Khalid, “Locating the 
(Post-) Colonial in Soviet History”, in Central Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (December 2007): 465-73. 
3 “Resolution based on Kaktyn’s report on Vakhshstroi,” 1932, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History 
(Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii; hereafter RGASPI), f. 62 (Central Asia Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), op. 2 (1929-1934), d. 2782, l. 72 (full 
document is ll. 65-74); and “The Vakhsh Valley Project,” Central Asian Review 4, no. 3 (1956): 264. 
4  Report titled “Description of the Vakhsh irrigation project and its immediate needs,” signed by Syromiatnikov 
(Head Engineer of Vakhshstroi) in Tashkent on 19 June 1932, RGASPI, f. 62, Op.2, d. 2782, l. 49 (full document is 
ll. 48-59); and “The Vakhsh Valley Project,” 265; and Khomidov Furkat, Vakhshstroi: detishche druzhby narodov 
(Khujand, Tajikistan: Tsentr molodezhnyikh initsiativ “Ittifok,” 1998), 18. 
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about forty-two thousand hectares, and hydroelectric stations were still only a distant possibility.5 
Meanwhile, its railroad had become much more consequential. Completed in 1935, it extended 
from the Amu Darya River port city of Panji Poyon, north to Qurghonteppa, with a leg 
connecting Jilikul to the main run. Altogether, it consisted of about one hundred and twenty-five 
kilometers of track.6 And it had already come to serve as a preferred and dominant route for 
many economic and state activities of the region that were not directly affiliated with the 
Vakhshstroi. Its rise to prominence would garner such epithets as “Southern Railroad” and 
“Vakhsh Railroad.”7 The significance it represented to regional economic development inspired 
one Tajik historian to later call it “our Turksib,” referring to the most famous railroad project of 
the Stalin period.8 The latter, far larger line, whose construction began at the turn of the century 
and was completed in 1930, extended from Siberia across Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. It was the 
object of much propaganda and historiography, and and is credited with promoting the growth of 
Central Asia’s economy because of improved communication with Russia.9 In reality, the 
Turksib did not come into heavy use until the end of the 1930s.10 Its relationship to, and impact 
on, the historical development of the Central Asian (or even, the broader Soviet) economy, and 
                                                
5 “Explanatory Note on Vakhsh Construction in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarters of 1932,” attributed to Artykhbaev 
(Deputy Head of Vakhshstroi) and Syromiatnikov (Head Project Engineer), n.d., TsGART, f. 268 (Administration of 
the Vakhsh Irrigation Project of the Tajik SSR, Under the Central Asian Construction Trust for Government 
Irrigation Works (Vakhshstroi), op. 1 (1929-1940), d. 29, ll. 1-2 (full document is ll. 1-7); and P. A. Vasil’ev, 
Tadzhikistan (ekonomiko-geograficheskoe opisanie) (Stalinabad: Gos. Izd. Tadzh. SSR, 1947), 145-46. Work on the 
project continued after World War II, though it is hard to gauge progress from the secondary literature. See, for 
example, R. M. Masov, ed., Noveishaia istoriia (1917-1941), vol. 5 of Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda (Dushanbe: 
Institut istorii, arkheologii i etnografii im. A Donisha AN respubliki Tadzhikistan, 2004), 573-78. 
6 Panji Poyon translates from Tajiki as Lower Panj (Nizhny Piandzh, in Russian), and refers to the part of the upper 
Amu Darya River (Oxus) that forms much of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, and is also called the Panj River. 
7 S. Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo i razvitie transporta v Tadzhikistane, 1917-1941 gg. (Dushanbe: 
Izdatel’stvo “Donish,” 1979), 138. 
8 Furkat, Vakhshstroi, 32. 
9 On the Turkestano-Siberian Railroad (Turksib), see Matthew J. Payne, Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building 
of Stalinism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). 
10 Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
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to the delay of such grand Stalinist projects as the Ferghana valley’s Grand Ferghana Canal, 
completed in 1940, is underexplored. My analysis of Vakhshstroi’s railroad demonstrates that 
such analysis would illuminate cause and effects of historical contexts, and improve 
chronologies. 
 
Stalinabad, yes, but Stalinism? Tajikistan as a Soviet aid recipient 
The contrast between the intended purpose of the Southern Railroad and its real importance is 
striking. It raises questions about familiar views of 1930s Soviet governance in Tajikistan and 
across the entire USSR. This period is known for generating some of the core facets of socialist 
governance that are associated with the leadership of Joseph Stalin. When work on the 
Vakhshstroi and its railroad started in 1931, it was the height of the first five-year plan. The 
scholarly consensus is that this program inaugurated the transition to the Soviet economic 
system. This so-called “command economy” was a highly centralized state bureaucracy for 
cross-sectoral management that changed very little between 1932 and 1957.11 
The actual unfolding of economic development that I observe in the Vakhsh River valley 
region stands at odds with the vision of a system that concentrated decision-making in the 
executive institutions of the USSR, and ultimately in Moscow.12 Here, as I also argue in the other 
                                                
11 Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 214-17, 
226-272; James R. Millar, The ABCs of Soviet Socialism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 21-35; and 
Serguei Alex. Oushakine, “‘Against the Cult of Things’: On Soviet Productivism, Storage Economy, and 
Commodities with No Destination,” The Russian Review 73, no. 2 (April 2014): 203-04. E. A. Rees argues that 
Stalinism was characterized by the coexistence of central control and of semi-autonomous, institutions. Importantly, 
however, these were usually often “centrally”-based themselves, either as economic ministries in Moscow, or in 
republican headquarters. See E. A. Rees, ed., “Conclusion,” in Decision-making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 
1932-37 (New York: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1997), 273.  
12 In this way, this chapter aligns with scholars concerned with models used by most studies of the Stalin era. Please 
see, David L. Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939 (Ithaca: 
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chapters of this dissertation, upper-level officials disseminated plans setting production targets 
for every organization within Soviet borders, but they could not prescribe operations and the 
ways that goals would be met. My analysis of Soviet economic development in the Vakhsh River 
valley region—and elsewhere throughout Tajikistan and the USSR, as I have demonstrated—
attests to decentralized, under-planned activities that resulted in what came to be known as the 
Soviet state. 
My conclusions contradict characterizations of this period as inescapably oppressive and 
centrally controlled. As I explained in the Introduction, I come to this uncertainty about the large-
scale causes and rationales by foregrounding material phenomena and dynamics. Various 
frameworks are used to interpret paradoxes of everyday economic life like those in southern 
Tajikistan. The dominant approach of recent scholarship is Stephen Kotkin’s view of the USSR 
as a “participatory totalitarianism.” This term refers to the manner in which people who lived on 
the territories of the Soviet regime, whether they supported its ideology or not, were by varying 
degrees integrated in and supporting activities that the state promoted as ideological projects.13 
This constellation of institutions, practices, and dispositions are what scholars refer to as 
“Stalinism.”14 In 1929, Tajikistan symbolically recognized his emergence as the undisputed 
leader of the USSR by naming its capital “Stalinabad,” just months before acquiring status as a 
fully independent republic in the USSR in the same year. Beyond the symbols and discourses of 
Communist Party supremacy and political culture, however, grand scholarly assumptions about 
                                                
Cornell University Press, 2011); and Anna Krylova, “Soviet Modernity: Stephen Kotkin and the Bolshevik 
Predicament,” Contemporary European History 23, no. 2 (May 2014): 167-92. 
13 See Astrid Hedin, “Stalinism as a Civilization: New Perspectives on Communist Regimes,” Political Studies 
Review 2, no. 2 (2004): 169, 174; and Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995). 
14 See, for example, Robert C. Tucker, “Introduction: Stalinism and Comparative Communism,” in Stalinism: Essays 
in Historical Interpretation, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1979), xi-xx; and 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. 
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average people participating in Stalinism do not explain how economic life actually worked, or 
even the everyday economic motivations for those operations. I show that enacting profound 
societal change was a messy affair, even if its many parts operated in officially common cause. 
My approach provides an understanding of relationships that are not exclusive of others observed 
in the historiography. The ad hoc operations that I highlight may often have been concurrent with 
and woven into actions implying participation in a society that might be characterized as 
totalitarian, whether in Tajikistan or elsewhere. In fact, the behaviors I describe tend to be 
obscured by such universalizing (or, totalizing) analytical pronouncements about how things 
worked across the USSR. 
Nothing about the Vakhshstroi or its railroad was planned carefully, as its managers and 
experts of the 1930s affirmed. The authors of regular evaluations of ongoing activities were often 
open about the fact that they considered the project’s plans to be audacious. A report by the 
Vakhshstroi leadership in the first quarter of 1932 stipulated that their remarks would be 
tentative since all previous and planned work was conducted on the basis of only approximate 
plans, and this continued to be the norm.15 Central Asia Bureau officials in Tashkent challenged 
this a few months later, alleging that the first year of operation progressed without any 
operational plan at all.16 The practice of improvisation, furthermore, led to an apparent laxity in 
planning procedures and deadlines. In 1935, for example, several budgeting exercises meant for 
the spring were delayed to December because previous budgets could be applied to incomplete 
work that had been delayed for as much as half a year.17 Even as late as 1937, a top official 
                                                
15 TsGART, f. 268, op. 1, d. 29, ll. 1-2. 
16 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2782, l. 72. 
17 “Explanatory note regarding the technical report on the Vakhsh Irrigation Project for 1935,” attributed to 
Tolstopiatov (Head of Project) and Kuznetsov (Temporary Head Engineer), 1936, TsGART, f. 268, op. 1, d. 94, l. 
31 (full document is ll. 28-82). 
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commented comically on the nature of plan implementation, amazed that a project of 
Vakhshstroi’s scale could be conducted so haphazardly. To him, though, plans and budgets were 
necessarily unrealistic, since it was difficult to estimate the needs and productivity of labor. He 
saw no alternative to the practice of entrusting workers or agencies by a “tradition” where they 
were expected to work without concrete budgets and guidelines.18 
This official failed to mention that the byproduct of conducting urgent business this way 
was wastefulness, shoddy work and, above all, profound suffering among the laborers and 
animals involved. On the railroad, improvised construction produced a low grade, dangerous 
route in need of continuing repairs until at least after the 1930s. It violated many Soviet technical 
norms, against planners’ wishes. Only twenty-one kilometers of the route had any ballast at all. 
Crossties, too, “were laid in a manner that digressed greatly from technical norms, both in the 
number of crossties used per kilometer of route, and in the quality of the crossties.” The chief 
cause of the poor quality and low usability of the railroad, however, was the fact that no tie plates 
at all had been placed under the rails, which led to more rapid deterioration of the crossties and 
other components.19 Immigrant laborers on the railroad, the Vakhshstroi, and other valley 
projects, often left the region because of trying conditions. They faced inconsistent employment 
and wages, a lack of such basic support as tents and food, as well as difficult environmental 
conditions, characterized by poor infrastructure, unfamiliar tropical climate, and diseases such as 
malaria.20 
                                                
18 Report addressed to Comrade Rudzutak (Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the USSR) et al., attributed to V. 
Beliakov (Head of Vakhshstroi), 1937, secret, TsGART, f. 268, op. 1, d. 94v, ll. 6-16 (full document). 
19 TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, l. 4. 
20 Report titled “Commencement,” addressed to the Central Asia Bureau (Sredazbiuro), signed by Vlasov (Deputy of 
the Secret Section), 27 October 1931, RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2523, l. 60 (full document is ll. 60-61); RGASPI, f. 
62, op. 2, d. 2782, l. 69; V. G. Glushkov, “Voprosy irrigatsii v Tadzhikistane,” Problemy Tadzhikistana: Trudy 
pervoi konferentsii po izucheniiu proizvoditel’nykh sil Tadzhikskoi SSR, vol. 1, ed. A. E. Fersman et al. (Leningrad: 
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This story is a familiar one. As I argued in earlier chapters, stock explanations drawn 
from the historiography of the early Stalin period often prevent a understandings of how 
economic development, and resultant state- and community-building, progressed dynamically 
and chronologically on (and in) the ground.21 My assessment, instead, joins a growing family of 
studies that seek to assign definite causes to ubiquitous phenomena, such as commodity 
“shortages” that tend to be uncritically accepted as characteristic of socialism.22 In Chapter 3, I 
argue for a more nuanced, relational view of planning problems and shortages based on my 
analysis of commodity chains of the Tajik SSR. A broad array of shipping agents and agencies 
across the USSR were responsible for Tajikistan’s material support and often the cause of capital 
shortages. Every Soviet endeavor in early years of the republic was entirely dependent on other 
regions of the USSR. Not only did authority, plans, and finances flow from Moscow. All of the 
materials needed for construction hailed from other, primarily “Russian,” regions.23 I find that 
the character of Tajikistan’s material dependency of the 1920s and 1930s was mediated by the 
contingencies of commodity chains serving it across the vast spaces separating destinations 
within the republic from sources of cargo. 
                                                
Izdatel’stvol akademii nauk SSSR, 1933), 148; “The Vakhsh Valley Project,” 264; and Maya Karin Peterson, 
“Technologies of Rule: Empire, Water, and the Modernization of Central Asia, 1867-1941” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2011), 429. 
21 See, for example, Peterson, “Technologies of Rule,” 403, 429. Among other recent studies of planning in practice, 
Heather De Haan points out that Soviet professionals implementing the somewhat theoretical projects of planners in 
Nizhny Novgorod encountered a material reality that was not so easy to mold. She, however, is more interested in 
the politics and discourses of city planning and building. For her discussion of material conditions of project 
implementation during construction of Nizhny Novgorod, see Heather DeHaan, Stalinist City Planning: 
Professionals, Performance, and Power (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 13, 56-59. 
22 Andrew Sloin and Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, “Economy and Power in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 11-12; Oushakine, 202. For a more usual 
understanding of shortages, see Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance 
and Structure, 6th ed. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 115, 127. 
23 Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East: A Communist Model for Development (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), 26, 114-21; and M. I. Iskandarov and G. Kh. Khaidarov, “Tadzhikistan v period 
vosstanovleniia narodnogo khoziaistva,” in Tadzhikskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika, ed. M. Asimov 
(Dushanbe: Glavnaia nauchnaia redaktsiia Tadzhikskoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1984), 109. 
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In fact, the Vakhshstroi was a project of such magnitude that it had its own commodity 
chains and storage bases in cities of southern Central Asia and throughout the USSR. The 
enterprise’s personnel were faced daily with its dependency on the USSR for needed materials 
because of constant delays and other complications with the delivery of supplies. Vakhshstroi’s 
managers often felt (with reason) that the cause of perpetual delays was in fact the managers of 
supply bases in Moscow and Tashkent, as well as governing authorities in those regions.24 
The project was a great hope, whose problems were emblematic of the larger challenges 
facing the republic in general, and its southern regions in particular. It was entirely dependent on 
other regions of the USSR, just like every Soviet ambition in early years of socialism in 
Tajikistan. The Vakhshstroi alone, as Khomidov Furkat points out, required the importation of 
"hundreds of thousands of tons of construction materials, mechanisms, equipment...people, and 
much else."25 
This chapter interprets Tajikistan as a dependent, peripheral territory of a postcolonial 
Soviet empire. Framing it this way acknowledges the coexistence of categorically dissimilar—
and indeed contradictory—dynamics that characterized the republic’s membership in the USSR. 
On one hand, Russian imperialism pervaded every aspect of socialist governance in Tajikistan, 
from the condescendingly communicated ideas that motivated educational and cultural 
standardization programs, to Soviet “Europeans” settling Central Asia, and dominating elite 
political and technical jobs, as well as the (neo-) colonial rationales that motivated economic 
planning. On the other hand, most of what concurrently transpired in every sector of early Soviet 
                                                
24 See, for example, Order No. 85 (II) of the Administration of the Vakhsh Irrigation Project, signed by Tolstopiatov 
(Chief of Construction) and Grigorova (Secretary), 23 October 1932, TsGART, f. 268, op. 1, d. 20, l. 91 (full 
document is ll. 91-95). 
25 Furkat, Vakhshstroi, 21. 
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life in Tajikistan was novel, unquestionably serving and empowering the people who lived 
within its borders—often as a result of local initiatives and desires.  
In this chapter, I side with commentators for whom local, native will and reception with 
respect to an “international development” project are the best indicators by which to gauge if, or 
to what degree, the project was intrusive or insidious. Most historians argue that postcolonial, 
international development only promoted (and promotes) “uneven” relationships between 
recipient and donor states. Scholars often construe this paradigm as little more than a 
perpetuation of dynamics and ideologies (such as varieties of civilizing mission) based in 
historically colonial relations.26 Others note that these relations might have been reconceived, but 
insist they are “imperialisms by a different set of vocabulary.”27 International development, 
however, ought not only be distilled to a range of concepts and practices mirroring a colonial 
legacy. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between constructive and demeaning intentions or 
outcomes of transnational economic planning.28 As Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard point 
out, “the development construct is also a history of how that concept was mobilized and 
deflected for other ends. People around the world are in some way engaged with far-reaching 
structures of power, and those engagements take more varied and complex forms than 
acquiescence or resistance.”29 During the conventional scholarly periodization of the 
                                                
26 This is the central criticism of the dependency and post-development critics. See, for example, Wolfgang Sachs, 
ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 
Ltd., 1992); and Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 4th edition (New 
York: Zed Books, Ltd., 2014). 
27 April R. Biccum, “Theorising Continuities Between Empire and Development: Toward a New Theory of 
History,” in Empire, Development, and Colonialism: The Past in the Present, ed. Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt 
(Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, Inc., 2013), 147. 
28 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the 
History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 17; and Jeffrey Haynes, 
Development Studies (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), 25-26. 
29 Cooper and Packard, International Development, 30. 
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“international development” paradigm as starting after WWII, the term and its manifold 
meanings were often appropriated with a view to the self-empowerment of formerly colonized 
and decolonizing peoples around the world.30 Indeed, the critiques and errors of dependency 
theorists themselves pointed to the importance of avoiding Euro- or US-centric analysis that 
often characterizes so-called “post-development” denunciations of transnational aid efforts.31 
I am addressing the realm of burgeoning popular and state desire for new economic 
means and capacities in 1930s Tajikistan, and the overwhelmingly positive, available native 
recollections of the efforts that resulted. This chapter’s emphasis on practical matters of 
economic development—projects—sets its analysis parallel to discourse analyses’ object of 
imperialistic rationalizations about culture and politics that we know were part of post-tsarist, 
Soviet conversations about national and economic regionalization policies.32 I take inspiration 
from the astute work of Alec Nove and J. A. Newth—written at the height of the modernization 
and dependency theories debate—which analyzed Soviet development in comparison to post-
colonial, international aid contexts. For them, the application of colonial typologies in the Soviet 
context depends greatly on what aspect of Soviet regional relations is under consideration. “Our 
entire judgment of all these matters must be affected by the importance which we attach to the 
national question.”33 They argue that willing, popular participation and desire for Soviet projects 
was not necessarily coincident with Russian colonialism anywhere in Central Asia. In southern 
regions of 1930s Tajikistan, economic growth involved enormous multinational settlement and 
                                                
30 See for example, Cooper and Packard, International Development, 9-12; and Rist, The History of Development. 
31 Errors implied include the relative economic successes of such states as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong in the 1970s “despite the influence of the international economic system” that dependency theorists 
believed would have been a roadblock. See Haynes, Development Studies, 24-28. 
32 On this, see Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
33 Nove and Newth, The Soviet Middle East, 125. 
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re-settlement campaigns of Central Asians, as well as individuals from Soviet regions west and 
north. Arguably, most of the heretofore ethnically Tajik population of Central Asia, and which 
came to reside within Tajikistan’s borders, had never been on its newly-defined territory before. 
In the 1920s and particularly the 1930s, hundreds of thousands of people migrated to Tajikistan’s 
southern regions, voluntarily, semi-voluntarily (because of incentives or contracts), and as a 
result of state coercion. Most of them traveled from other parts of the republic to settle southern 
agricultural regions. Some of them were return-migrants who had fled to Afghanistan during the 
post-tsarist wars. Many others still were Russians and Ukrainians, and other nationalities, who 
came in search of employment or a new home.34 
“Development” was thus a native, republican, as well as “all-Union” ambition. Tajikistan 
politicians and scholars often judged the economic vitality of their republic by reference to other 
regions of the USSR.35 In fact, state ambitions like Vakhshstroi had significant local political, 
administrative, popular, and indeed ex post facto, support. Economic and engineering experts in 
Central Asia and across the USSR believed that the project would be a great boon to the 
republican and Soviet economies. Such Tajik political elites as Abdurakhim Khodjibaev 
carefully managed lobbying efforts to support this project’s advancement alongside other major 
                                                
34 Aleksandr Trushnovich, Vospominaniia kornilovtsa, 1914-1934 (Moscow: “POSEV,” 2004), 308, 314-16; 
Christian Bleuer, “State-building, Migration and Economic Development on the Frontiers of Northern Afghanistan 
and Southern Tajikistan,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012): 75-77; Peterson, “Technologies of Rule,” 443-44; 
Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History (Canberra: Australia National 
University E-Press, 2013), 64; and Botakoz Kassymbekova, “Humans as Territory: Forced Resettlement and the 
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Work on the history of these settlers, who they were, how they came, and from where, are complicated by its stakes 
for characterizing the Soviet state, nationalities policy, and indeed the foundation of the national republic of 
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35 See, for example, Sh. M. Solomonov, “Nekotorye aspekty problemy vyravnivaniia urovnei ekonomicheskogo 
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economic endeavors.36 Later generations would recall it with pride, as a glorious national and 
transnational, cooperative Soviet effort.37 
Tajikistan’s dependency on other regions of the USSR can be seen as a symptom of the 
mutually beneficial capacities built through the cooperation of pan-Soviet and Tajikistan 
interests in economy. In fact, it can be argued that Soviet capital investment in Tajikistan—
mainly by Russia—was never directly repaid (or, that it is at best difficult to know the “balance” 
of the USSR’s economic relationship with Central Asia).38 While the details of this relationship 
reveal disagreements and conflicting motives of various agents, the power brokers at least agreed 
on the republic’s desire, if not need, for external aid. In Tajikistan’s southern regions, economic 
growth and dependency were no mere external creation, but a real outcome of the existence and 
ongoing Soviet project of the republic. 
 
Unanticipated outcomes on the Southern Railroad 
Framing Tajikistan as an aid recipient of the USSR allows me to draw on studies of roads 
projects in international development contexts for my analysis. From this perspective, the 
Southern Railroad was less of a tool of colonial occupation; this section focuses on the ways that 
                                                
36 Peterson, “Technologies of Rule,” 396-399; “Vakhshstroi zakonchit’ v srok,” Kommunist Tadzhikistana, no. 149, 
2 July 1931: 2; and “O Vakhshstroe,” Resolution No. 4 of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of 
Tajikistan, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, no. 19, 28 January 1934: 2-4. 
37 See, for example, K. Khasanov (Secretary of the TsK LKSM of Tajikistan), “Tadzhikskaia byl’,” Komsomol'skaia 
Pravda, no. 269, 16 November 1958: 4; Furkat, Vakhshstroi; Pavel Luknitskii, Tadzhikistan (Moscow: Izd. TsK 
VLKSM “Molodaia gvardia,” 1957), 375-81; V. G. Knoochkin, “Tridsat’ let spustia,” in Govoriat stroiteli 
sotsializma v Tadzhikistane (Vospominaniia uchastnikov stroitel’stva sotsializma v Tadzhikistane), ed. A. M. 
Bogoutdinova (Dushanbe: Izd. “Irfon,” 1967), 172-96. Rakhmon Safarov, Kahramoni Vakhsh va Dnepr (Dushanbe: 
Nashriyoti “Irfon,” 1982), 47-48. Today, few of the residents of Tajikistan or greater Central Asia are willing to 
commit to a view of the Soviet period as colonial. See Sergei Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central 
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it became the key conduit for state investment. In Tajikistan, as Ia. Bronshtein noted in the 
1960s, economic development “was directly dependent on securing the [transportation] 
connection of the republic with central regions of the country [the USSR].”39 Although the 
Southern Railroad was not planned for such a large role, its capacity for facilitating movement 
made it irresistible to regional enterprises that were not meant to use it. Socialism adjusted to its 
mistakes within the Vakhsh valley, making good on the reality that had evolved on its territory. 
Soviet planners’ original misunderstanding of the route’s likely future importance may 
seem like a profound blunder. It corresponds, however, to global patterns of road infrastructure 
construction and usage. The real impact of roads on regional economies is often hard to 
anticipate, and far more variable than common sense and assumptions, or plans, ever suggest.  
And even so, in discourses about international aid and development—and economic 
development in general—roads are a topic of convergence because of overwhelming evidence 
for the fact that ways of communication ensure the feasibility of economic growth in regions that 
depend on foreign sources of capital. Economic commentators and planners have historically 
tended to see land transportation infrastructures as a relatively unambiguous good, much as they 
do today.40 In fact, Soviet experts of the 1920s, 1930s, and later, employed a term of 
classification—bezdorozhnost’ (“roadlessness”)—in order to qualify how bad regional 
opportunities for mobility manifested in poor economic conditions, with corresponding 
categories of degree.41 Elsewhere, in the colonized and post-colonial lands of the nineteenth, 
                                                
39 Bronshtein, Ia. “Vliianie transporta na razvitie ekonomiki Tadzhikistana,” in Iskhakov et al., 64. 
40 See, for example, Amar Bhattacharya et al., “Infrastructure for Development: Meeting the Challenge,” Policy 
Paper for the Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy, the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change 
and the Environment, and the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four, June 2012. 
41 For a discussion of ways Soviet officials used the term “roadlessness,” see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Roadlessness 
and the ‘Path to Communism’: Building Roads and Highways in Stalinist Russia,” Journal of Transport History 29, 
no. 2 (September 2008): 277-94; and Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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twentieth, and twenty-first century worlds, experts have promoted roads infrastructure as always 
beneficial to the economic growth of a region, including where such roads were explicitly used 
for exploitative purposes.42 Critical studies of land transportation, however, emphasize that roads 
projects, and the roads themselves, are like any other object of analysis: part of a dynamic field 
of relations—both physical and abstract.43 The actors, rationales, political ideologies, and 
economic dogmas that motivate infrastructure construction do not only change from place to 
place, and state to state, but also over time. Even more importantly, perhaps, the post-
construction, real-world relevance of roads upon completion is always different from the 
frequently myopic visions that led to their realization.44 
Such is the story of the changing meaning of the Southern Railroad in the 1930s. Its 
significance exploded beyond that of a dedicated supply route to worksites of the Vakhshstroi 
because other enterprises of Tajikistan’s southern regions faced identical mobility problems. 
“Roadlessness” was a contextual challenge shared by all agencies and agents throughout most of 
the republic. As I detail in Chapters 1 and 2, southern Tajikistan bore none of the material or 
social antecedents that were platforms for Soviet economic development in other, even less 
economically developed parts of the former Russian empire. Prior to the mid-1920s, the territory 
of Tajikistan had hosted neither modern agricultural and economic activities, nor modern roads 
                                                
42 See, for example, Samir Amin, Neo-colonialism in West Africa, trans. from French by Francis McDonagh 
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or machines, and its uniquely rugged, almost entirely mountainous terrain challenged economic 
development efforts. A Vakhsh valley construction foreman based in Kafir Kala in 1932 
complained that “in all of our work, the one daily difficulty that the central administration is 
unable to resolve is transportation.”45 In 1934, the newly established Vakhsh System 
Administration found that present conditions of transportation still prevented effective 
governance. “The precariousness of automotive transportation also slows, and at times renders 
impossible, timely monitoring of regions where construction and other economic activities are 
underway.”46 
In the early 1930s, animal transportation was favored to that of automobiles because it 
often proved more able and reliable on the available, ungraded, often treacherous roads and 
pathways—or a lack thereof.47 Trucks and tractors, one historian points out, “quickly broke 
down because of the conditions of roadlessness [of southern Central Asia and Tajikistan].”48 One 
higher official asserted that the state’s expectation of poorly maintained and under-fueled 
machines to drive this terrain was in effect “perpetrating a crime against drivers.”49 During the 
early 1930s, about half of the 100-150 automobiles held by Vakhshstroi at any one time were in 
need of repairs. Its head engineer explained that “due to the poor quality of roads, as well as the 
bad quality of the automobiles themselves, the machines quickly fall out of commission. The 
average run of an automobile prior to needing basic [capital] repairs is five thousand kilometers.” 
                                                
45 Report addressed to the Central Asia Bureau, attributed to M. V. Shutov, 18 September 1932, in “Kafir Kala, Zone 
1 of the Vakhsh valley resettlement project,” RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2768, l. 67 (full document is ll. 65-68). 
46 TsGART, f. 268, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 36-37. 
47 See, for example, “Explanatory note on the summary of operations of 30 September 1931,” addressed to Bauman 
and Manzhara of the Central Asia Bureau, signed by Kalizhniuk (Deputy Head of the Vakhsh Agro-Industrial 
Complex), 5 October 1931, RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2523, ll. 42-43 (full document is ll. 39-44). 
48  Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 62. 
49 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2523, l. 61. 
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In fact, he alleged that eight percent of automobiles experienced significant problems during 
their first run.50 Horses, camels, and donkeys had been available to shipping operations within 
the rugged territory from the start. They transported some commodities all the way from Termez, 
the Amu Darya and rail hub city in southern Uzbekistan. But neither these animals nor the carts 
they occasionally pulled could handle the large heavy cargoes they sometimes received.51 Such 
loads were often critical goods, such as timber and machines. Furthermore, there were never 
enough of the animals on hand to support shipping. Those that were present could rarely meet 
basic norms of productivity (forget the high demands of the project) because imports could not 
even provide them with the standard minimum allotment of five kilograms of imported fodder 
per day. Sources of fodder within the republic were not able to supplement external ones, as 
might be assumed. In 1931, the cereal producing regions closest to the Vakhshstroi were from 
100 to 200 kilometers away from work sites, beyond mountain ridges in Kulob and Hissor, 
accessible by routes that were only traversable (ironically) by pack animals.52 
Later, officials blamed the terrain for the low quality of the Southern Railroad itself. One 
report claimed that “the restless topography of the Vakhsh valley predetermined the profile of the 
[railroad’s] route, and that is why sixty percent of the route consists of curves” having a 
minimum radius of two hundred meters.53 The Vakhshstroi’s dependency on the center 
exacerbated topographical challenges to the construction of railroad. In September of 1931, 
construction was slowed because long-awaited rails that had been shipped from Leningrad were 
                                                
50 The average viability of a repaired car changed drastically by season: four thousand kilometers in the summer and 
winter, and ten thousand during the spring and fall. See RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2523, l. 42; and RGASPI, f. 62, op. 
2, d. 2782, l. 57. 
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through relatively “unknown territory, hard soil, and rugged terrain.” See Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 63. 
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now held up at the port of Termez. Not only were they delayed, but an insufficient number had 
been dispatched as well. “The situation with crossties is even worse,” explained the deputy 
director of the Vakhshstroi. Crossties had to be processed from timber elsewhere, and could not 
be made on location. By September, however, only eight of the two hundred expected 
wagonloads—carrying 120,000 crossties—had arrived at all.54 The pace at which the railroad’s 
basic building blocks were imported slowed work considerably and led managers to improvise 
with what was at hand. 
Anticipating such problems in dire conditions, some engineers and managers had warned 
that the endeavor was too ambitious for this territory, while economists of the State Planning 
Committee (Gosplan) of the USSR called it “financially irrational” on the same grounds.55 
Supporters of Vakhshstroi ignored them, and instead emphasized that it would be implemented 
in a lower foothills region of the republic, and that conditions here were better suited to growing 
Egyptian cotton than almost anywhere else.56 Like post-WWII commentators on the enterprise 
and its vicinity, they claimed that water delivery could be accomplished cheaply because the 
terrain presented minimal technical challenges. To them, it was simply a matter of harnessing the 
momentum of mountainous waters, with no need to build the dams and tunnels necessary 
elsewhere.57 
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But officials who were intimately involved in implementing Vakhshstroi increasingly 
saw transportation as a greater priority than water management. The reasoning was simple: 
building canals and other developments depended on supplies arriving at construction sites. In 
June 1932, Vakhshstroi’s head engineer, Syromiatnikov, qualified his positive assessment of its 
prospects the way economic officials had since before the creation of Tajikistan: “the only 
difficulty is that of connections, both within this enormous territory, and with the outside 
world.”58 Such concerns had turned into lessons for one analyst at a 1933 conference on 
Tajikistan’s economy. 
Vakhshstroi’s experience teaches yet another thing: large jobs should never be launched 
without serious and complete preliminary preparation. This has particular significance for 
distant locales lacking transport infrastructure, a labor force, construction materials, 
foodstuffs, fodder, fuel, power—where there is nothing on site but water and soil, and 
everything else must be brought and distributed and managed. It is clear that the 
fundamental element for the implementation of the preparatory period is the construction 
of transport infrastructure and the organization of transportation. Until this is done, there 
is no point in even initiating preparatory work, to say nothing of basic construction.59 
The analyst captured the central problem of most economic development projects in the new 
Soviet republic: the fundamental contradiction between native material legacy and Soviet 
ambition. His summary of the lived and potential bitter consequences—higher costs of 
construction, massive delays, and rushed, wasteful, low-quality work— characteristically 
excluded attendant human and animal suffering that accompanied such brash enterprises.60 
His criticisms, however, were addressed to the large-scale planners of Gosplan, based 
outside Tajikistan in Moscow. Vakhshstroi officials on site prioritized the Southern Railroad as a 
                                                
58 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2782, l. 48. 
59 Glushkov, “Voprosy irrigatsii v Tadzhikistane,” 146. 
60 The author also pointed out that officials were only beginning to seriously consider using canals for organized 
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lifeline to the larger complex under development; or as Vakhshstroi’s Chief, Tolstopiatov, 
referred to it in September 1932, “the most important nerve” of the entire enterprise.61 When the 
second year of the project began, managers explained that delays in the erection of buildings, and 
general failure to complete sixty percent of goals for that year, was due to transportation 
problems and an incomplete railroad.62 They appealed to the Soviet preference for railroad as a 
means of transportation and requested more related shipping resources on the grounds that they 
might not otherwise meet the new, extended deadline for completing the main canal in the fall of 
1933.63 Syromiatnikov grudgingly lobbied Moscow by appealing to global awareness of 
Tajikistan’s dependency in his bid for a minimum of two locomotives, five new excavator 
buckets, and ninety automobiles. He was openly concerned that the low productivity he 
attributed to not having these things would lead upper-level officials to punish the project by 
withholding promised equipment in future budgeting periods. If they did not receive critical 
means of shipping, he threatened, “do not expect water to run in the main canal by the fall of 
1933, nor [a fruitful] agricultural season for the entire following year.”64 
It was officials like him, on the ground, tasked with implementing the Vakhshstroi 
project, who made the railroad the focus of transportation in southernmost Tajikistan, against the 
intentions of central authorities. Enterprises of all sorts throughout the Vakhsh River region 
prized the growing rolling stock of the Southern Railroad because it helped overcome challenges 
to other forms of mobility. Locomotives, wagons, and excavators animated its rails even as the 
line was being constructed. Shipping agents serving other projects found ways to use these tools 
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of the railway immediately, setting the foundations for regional commodity chain dependence on 
this line. In 1933, the railway owned three steam-powered locomotives, and a growing park of 
platform cars that totaled 118 by 1937. These, with the help of three excavators, allowed the 
railway to do heavy lifting at a scale and pace that other means of shipping could not. They 
expedited distribution of loads of machines, timber, and metalworks to trucks and tractors farther 
up the rails, which in turn made deliveries to farms, towns, or other sites.65 Of course, they 
frequently faced the mobility challenges that I have discussed in earlier chapters, such as 
seasonal runoff, and disorganization of supply-side cargo arrival. When they were able to work 
on their own terms, however, the three locomotives reportedly outperformed expectations at a 
rate of one hundred and twenty-three percent fulfillment.66 These advantages were well-known 
to other regional economic organizations managing various kinds of construction and 
development endeavors, as well as the shipping agents who served many of them. They were 
under the same Stalin-era pressure as Vakhshstroi to exact substantial progress in their respective 
projects. 
Remarkably, these other enterprises found ways of accessing the Southern Railroad while 
it was still under construction. As legs were built, regional shipping operations reorganized to 
take advantage of locomotive hauling capacity. Even the first stretch, a mere sixteen 
kilometers—completed by the original September 1931 deadline for the entire line—
immediately came into use. Locomotives and other devices traveled its rails, hauling materials 
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for many more purposes than its construction alone. They were already busy at work advancing 
larger loads inland from the Amu Darya for transfer to other forms of transportation up the short 
line.67 Officials of all sorts soon came to depend heavily on the railroad as a supplement to other 
transport.68 
Not only did managers of all sorts independently seek ways of using the railroad’s 
capacity in the difficult physical environment of southern Tajikistan. The central shipping 
administration of the republic ordered commodity chain agents to do so. Already in early 1931, 
the Transportation Union (Soiuztrans), the organization responsible for managing shipping 
agencies and activities in Tajikistan, instructed subordinate agencies to plan on updating their 
delivery schedules in a way that incorporated the railroad, and it anticipated the need to 
reorganize administration of shipping with new coordination challenges associated with “mixed” 
shipping that used various means of transportation on water, rail, and road within the southern 
region. It directed hauling organizations to channel traffic headed to southern regions towards the 
railroad.69 
Freightage workers would increasingly access the Southern Railroad using rafts and 
barges that traveled on the Amu Darya from Termez in southern Uzbekistan to Panji Poyon. 
Virtually all of the supply for this region entered the republic through the rail and river hub city 
of Termez. The commodity chains of Tajikistan in the first half of the 1930s were in a state of 
constant restructuring. They relied heavily on semi-autonomous cooperative workgroups (artels) 
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that the USSR had been all but phased out in Russia and elsewhere, including Kazakhstan.70 The 
state generally operated them on the basis of improvised and semi-legal arrangements—whatever 
it took to get the job done. Here, artels serving economic organizations other than Vakhshstroi 
rented access to the Southern Railroad by entering into short-term agreements with its 
administration to pay for transportation services.71 
Soiuztrans’ order instructing the use of the line is significant because its unilateral 
authority over shipping transportation did not officially extend to any railroads. Vakhshstroi, like 
other organizations of this time, engaged in such semi-legal practices as selling its service in 
order to acquire needed supplies, or even cash to pay wages. Shipping organizations, however, 
often failed to compensate Vakhshstroi, and the railroad lost money by providing transportation 
services. Other agencies, if they actually paid up, always paid too little for the service.72 In 
disputes between the railway and its external clients, which were handled by arbitrage courts of 
the Tajikistan’s Council of People’s Commissars (SNK), the arbitrator always found in favor of 
the clients (about funds owing, or other violations of railway laws). This led to greater efforts to 
set contracts in advances of rendering services—which in turn further slowed railway traffic.73 
The confusing, semi-official character of shipping in Tajikistan throughout the decade 
highlights the significance of engaging with real material conditions and operations of 
infrastructure in addition to announcements of their construction and discourses about their 
symbolic value. My engagement with the physical environment discussed in Soviet state sources 
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about economic development promotes an understanding of which local dynamics drove the 
Vakhshstroi and other regional processes, along with a better sense of when. Usage of the 
railroad as it was being constructed is the reason why various accounts—contemporary and 
scholarly—claim that the line began full operations in March of 1932, when it reached the main 
canal. In fact, it only began regular operations after they reached Qurghonteppa sometime in 
mid-1934. Its branch line to Jilikul was only completed in 1935.74 The received periodization of 
the larger agricultural complex is murky. It was originally planned in “stages,” and later accounts 
have variously addressed “phases” of construction, accomplished or delayed. I have not seen any 
of the original planning documents, making it difficult to decipher interpretive claims and what 
stakes they represent. Some things, though, are clear. Vakhshstroi finished building the main line 
of the railroad in 1934, about three years later than desired. In the eyes of managers, this affected 
other aspects of construction, including postponing the opening of the main canal to the fall of 
1933 and the main branch canals to a year later.75 
Over the course of the 1930s, various officials had continued warning that both the 
Vakhshstroi and central Tajikistan administrations were failing to see the significance of the 
railway in republican development, even as it was doing quite a lot of work for them.76 One 
alleged that “the operational potential of the light rail line is much higher than projected, as is 
corroborated by the easy yearly fulfillment of the plan for shipments.”77 Ironically, the Southern 
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Railroad was now a de facto greater service to the wider region than to the complex it was built 
for. Usage of the line by other organizations rose steadily between 1933 and 1936, while it 
decreased somewhat on the part of Vakhshstroi. Unrelated enterprises came to provide the 
majority of the workload for the railroad. Shipping agencies, including those serving timber, fuel, 
and cotton transportation, increasingly used the railroad for operations that had little or nothing 
to do with the Vakhshstroi project itself. Other organizations’ use of the line grew significantly 
between 1934 and 1936, from about a quarter of traffic to a little more than half.78 For this 
reason, an SNK report of 1937 explained that “the narrow gauge railroad of the Vakhsh irrigation 
project, starting in 1933 as a narrowly purposed, secondary concern, grew into an enterprise 
serving the transport needs of the entire Vakhsh valley.”79 
 
The developing geography under Stalin in southern Central Asia 
Tajikistan’s Union for Cooperative Transportation (Promkooptrans), a subsidiary organization of 
Soiuztrans, had anxiously awaited the chance to take advantage of the Southern Railroad during 
planning stages. Its desire to use any potential railroad for commodity transportation in 
Tajikistan in order to expedite shipments was longstanding and had been thwarted before. SNK 
had denied Promkooptrans access to the Termez-Stalinabad Railroad, the first ever in the 
republic, when it was completed in 1929. As a result, the shipping agency had poured its energy 
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into transferring cargo into southern Tajikistan by way of the Amu Darya, also creating the need 
to purchase and maintain watercraft at great expense.80 
SNK and Soiuztrans directives ordering southward passage of commodities were and are 
confusing, even if their main motive was the desire to simplify a complicated shipping regimen. 
Substantial evidence exists of prior and contemporary factors that should have interfered with 
these orders. While shipping to Vakhshstroi and other southern enterprises was explicitly 
directed through the Amu Darya corridor, earlier and larger road transportation projects to the 
north had always been promoted as a way to serve those same, southern regions. Officials who 
lobbied the state for aid to the construction of the Termez-Stalinabad Railroad had emphasized 
that it would enable commodity flows in and out of the developing cotton centers south of the 
capital. The same logic was used to sell the various iterations of the Stalinabad-Qurghonteppa 
road project, finally completed as a one hundred-kilometer highway in 1933. As late as the end 
of 1932, however, Tajikistan’s Soiuztrans continued ordering shipping organizations to move 
commodities slated for the southern regions through Termez, and from there on the Amu Darya 
to the city of Panji Poyon, where they could be transferred to the railroad or other means of 
transportation.81 These directives dismissed the fact that Vakhshstroi, unlike other regional 
enterprises, even had its own dedicated official “supply base” to the north in Stalinabad, in 
addition to ones in Termez and Panji Poyon.82 Soiuztrans warned commodity chain agents 
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serving the grand agro-industrial project that they would be fined if they traveled through the 
capital.83 
The Southern Railroad’s central gravity in the new, roadless republic made it the 
unintended driver of the developing geography of Soviet mobility in the southern regions of 
Tajikistan. Studies of infrastructure show that various kinds of roads, and their auxiliary parts, 
“mediate” social relations of states by facilitating or inhibiting movement, its direction, as well 
as intention and potential.84 Chandra Mukerji explains that “state infrastructure, land use 
practices, and regulations of resources affect the social order in subtle but consequential ways.”85 
Roads like Vakhshstroi’s railway were tools of governance and change, alongside collectivizing 
farms, mass industrial projects, and guns. The story of the Southern Railroad also fits global 
infrastructure patterns because once construction started, its presence irreversibly impacted the 
physical environment of the territory of Tajikistan by creating new, often unpredictable 
opportunities for mobility.86 Mukerji elaborates, pointing out that “built environments exert 
powers, silently changing the ground on which political struggles take place and defining 
conditions of possibility for collective life.”87 
Thus, while roads projects may be initiated with a particular purpose and vision, the real 
interactions, usages, and dependencies it encounters and fosters are not easy to delimit. 
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Vakhshstroi officials’ demands for the means to build and conduct activities on the tracks had 
not officially included plans to serve other organizations. Discourses and theories about land 
transportation infrastructure rarely, however, have actual deterministic power. Roads exist in 
dynamic relation to a constellation of other factors that are often hard to control or anticipate, 
especially in poor regions.88 The Southern Railroad became desirable to enterprises across 
economic sectors because it moved goods more reliably and more cheaply than other forms of 
transportation. Furthermore, Soiuztrans and its brigades of shipping agents saw this railroad as 
an opportunity and made it part of their ever intensifying cargo hauling activities. On southern 
Tajikistan’s rugged terrain, the viability of any enterprise of the region was conditioned by 
material dependency, on access to commodities and transportation infrastructure. 
The stops along the Southern Railroad came to influence the development, regions, and 
directions of these growing networks of intensifying mobility. In fact, M. Saidov goes so far as 
to argue that the narrow gauge railway even opened up regions that were little inhabited.89 Over 
the course of the 1930s, settlements neighboring the line gained prominence through operational 
significance directly related to shipping. For example, a December 1932 inventory commission’s 
plan and geographic schedule of activities identified supply depots of regions primarily by areas 
of development. At that time, they were referred to as the “main site,” the first to sixth work 
zones (prorabstva), the “former second site,” the Stalinabad base, and the Termez base.90  By 
1937, SNK saw the seven key stations of the line extending from Panji Poyon as the “five main 
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regions of the Vakhsh valley.”91 These regions were now defined not only by the railroad 
stations, but also by other loading points like the sites of sidings, as well as by how the material 
and economic character of their regions concerned the railroad as objects of in- and outbound 
mobility. Their stations were now known by names and by their distance from the Amu Darya. 
The regions they served were important in relation to the railroad because of what forms of 
mobility they had available and by what economic organizations would need coordinated 
transportation services. The first region of passage, for example, contained three stations and one 
siding. The Kalniniskaia Station, forty kilometers from the river, was defined by a Cotton Base 
and a Machine and Tractor Station (MTS) office of the same name, and a “newly constructed 
city of Voroshilovsk.” In the next contiguous region by the name of “October,” the railroad 
stopped in the city of Vakhshstroi, which contained a warehouse for seeds, as well as at the 
Tasharabatskii Cotton Base at the sixty-eight kilometer mark. Although October was important 
because of its product, it still lacked access roads, and even a crossing. The Jilikul and 
Qurghonteppa regions consisted of stations and cities by the same names, and were defined by 
robust administrative and material infrastructures, “with all of its [their] organizations, 
institutions, and enterprises.” Qurghonteppa was distinguished by the presence of a cotton gin, a 
mill, and oil storage.92 
The growth of these locations of settlement within the Vakhsh valley was directly related 
to, and co-constitutive of, the growing importance of Termez and Panji Poyon to the Southern 
Railroad. These two Amu Darya port cities became the primary through-points for goods 
traveling in and out of Tajikistan’s southern regions served by the railroad. Their role in the 
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transportation of supplies by river to the republic rose rapidly in 1930 when Soviet agricultural 
development efforts increased in southern regions of the newly independent republic, and they 
came under stresses similar to those affecting other points of rapid economic growth.93 
Despite their roles as commodity destinations and through points, these hub cities shared 
many of the same challenges as areas along the Vakhshstroi line and in the rest of southern 
Tajikistan and Central Asia. Most urgently, their residents faced many of the same dire material 
conditions. Laborers at Termez, Panji Poyon, and throughout the Vakhsh river region lacked 
adequate housing, in addition to facing food and wage shortages, and other privations. 
Throughout the 1930s, though, conditions were worse in the Vakhsh valley. Enterprises there 
never received the thousands of tents and yurts they hoped to obtain to support a starving 
workforce. Officials openly complained that it was difficult to oblige their charges to do difficult 
work if they could not provide them with sustenance, lodging, or basic equipment like boots. A 
Vakhshstroi report of 1936 explained that “of the four hundred qualified carpenters who were 
imported, only one hundred and twenty are employed in their area of specialization, while the 
others do general work as they await the arrival of timber and nails.” These conditions are 
confirmed by Soviet press accounts of how the second stage of the project in 1954 and 1955 
contrasted with material conditions of the first stage. They pointed out that, in the past, much of 
the work of Vakhshstroi had been completed with people’s hands, and that they lived in harsh 
conditions, in tents if they were lucky, and without if they were not.94 
A major cause of these conditions in the Vakhsh River valley was the disarray and pile-
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ups of commodities at hub cities. The physical infrastructure of Termez and Panji Poyon was 
insufficient for the task of managing bulk loads of goods, which often needed reorganization for 
distribution. Construction was a constant feature of these river cities, though it was itself often 
delayed due to a shortage of supplies available to agencies that managed cargo bases themselves. 
In September of 1931, officials were distressed because eighty tons of steel products were piled 
at the Panji Poyon port. These commodities were allegedly a mess because the city lacked the 
timber to build appropriate temporary storage structures. In fact, the docks here were still under 
construction.95 Termez faced the same kinds of problems with holding space throughout the 
decade. In late 1937, the city’s base of Tajikistan Matlubot, a mass commodity provider, still 
lacked rather basic structures to manage the growing amounts of incoming cargo it distributed to 
eighteen MTS points in southern Tajikistan. Explaining that it did not own any dedicated storage 
facilities in Termez, it lobbied the republic’s SNK for an open shed structure (covered by 
canopy) to use as storage for timber and manufactured goods, and it also requested a storage yard 
that had a basement warehouse.96 
The changing geography of commodity chain infrastructures extending from southern 
Uzbekistan to the outer reaches of the Vakhsh valley could not keep pace with the material needs 
of Soviet economic ambitions. At the Termez and Panji Poyon ports, transferring cargo between 
different types of transportation was a complicated affair that required more than the 
coordination of laborers and rafts and automobiles and animals. As the size and number of total 
shipments grew through the 1930s, hauling organizations acquired greater numbers of offloading 
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platforms, docks, lots, and storage facilities that need to be connected by such infrastructures as 
service roads and railroads, as well as bridges. All of these structures, and the growing number of 
people, animals, and machines that traveled them also required constant support—in the form of 
materials, cash, and credit—and maintenance in order to remain viable.97 
The consequences of insufficient infrastructure to manage goods at the hubs were smaller 
reflections of greater problems further down the commodity chain. As late as 1937, the Southern 
Railroad had few buildings with which to house either the administration or the laborers of the 
railroad. Vakhshstroi’s head engineer at the time explained that “there had been no special 
construction of office, residential, or warehouse buildings” because of a belief that this would 
serve rapid railway construction and usage and the rapid start-up of Vakhshstroi. Of the two 
departmental office buildings it planned to construct in Panji Poyon, only one was started, and 
still only thirty percent complete by then.98 A more important operational problem was the fact 
that the railroad point Panji Poyon had to share a single telephone line, established in 1931, with 
other enterprises of the Vakhsh valley involved in “construction, development, the railroad, etc.” 
According to regulations, its intended use to allow for various enterprises representatives to 
report to head officials in the valley or in the capital according to a regular schedule. Railway 
and port officials requested a dedicated line because they were concerned that sharing one was 
making it difficult to effectively operate loading and offloading at the river, hauling on the 
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railway, and coordinating operations with other agencies and activities throughout the region.99 
The material conditions of shipping in the ports and on the railroad are important because 
officials believed they were a key cause of equally great problems in labor and administration of 
logistics. At Termez, Panji Poyon, and regions of the railroad, the laborers were seen as more 
prone to delinquent behavior. As in the case of transportniki I discussed in Chapter 3, officials 
involved in Vakhstroi were concerned that there were few options for improving the situation 
since it was hard to reprimand people working in these critical transit spaces.100 
Shipping personnel at the river hubs had influence within the region that was in many 
ways far greater than officially accorded. They worked in sites where power was as diffused as 
the rest of the commodity distribution system. No higher authorities had clear consistent control 
of traffic. In fact, several shipping organizations had local hub offices with exclusive juridiction 
and use of their own, or shared, docks, storage facilities, and equipment.101 
Central Tajikistan authorities in Stalinabad knew about such problems and worked to 
exert authority on southern economic development and shipping. In 1935, Tajikistan’s SNK 
deployed a representative to investigate activities at Termez and Panji Poyon. This Comrade 
Liubman’s assessments and recommendations showed that many of the same problems persisted 
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through the decade. They also suggested that some of the problems had been perpetuated by a 
lack of responsiveness, or ability to respond, on the part of officials in Stalinabad. He called for 
improved material conditions in general, and for expanding service roads and rail connections, 
and addressing fleets of watercraft in disrepair. But in late 1935, he lamented that such 
recommendations, “to date, have not received a response.”102 The next priority, for Liubman, was 
establishing a clear hierarchy of authority among various agencies. He argued that pile-ups could 
only end if his employers were to appoint a single official empowered to manage logistics at 
hubs.103 “It may be that the carelessness of local organizations with respect to shipments headed 
for southern Tajikistan have something to do with” the lack of clear authority and the fact that 
higher officials would only visit temporarily. 
His observations corresponded to the fact that Vakhshstroi and other enterprises 
throughout the Vakhsh valley tried to overcome confusion at hubs by appealing to abstract, 
Stalinist structures of authority. Their officials commonly wrote their Termez and Panji Poyon 
bases to ensure, restart, or plan shipments to points beyond the railroad.104 In the fall of 1931, for 
example, Vakhshstroi’s Director of Supply, based in Qurghonteppa, expressed concerns about 
the lack of cargo and fuel reaching work “sites and farms.” In his view, the problem could be 
solved through better coordination by the complex’s supply base at Panji Poyon and a more 
effective deployment of means of transportation to Termez for loading. The director’s instruction 
to the manager of the supply base, however, revealed the considerable influence that came with 
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controlling traffic. He patronized his subordinate by pointing out that surely his Panji Poyon 
operation also was lacking supplies and by pointing out that slow imports were also slowing 
down the construction of the railroad. His rather specific instructions furthermore demonstrated 
the fragility of commodity chains between Termez and Vakhshstroi sites. He ordered that 
shipments must travel fourteen kilometers by rail, at which stage they should be picked-up by 
“inbound automobiles, carts, or tractors carrying cargo.” These, he underlined, should never 
travel without additional fuel cargo. The security of shipments, meanwhile, was to be ensured by 
notifying the Qurghonteppa office of the name of the cargo driver and the kinds of things he was 
towing.105 
Liubman’s reporting indicated that disorderly shipments and commodity pile-ups at ports 
still persisted years later. For him, operations at Termez were influential in the continuing and 
profound disorder that also pervaded daily operations of the local Party organization and 
agencies of various sectors of the economy.106 The result was congestion of various kinds of 
cargo. During one expedition there, “shipments headed to southern Tajikistan accumulated in 
very significant amounts.” In addition to the more than 1,200 cubic meters of cereals and other 
commodities, the amount of timber destined for Vakhshstroi had grown from three thousand to 
five thousand cubic meters in just five days.107 The solution, in Liubman’s view, was always the 
imposition of greater authority. “In order to unify and manage all of the Tajik SSR’s 
organizations that are active in Termez, I request that the TsK KP (b) of Tajikistan send a 
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permanent representative to Termez.” The Tajikistan SNK had received similar 
recommendations from the Termez Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Uzbekistan SSR. What they perceived to be a growing problem “threatens to entirely cut off the 
planting campaigns in regions of southern Tajikistan supplied through Termez.”108 
Liubman was well-placed to comment on systemic problems because he was also 
empowered with managing shipping for the SNK at Panji Poyon. Since his employers did not 
grant his request for the centralization of authority in southern Tajikistan’s commodity chains, he 
was forced to engage in local shipping practices according to norms that existed in the absence of 
clear authority, order, and infrastructure. Some of these problems were material. He complained 
that he had no means to effectively communicate with the regions he directed shipments to. His 
radio frequently failed. And he still lacked permission to travel by boat throughout the region 
under his purview.109 
More importantly, this dedicated cadre became involved with illegal, “expediter” 
shipping agents. These tolkachi, as I explained in Chapter 3, were couriers commonly used by 
Soviet enterprises to overcome shortages and ensure acquisition of needed capital. Their 
activities and employment were neither avoidable nor legal (because they were unplanned).110 At 
a time when the command economy was taking shape, Vakhshstroi’s administration evidently 
resented the anxiety caused by the unofficial expectation that it conduct such illegal economic 
practices because of the official rebukes it drew and the added stresses it caused. In 1931, the 
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Central Asia Bureau ordered Tajikistan’s Procurator to punish the “individuals” responsible for 
illegally couriering three excavators meant for Chirchikstroi, in Tashkent, to Vakhshstroi.111 The 
success of expeditions to seek animal transportation was equally dire in the early years, as 
attempts to purchase thousands of horses from agencies throughout Central Asia often came up 
short.112 A 1932 report complained, that “the enterprise has exhausted all legal options available 
for rapid acquisition of locomotives.”113 While Liubman’s messages to SNK revealed a strong 
sense for how to improve efficiency of commodity chains, he himself saw no alternative to 
engaging in such unauthorized practices. In a message to a colleague in Panji Poyon, he 
promised that he would secure a shipment of timber and cement, but his conscience led him to 
warn that such practices “will in no way serve to establish Vakhshstroi.”114 
Liubman had been concerned with the apparent randomness with which supplies arrived 
at Vakhshstroi sites, and he believed that the practice of making such special, illegal efforts for 
single hauls was causing delays in the project. To him, pile-ups and shortages were often caused 
by the informal economy of expediter shipping which involved many unplanned and 
unannounced shipments. These included large “shipments of migrants” who had traveled 
according to informal agreements with expeditors.115 The Vakhshstroi, like many other projects, 
was not successful at attracting Central Asians to the construction endeavor or to the collective 
farms. Peterson explains that “the same problems that plagued ‘Magnitka’—constant 
replacement of the administration in the early years, huge labor turnover, difficult working 
conditions—plagued Vakhsh, only magnified. If Russians and Ukrainians felt that the Urals were 
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the end of the earth, one can only imagine how they felt about Tajikistan, a region that had 
difficulty retaining even committed party officials.”116 Expediters were key participants in the 
“recruitment” of labor from other parts of the USSR, yet their activities contributed to massive 
ineffectiveness in some sectors while allaying it in others. 
Despite these difficult, complicated circumstances, increasing shipments were 
nevertheless making it to their Vakhsh valley destinations, if not always in a manner desired by 
recipients. In murky, Soviet terms (reproduced in post-Soviet publication), Vakhshstroi’s 
material impact on the region during the 1930s could be measured as “thirty million cubic meters 
of earth works, the laying of forty thousand cubic meters of concrete or steel reinforced concrete, 
twenty-two thousand cubic meters of timber construction,” along with “many” buildings and 
roads of various sorts—the result of an investment of some one hundred and fifty-three million 
rubles.117 Thanks to the Vakhsh Railroad, shipping organizations had built a constellation of 
infrastructures to enable the transportation of commodities to sites where the built environment 
of the state economy was changing rapidly. Soviet figures point to the economic significance of 
the region, suggesting that it was responsible for fourteen percent of Tajikistan’s economic 
productivity by the early 1940s, after Stalinabad and Leninabad oblasts (regions).118 
 
Conclusion 
The evolving realities of mobility and its impact on economic growth in the Tajik SSR resulted 
in higher-level agencies transferring management of the Vakhsh Railroad to the republican SNK 
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in the spring of 1937.119 The move was an outcome of shipping and other economic 
organizations participating in an interdepartmental meeting headed by SNK and Gosplan 
Tajikistan. These agencies agreed that centralized ownership would lead to better usage the 
railway, helping to overcome difficulties of fulfilling their shipping quotas using other means of 
transportation.120 An SNK resolution justifying its acquisition of authority explained that 
Vakhshstroi’s administration, always considering the railway as secondary to its purposes, had 
never conducted proper and needed repairs and had failed to add to its rolling stock. As a result, 
the accusation went, the railway was now in rather poor condition and was failing to fulfill 
growing needs.121 The resolution passed, and the commission set out plans to enact significant 
repairs on the railroad in order to “avoid accidents, as well as to calculate the [true] traffic 
capacity of the road.”122 The executive institution justified the decision using language about 
technical issues similar to that used in the construction of the other roads discussed in Chapters 
1, 2, and 4, which obscured the complicated history of environmental management related to the 
line.  They blamed the failing Vakhshstroi for the low quality of the railroad, and for not properly 
serving the transport needs of other organizations, whose right to use the tracks was ambiguous. 
This chapter’s analysis the 1930s history of the Vakhsh Railroad demonstrates the 
importance of examining regional economic growth in the USSR by asking what was done, 
rather than what was not accomplished. I have argued that although the Vakhshstroi project was 
and is judged to have been a failure, its railroad came to have a regional purpose independent of 
                                                
119 Phoned telegram announcing the 29 March 1937 meeting about the transfer of the Vakhshstroi Railroad to SNK 
Taj SSR to take place in the office of the Chairman of Gosplan Taj SSR, 28 March 1937, TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 
943, l. 1 (full document); and TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, ll. 2-3. 
120 TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, l. 9. 
121 TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, l. 2. 
122 At minimum, the commission estimated that repairs would involve changing about fifty thousand crossties, in 
addition to setting down actual support linings. See TsGART, f. 20, op. 2, d. 943, ll. 4-5. 
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this enterprise. I acknowledge the unplanned importance of the railroad by illuminating how it 
was used and in which ways it was significant to the valley. I ask “what happened?” rather than 
“what was supposed to happen?” or “what did people say happened?” Material phenomena such 
as infrastructures are ideal objects for such inquiry because their existence immediately becomes 
a point of reference for the economic contexts in which they are situated; they have physical 
impact and cannot be undone. Soviet railroads are a good example of this because they were the 
preferred and dominant form of mass transportation. 
For this reason, this study of the Vakhsh Railroad is an example from the periphery that 
has broad methodological relevance to future directions in historical study of the USSR. It does 
not seek to fit the model of center-periphery studies that aim to demonstrate influence of the 
margins on the “metropole.” Rather, this history illuminates dynamics that can inspire 
reconsideration of and elaboration on more familiar narratives—including those of other grand 
Stalin-era projects. Knowledge of the transportation causes and effects of situations on the 
ground can do much to help explain changing conditions, as well as successes and failures. 
Available secondary information on the famous Magnitogorsk iron and steel complex in 
the Ural Mountains region, for example, reveals underexplored implications of roads and 
transportation. Stephen Kotkin gestures at connected issues of mobility and geography and 
points out that that delays in the project coincided with postponements in the construction of the 
145 kilometer-long railway connecting it to Kartaly.123 The larger geographic scale and 
significance of this connection, however, must be derived from reference to other studies. John 
Scott’s memoir about life at Magnitka reveals his view that challenges of transportation on the 
                                                
123 Kotkin also shows that transportation created hierarchies of ethnic and professional communities in 
Magnitogorsk, isolating some from others, while it also prevented proper attention to various services. See, Kotkin, 
Magnetic Mountain, 44-45, 131-37. 
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Karataly railroad—in addition to the lack of connections to major centers—was a specific cause 
of shortages. He furthermore implied that the quality and safety of this connection also affected 
supply problems.124 In fact, studies of transportation under Stalin often conclude that physical 
connections and geographies of Soviet construction were central drivers of the daily experiences 
of economic life. Among the clearest examples was Magnitogorsk’s dependence on the rail 
connections (beyond Karataly, via Troitsk) and coal from the Kuznetsk Basin. The relationship 
could only be sustained by special policy and tariff exceptions.125 Rees explains that planners for 
the Urals- Kuzbass combine ignored warnings of economists who believed that the real 
transportation costs between Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk would be too high. “The official line 
was, ‘the means of transportation on most occasions do not determine the choice of region and 
sites for the construction of iron and steel works. On the contrary, the construction of the 
metallurgical works determines the organization of the corresponding system of transport 
connections.’”126 
In southern Tajikistan, new opportunities for freightage garnered by the Vakhsh Railroad 
literally shaped the geography of economic possibility. A greater knowledge of what, or if, 
actions based in infrastructure on the ground influenced the statements and decisions of planners 
and managers can lead to a better understanding of state-society relationships and their regional 
iterations. In Tajikistan, the SNK’s acquisition of the Vakhsh Railroad may have led to the line’s 
increased productivity. One estimate suggests that freight turnover rose from 5,680 tonne-
                                                
124 John Scott, Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia’s City of Steel, enlarged edition prepared and 
introduced by Stephen Kotkin, orig. pub. in 1942 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 76, 100-102. In 
fact, Kotkin points out that the speed limit on this line in 1930 was just 10 km/hr because of how shoddy it was. 
125 See J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964), 244, 261. 
126 E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 29-30. 
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kilometers in 1938 to 8,466 the following year.127 This statistic alone suggests that new official 
permission for previously improvised activities enabled better functioning of an already 
established geography of shipping and economic growth; alternatively, it may simply reflect a 
more realistic, now official account of railroad usage. 
This history of “Tajikistan’s Turksib” recommends ways of expanding knowledge of the 
Turksib itself. Whereas most of what is known about the original has to do with the period of its 
construction, research into the relationship between the railroad and other economic phenomena 
could promote improved understandings of social change and chronologies across the USSR. As 
J. N. Westwood points out, “the economy of Central Asia was sensibly changed by the 
construction of this line,” although this was not the case until the later in the decade.128 This 
observation of what actually happened inspires new questions. For example, did the delay in the 
usage of the Turksib correlate to the chronology of jams in other economic projects of Central 
Asia? The Great Ferghana Canal venture of 1939-40, for example, is generally attributed to the 
colossal forced efforts (and suffering) of laborers on site. It is the best known of fifty-two 
irrigation projects implemented at roughly the same time in Uzbekistan.129 Extensive irrigation in 
the Ferghana Valley and throughout the republic had, however, been an unsatisfied state 
ambition since the mid-1920s.130 The history of transportation construction and commodity 
chains of the larger region of these projects could illuminate physical dynamics that bore on their 
                                                
127 Nazrulloev, Dorozhnoe stroitel’stvo, 138-39. 
128 Westwood, A History of Russian Railways, 243. 
129 Teichmann, “Canals, Cotton,” 512. 
130 Christian Teichmann, “The Economy of Nationality: Stalinism and Irrigation in Uzbekistan, 1924-1941,” posted 
to the Virtual Semninar on Russian and East European history hosted by the South Ural State and Basel Universities, 
4 September 2007. Accessed at http://isem.susu.ac.ru/archen/wasser_eng/ on 12 August 2015, 10-11 (of pdf 
printout); Jonathan Michael Thurman, “Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 
1876 to Present” (PhD diss., Indiana University, Bloomington, 1999), 203-22; and Peterson, “Technologies of 
Rule,” 451-66. 
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realization, and it may indicate dynamic, collective chronologies that specifying causal 
relationships determining the character and location of completion. 
In the case of the Vakhshstroi railroad, the contrast between its intended relationship to 
the regional economy and its real significance is striking. The unplanned importance of the 
narrow gauge line facilitated a familiar scale of Stalin-era construction by way of unfamiliar 
dynamic relationships among diverse, dispersed economic actors cooperating in material 
exchange. The new itineraries and projects that would come were built on a physical 
environment established in the Vakhsh valley region that bore the legacy of real economic life 
that appears unusual to the historiography of the 1930s.
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CONCLUSION 
 
The central problem of this dissertation is the physical manifestation of the state in the newly 
created territory of Tajikistan. I ask, what was the difference between the Soviet announcement 
that this republic existed, and actually making it so through changes to the physical environment 
of its territory? I find that the grand aspirations of the revolutionary regime depended on the 
arrangement of basic material aspects of economic life. The massive mobilizational projects that 
characterized especially the Stalin era of the 1930s would have been impossible without 
functional transportation and commodity chains—fundamental economic factors in any society. 
Infrastructure and freightage, however, were material phenomena whose establishment and scale 
of presence reflected the implementation of Soviet ambitions, and thereby the degree of the 
establishment of the state. The pursuit of economic growth in Tajikistan had led to permeant 
changes in its physical environment. The Termez-Dushanbe Railroad, the Stalinabad-
Qurghonteppa Highway, and the Vakhshstroi Railroad, along with other structures, made parts of 
the republic’s territory platforms more suited to enterprises contributing to the larger economic 
endeavor of sustaining the project of the Tajik SSR. Growing constellations of roads, combined 
with increasingly complex human, animal, and machine labor of shipping services were 
workscapes of the state. This finding recommends underexplored avenues of analysis for a series 
of problems in Soviet history for which there are currently few explanations. 
One of the least understood issues of the literature is that of persistent delays in the 
completion of projects. A key explanation—just as hard to understand—is that projects were 
delayed because of the fact that economic life was characterized by ubiquitous shortages of all 
forms of capital. Enterprises might be held up because of a lack of construction materials, labor, 
or food for the workers. I have demonstrated that explanations for shortages of capital that were 
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connected to delays of projects are achievable through of analysis of the way that organizations 
obtained their capital. Commodity chains were crucial to this endeavor. The various agents and 
activities that characterized their operations show the manner in which cargo was transported 
from place to place, and why it might have arrived late or not at all. The pace, scale, timing and 
fate of Soviet enterprises dependent on freightage may be better understood through an 
engagement with their ad hoc everyday dynamics. 
The infrastructure upon which transportation was conducted also determined the degree to 
which commodity movement could be achieved. Environmental management of mobility was 
thus a basic problem of Soviet economic growth endeavors, with the potential to set the pace and 
character of historical change.  Railroads, highways, or dirt roads that were poorly constructed 
slowed and stopped traffic. On Tajikistan’s rugged terrain, the quality of most roads was low and 
hard to maintain. Their imperfect surfaces damaged the vehicles, animals, and cargos that 
traveled them, which in turn inhibited flow as well. Roadlessness, moreover, demanded that state 
officials rapidly explore and seek knowledge of Tajikistan’s little understood native environment 
in order to facilitate the building of entirely new routes between settlements that were intended 
for rapid economic growth. The history of infrastructure in Tajikistan, and likely throughout the 
USSR, provides an important window on the interaction between the rhythms of daily 
workscapes in mobility and utopian aspirations for unprecedented levels of real, material change. 
As a foundation of economic and social activity, the transportation sector provides 
opportunities for fuller understandings of Soviet historical change because it engages 
contingencies involved in efforts to implement political and cultural ideals. As I demonstrated, 
the Soviet ideal of the modern mobility as enabled by automotive vehicles was often not feasible 
for transportation management in Tajikistan. Sometimes, routes were not yet sufficiently 
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navigable roads, and in other cases machines would have destroyed what had been constructed. 
The desire to use trucks and tractors in transportation also faced added challenges of commodity 
chains themselves because obtaining adequate supplies of machines from Moscow was difficult. 
Instead, the modern face of transportation in Tajikistan was ungulates. As I demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, horses and camels comprised the means of shipping in the republic, where the regime 
employed modern management to overcome challenges of importation and technology, 
particularly through the institutionalization of breeding infrastructure by the mid-1930s. The 
world of Soviet mobility in 1920s and 1930s Tajikistan, and many other Soviet regions, was 
characterized by animals. 
My analysis of state management of mobility and environment for economic growth in 
Tajiksitan promotes an understanding of Soviet geographic history at odds with idealized cultural 
interpretations focused on modernity and nation. From the perspective of economic life, the 
republic's landscape was characterized by orographic challenges unlike those of any other region 
in the USSR, where real and potential animal and machine labor defined the speed, direction, and 
location of economic activity. The workscapes of shipping, as I demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
mediated the aspirations of planners and the realities of terrain to define rapidly changing 
geographies of settlement and production. Land transportation and commodity chains were thus 
consequential in the realization—indeed, the substantiation—of ambitions defined and implied 
by political geography. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, the existence of a single railroad, from 
Termez to Dushanbe, facilitated the very opportunity for Soviet efforts to commence economic 
growth projects on a desired scale. The outcome of my approach to geography is engaging 
contingency as a daily experience with potentially great consequences. 
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This picture of how the physical environment of Tajikistan changed because of 
transportation and commodity chains also engenders a way to understand how the USSR worked 
as a post-colonial state. The Soviet empire managed the movement of capital through various 
aspects of logistics, which facilitated state management of resources that regional administrations 
needed for economic growth. To this extent, many regions’ relationship to sources of capital was 
a dependent one—extremely so in the case of Tajikistan. The material quality of this reality 
clarifies the apparent paradox of how Soviet authority based in Moscow could have exerted 
continuing influence over the republic’s southern regions where, as I showed in Chapter 3, 
economic operations were characterized by activities that not only deviated from central plans 
and norms, but were frequently illegal in their daily experience. Officials acting on behalf of 
state agencies throughout the USSR often acted in ways that appeared counterproductive and 
even contrary to state aims. The unplanned shipping activities that I analyzed in especially 
Chapters 3 and 5, however, were designed for the survival of individuals and enterprises. They 
were not, based on the evidence, meant to actually derail or sabotage any particular project or 
endeavor of the state. Rather, they were strategies that allowed people to survive conditions of 
profound difficulty as they labored in organizations that ultimately served the state.
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